Finally! It has been quite some time since my last post, but the CFBT-US web site and blog have been attacked twice by hackers WordPress and ISP upgrade issues have been a major challenge and it has taken some time to get things back to normal.
A Big Improvement, But More Work is Needed
The Fire Service in the United States saw a considerable reduction in firefighter line-of-duty deaths in 2009. However, our efforts to improve firefighter safety must persist. Recent events reinforce the need to ensure understanding of practical fire dynamics and have the ability to apply this understanding on the fireground.
Three recent incidents involving extreme fire behavior present an opportunity to examine and reflect on the hazards presented by fires and accumulation of excess pyrolizate and unburned products of combustion in attics and other void spaces.
Minneapolis, MN Residential Fire
At 1130 hours on Saturday, July 3, 2010 Minneapolis firefighters responded to a residential fire at 1082 17th Avenue SE. First arriving companies observed light smoke and flames showing from a two and one-half story wood-frame home. A crew opening up the kneewall on the A/D corner of Floor 3 was trapped on the third floor by rapid fire progress.
Note: Photo by Steve Skar
A department spokesperson indicated that as they opened up the walls “it flashed over on them”. News reports indicated that the blast threw Firefighter Jacob LaFerriere, across the room and that he was able to locate a window, where he exited and dropped to the porch roof, one floor below. Capt. Dennis Mack was able to retreat into the stairwell where he was assisted to the exterior by other crews operating on the fireground (Mathews, 2010; Radomski & Theisen, 2010).
News reports also reported that a witness stated that the “flashover was quite loud and within seconds heavy fire was venting from the attic area” (Mathews, 2010). A later statements by department spokespersons indicated introduction of oxygen when the wall was opened resulted in the flashover (Porter, 2010) and that a burst of flames blew out the south side of the roof (Radomski & Theisen, 2010).
Firefighter Jacob LaFerriere suffered third degree burns on his arms and upper body. Capt. Dennis Mack suffered second degree burns (Radomski & Theisen, 2010) and are as of Sunday, July 4 were in satisfactory condition in the Hennepin County Medical Center Burn Unit.
Harrisonburg, VA Townhouse Fire
On June 24, 2010 Harrisonburg, Virginia firefighters responded to an apartment fire off Chestnut Ridge Drive. First arriving companies encountered a fire in a townhouse style, wood frame apartment. Investigating possible extension into Exposure Bravo, Firefighters Chad Smith and Bradly Clark observed smoke and then flames in the attic. They called for a hoseline, but when the pulled the ceiling, conditions worsened as the room ignited. Both firefighters escaped through a second floor window (head first, onto ladders placed by exterior crews). Four other firefighters were inside Exposure B when the extreme fire behavior occurred. Two received second degree burns, one was treated for heat exhaustion, and the fourth was uninjured (Firehouse.com News, 2010; WHSV, 2020). Department spokespersons indicated that a backdraft occurred when fire gases built up in the attic.
Note: Photo by Allen Litten
Sandwich MA Residential Fire
At around noon on Memorial Day, Sandwich, Massachusetts firefighters responded to a residential fire at 15 Open Trail Road. On arrival they found a 5,000 ft2 (464 m2) wood frame single-family dwelling with a fire on Side C (exterior) with extension into the home. Firefighters Daniel Keane and Lee Burrill stretched a handline through the door on Side A, knocking down the fire and extending the line out onto a deck on Side C. Fire was extending through a void containing a metal chimney flue on the exterior of the building. The crew on the hoseline was making good progress until they hit the soffit with a straight stream and an explosion occurred. The force of the blast knocked the crew over the deck railing and caused significant structural damage. Firefighter Keane suffered fractures of his neck and back while Firefighter Burrill experienced a severely fractured ankle (Fraser, 2010; D LeBlanc personal communication June 2010).
Note: Photos by Britt Crosby (http://www.capecodfd.com/)
Questions
One of these fires occurred in an older home of legacy construction, the other two occurred in relatively new buildings. One was a large contemporary home, likely with an open floor plan and large attic/trussloft voids. The other two occurred in buildings with smaller void spaces in the attic/trussloft.
What is similar about these incidents and what is different?
Based on the limited information currently available, what phenomena do you think occurred in each of the cases? What leads you to this conclusion?
What indicators might have pointed to the potential for extreme fire behavior in each of these incidents?
How might building construction have influenced fire dynamics and potential for extreme fire behavior in these incidents?
What hazards are presented by fires in attics/trusslofts and what tactics may be safe and effective to mitigate those hazards?
Late Breaking Information
Two firefighters and an officer from the Wharton Fire Department were trapped by rapid fire progress in a commercial fire at the Maxim Production Company in Boling, TX on July 3, 2010. The crew had advanced a hoseline into the 35,000 ft2 (3252 m2) egg processing plant to cut off fire extension when they encountered rapidly worsening fire conditions. The two firefighters were able to escape, but Captain Thomas Araguz III was trapped and killed (Statter, D., 2010). More information will be provided on this incident as it becomes available.
It has been a number of months since the last Reading the Fire post. It is essential to continue the process of deliberate practice in order to continue to improve and refine skill in Reading the Fire.
As we start the New Year it is a good time to reaffirm our commitment to mastering our craft. Developing and maintaining proficiency in reading the Fire using the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame) organizing scheme for fire behavior indicators, requires practice. This post provides an opportunity to exercise your skills using a video segment shot during a residential fire.
Residential Fire
In mid-January 2010, the Gary, Indiana Fire Department was dispatched to a residential fire on Massachusetts Street at East 24th Avenue, on arrival Battalion 4 advised of a working fire in a 2 story dwelling. While the first arriving engine was laying a supply line from a nearby hydrant, the first in truck forced entry.
Watch the first 35 seconds (0:35) of the video. This segment was shot from Side A. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators; then answer the following five standard questions?
What additional information would you like to have? How could you obtain it?
What stage(s) of development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
What burning regime is the fire in (fuel controlled or ventilation controlled)?
What conditions would you expect to find inside this building? If presented with persons reported (as the first arriving companies were) how would you assess potential for victim survival?
How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes
Now watch the remainder of the video clip and answer the following questions:
Did fire conditions progress as you anticipated?
A voice heard in the video states that this was a backdraft. Do you agree? Why or why not?
It is likely that the first in truck company in this incident made entry to search for occupants and to locate the fire. Regardless of your perspective on search with or without a hoseline, this video clip provides lessons.
It is essential to read the fire, recognize the stage(s) of fire development and burning regime(s) in the involved compartments.
In addition to reading current conditions, anticipate likely fire development and potential for extreme fire behavior.
Making entry (and leaving the door fully open) creates a ventilation opening (inlet, exhaust, or both). Recognize the potential influence of changes to the ventilation profile on fire behavior.
To borrow a phrase from a number of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Death in the Line of Duty reports; Ventilation and fire attack must be closely coordinated. One key element in this coordination is that charged lines must be in place before completion of ventilation openings. This is critical when dealing with a ventilation controlled fire.
The previous post in this series presented a video clip of an incident on the afternoon of February 18, 2010 that injured four Chicago firefighters during operations at a residential fire at 4855 S. Paulina Street.
First arriving companies discovered a fire in the basement of a 1-1/2 story, wood frame, single family dwelling and initiated fire attack and horizontal ventilation of the floors above the fire. Based on news accounts, the company assigned to fire attack was in the stairwell and another firefighter was performing horizontal ventilation of the floors above the fire on Side C when a backdraft or smoke explosion occurred. Two firefighters on the interior, on at the doorway and the firefighter on the ladder on Side C were injured and were transported to local hospitals for burns and possible airway injuries.
In analyzing the video clip shot from inside a nearby building, we have several advantages over the firefighters involved in this incident.
Time: We are not under pressure to make a decision or take action.
Reduced Cognitive Workload: Unlike the firefighters who needed to not only read the fire, but also to attend to their assigned tactics and tasks, our only focus is analysis of the fire behavior indicators to determine what (if any) clues to the potential for extreme fire behavior may have been present.
Repetition: Real life does not have time outs or instant replay. However, our analysis of the video can take advantage of our ability to pause, and replay key segments, or the entire clip as necessary.
Perspective: Since the field of view in the video clip is limited by the window and the fidelity of the recording is less than that seen in real life, it presents a considerably different field of view than that of the firefighters observed in operation and does not allow observation of fire behavior indicators and tactical operations on Sides A, B, and D.
Initial Size-Up
What B-SAHF indicators could be observed on Side C up to the point where firefighters began to force entry and ventilate the basement (approximately 02:05)?
Figure 1. Conditions at 01:57 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Building: The structure is a 1-1/2 story, wood frame, dwelling with a daylight basement. The apparent age of the structure makes balloon frame construction likely, and the half story on the second floor is likely to have knee walls, resulting in significant void spaces on either side and a smaller void space above the ceiling on Floor 2. One window to the left of the door on Side C appears to be covered with plywood (or similar material). Given the location of the door (and door on Side A illustrated in the previous post in this series), it is likely that the stairway to the basement is just inside the door in Side C and a stairway to Floor 2 is just inside the door on Side A.
Smoke: A moderate volume of dark gray smoke is visible from the Basement windows and windows and door on Floor 1 as well as a larger volume from above the roofline on Side B. While dark, smoke on Side C does not appear to be thick (optically dense), possibly due to limited volume and concentration while smoke above the roofline on Side B appears to be thicker. However smoke on Side C thickens as time progresses, particularly in the area of the door on Floor 1. The buoyancy of smoke is somewhat variable with low buoyancy on Side C and greater buoyancy on Side B. However, smoke from the area of the door on Floor 1 Side C intermittently has increased buoyancy.
Air Track: Smoke on Side C appears to have a faintly pulsing air track with low velocity which is masked to some extent by the effects of the wind (swirling smoke due to changes in low level wind conditions). Smoke rising above the roofline on Side B appears to be moving with slightly greater velocity (likely due to buoyancy).
Heat: The only significant heat indicators are limited velocity of smoke discharge and variations in buoyancy of smoke visible from Sides B and C. Low velocity smoke discharge and low buoyancy of the smoke on Side C points to relatively low temperatures inside the building. The greater buoyancy and velocity of smoke observed above the roofline on Side B indicates a higher temperature in the area from where this smoke is discharging (likely a basement window on Side B).
Flame: No flames are visible.
Initial Fire Behavior Prediction
Based on assessment of conditions to this point, what stage(s) of development and burning regime(s) is the fire likely to be in?
Dark smoke with a pulsing air track points to a ventilation controlled, decay stage fire.
What conditions would you expect to find inside the building?
Floors 1 and 2 are likely to be fully smoke logged (ceiling to floor) with fairly low temperature. The basement is likely to have a higher temperature, but is also likely to be fully smoke logged with limited flaming combustion.
How would you expect the fire to develop over the next few minutes?
As ventilation is increased (tactical ventilation and entry for fire control), the fire in the basement will likely remain ventilation controlled, but will return to the growth stage as the heat release rate increases. Smoke thickness and level (to floor level) along with a pulsing air track points to potential for some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior such as ventilation induced flashover (most likely) or backdraft (less likely). Another possibility, would be a smoke explosion; ignition of premixed gas phase fuel (smoke) and air that is within its flammable range (less likely than some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior)
Ongoing Assessment
What indicators could be observed while the firefighter was forcing entry and ventilating the daylight basement on Side C (02:05-02:49)?
There are few changes to the fire behavior indicators during this segment of the video. Building, Heat, and Flame indicators are essentially unchanged. Smoke above the roofline appears to lighten (at least briefly) and smoke on Side C continues to show limited buoyancy with a slightly pulsing air track at the first floor doorway.
What B-SAHF indicators can be observed at the door on Side C prior to forced entry (02:49-03:13)?
Figure 2. Conditions at 03:06 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Figure 3. Conditions at 03:08 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Building, Smoke, Heat and Flame indicators remain the same, but several more pulsations (03:05-03:13) providing a continuing, and more significant indication of ventilation controlled, decay stage fire conditions.
What indicators can be observed at the door while the firefighter attempts to remove the covering over the window adjacent to the door on Floor 1 (03:13-13:44)?
No significant change in Building, Heat, or Flame Indicators. However, smoke from the doorway has darkened considerably and there is a pronounced pulsation as the firefighter on the ladder climbs to Floor 2 (03:26). It is important to note that some of the smoke movement observed in the video clip is fire induced, but that exterior movement is also significantly influenced by wind.
What B-SHAF indicators do you observe at the window on Floor 2 prior to breaking the glass (03:44)?
Figure 4. Conditions at 03:43 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
The window on Floor 2 is intact and appears to be tight as there is no smoke visible on the exterior. It is difficult to tell due to the angle from which the video was shot (and reflection from daylight), but it would be likely that the firefighter on the ladder could observe condensed pyrolizate on the window and smoke logging on Floor 2. It is interesting to note limited smoke discharge from the top of the door and window on Floor 1 in the brief period immediately prior to breaking the window on Floor 2.
What indicators are observed at the window on Floor 2 immediately after breaking the glass (03:44-03:55)?
Figure 5. Conditions at 03:52 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
No significant changes in Building, Heat, or Flame indicators. Dark gray smoke with no buoyancy issues from the window on Floor 2 with low to moderate velocity immediately after the window is broken.
What B-SAHF indicators were present after the ventilation of the window on Floor 2 Side C was completed and 04:08 in the video clip (03:44-04:08)?
Buoyancy and velocity both increase and a slight pulsing air track develops within approximately 10 seconds. In addition, the air track at the door on Floor 1 shifts from predominantly outward with slight pulsations to predominantly inward, but with continued pulsation (possibly due to the limited size of the window opening on Floor 2, Side C.
Anticipating Potential Fire Behavior
Unlike the firefighters in Chicago who were operating at this incident, we can hit the pause button and consider the indicators observed to this point. Think about what fire behavior indicators are present (and also consider those that are not!).
Initial observations indicated a ventilation controlled decay stage fire and predicted fire behavior is an increase in heat release rate with potential for some type of extreme fire behavior. Possibilities include ventilation induced flashover (most likely) or backdraft (less likely), or smoke explosion (less likely than some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior).
Take a minute to review the indicators of ventilation controlled, decay stage fires as illustrated in Table 1.
Table 1. Key Fire Behavior Indicators-Ventilation Controlled, Decay Stage Fires
Which of these indicators were present on Side C of 4855 S. Paulina Street?
Building: The building appeared to be unremarkable, a typical single family dwelling. However, most residential structures have more than enough of a fuel load to develop the conditions necessary for a variety of extreme fire behavior phenomena.
Smoke: The dark smoke with increasing thickness (optical density) is a reasonably good indicator of ventilation controlled conditions (particularly when combined with air track indicators). Lack of buoyancy indicated fairly low temperature smoke, which could be an indicator of incipient or decay stage conditions or simply distance from the origin of the fire. However, combined with smoke color, thickness, and air track indicators, this lack of buoyancy at all levels on Side C is likely an indicator of dropping temperature under decay stage conditions. This conclusion is reinforced by the increase in buoyancy after ventilation of the window on Floor 2 (increased ventilation precipitated increased heat release rate and increasing temperature).
Air Track: Pulsing air track, while at times quite subtle and masked by swirling smoke as a result of wind, is one of the strongest indications of ventilation controlled decay stage conditions. While often associated with backdraft, this indicator may also be present prior to development of a sufficient concentration of gas phase fuel (smoke) to result in a backdraft.
Heat: Velocity of smoke discharge (air track) and buoyancy (smoke) are the only two heat indicators visible in this video clip. As discussed in conjunction with smoke indicators, low velocity and initial lack of buoyancy which increases after ventilation is indicative of ventilation controlled, decay stage conditions.
Flame: Lack of visible flame is often associated with ventilation controlled decay and backdraft conditions. However, there are a number of incidents in which flames were visible prior to occurrence of a backdraft (in another compartment within the structure). Lack of flames must be considered in conjunction with the rest of the fire behavior indicators. In this incident, lack of visible flames may be related to the stage of fire development, but more likely is a result of the location of the fire, as there is no indication that flames were present on Side C prior to the start of the video clip.
What Happened?
Firefighters had entered the building for fire attack while as illustrated in the video clip, others were ventilating windows on Side C. It is difficult to determine from the video if a window or door at the basement level on Side C was opened, but efforts were made to do so. A window on Floor 2 had been opened and firefighters were in the process of removing the covering (plywood) from a window immediately adjacent to the door on Floor 1. At 04:12, an explosion occurred, injuring two firefighters on the interior as well as the two firefighters engaged in ventilation operations on Side C.
Starting at approximately 03:59, velocity of smoke discharge from the window on Floor 2 Side C increases dramatically. At 04:08 discharge of smoke begins to form a spherical pattern as discharged from the window. This pattern becomes more pronounced as the sphere of smoke is pushed away from the window by increasing velocity of smoke discharge at 04:12, immediately prior to the explosion. Velocity of smoke discharge at the door increases between 03:59 and -4:12 as well, but as the opening is larger, this change is less noticeable. As pressure increases rapidly during the explosion a whooshing sound can be heard. After the explosion, there was no noticeable increase in fire growth.
Figure 6. Conditions at 04:08 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Figure 7. Conditions at 04:09 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Figure 8. Conditions at 04:10 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Figure 9. Conditions at 04:11 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Figure 10. Conditions at 04:12 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Figure 11. Conditions at 04:13 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip
Based on observation of fire behavior indicators visible in the video clip, we know that a transient extreme fire behavior event occurred while a crew was advancing a hoseline on the interior and ventilation operations were being conducted on Side C. What we dont know is what firefighting operations were occurring on the other sides of the building or in the interior. In addition, we do not have substantive information from the fire investigation that occurred after the fire was extinguished.
The Ontology of Extreme Fire Behavior presented in an earlier post classifies these types of phenomena on the basis of outcome and conditions. As a transient and explosive event, this was likely a backdraft or smoke explosion. In that this occurred following entry and during ongoing ventilation operations, I am inclined to suspect that it was a backdraft.
Indicators visible on Side C provided a subtle warning of potential for some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior, but were likely not substantially different from conditions observed at many fires where extreme fire behavior did not occur.
As the title of the wildland firefighting course S133 states; Look Up, Look Down, Look Around! Anticipation of fire development and extreme fire behavior requires not only recognition of key indicators, but that these indicators be viewed from a holistic perspective. Firefighters and/or officers performing a single task or tactical assignment may only see part of the picture. It is essential that key indicators be communicated to allow a more complete picture of what is occurring and what may occur as incident operations progress.
Updated March 7, 2010 with Longer Video Clip of this Incident
On the afternoon of February 18, 2010, firefighters in Chicago responded to a residential fire at 4855 S. Paulina Street. First arriving companies discovered a fire in the basement of a 1-1/2 story, wood frame, single family dwelling and initiated fire attack and horizontal ventilation of the floors above the fire.
Based on news accounts, the company assigned to fire attack was in the stairwell and another firefighter was performing horizontal ventilation of the floors above the fire on Side C when a backdraft or smoke explosion occurred. Three firefighters on the interior and the firefighter on the ladder on Side C were injured and were transported to local hospitals for burns and possible airway injuries.
Figure 1. Consider Key Fire Behavior Indicators
B-SAHF Indicators
Recognizing subtle fire behavior indicators during incident operations can be difficult and important indicators are often only visible from one location (other than where you are). What Building, Smoke, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF) indicators would you anticipate seeing if potential backdraft conditions exist (or may develop as the incident progresses)? How would this differ from the indicators that conditions may present risk of a smoke explosion?
For more information on key fire behavior indicators related to ventilation controlled burning regime, decay stage fires, backdraft, and smoke explosion, see the following posts:
A video of the incident at 4855 S. Paulina Street was recently posted on YouTube (a shorter version is posted on Firevideo.net). It appears that the video may have been shot through a window by an occupant of the D2 exposure. The title of this video is Chicago Smoke Explosion. After watching the video and answering the questions posed in this post, do you think that this was a backdraft or smoke explosion? Why?
One of the great assets of using video as a learning tool is the ability to stop the action and go back to review key information. Watch the video and stop the action as necessary to answer the following questions
Pause at 02:05. What B-SAHF indicators could be observed on Side C up to this point in the video clip?
Pause at 02:49. What indicators could be observed while the firefighter was forcing entry and ventilating the daylight basement on Side C?
Pause at 03:13. What B-SAHF indicators can be observed at the door on Side C prior to forced entry?
Pause at 03:35. What indicators can be observed at the door after forcing the outer door (prior to ventilation of the window on Floor 2)?
Pause at 03:44. What B-SHAF indicators do you observe at the window on Floor 2 prior to breaking the glass?
Pause at 03:55. What indicators are observed at the window on Floor 2 immediately after breaking the glass?
Pause at 04:08. What B-SAHF indicators were present after the ventilation of the window on Floor 2 Side C was completed and 04:08 in the video clip?
After answering the questions, watch the complete clip. Do you think that this was a backdraft or smoke explosion? If you thought that this was a backdraft: Did you see potential indicators? If so what were they? If not, why do you think that this was the case? If you think that this was a smoke explosion, what indications lead you to this conclusion? What indicators were present?
You may want to watch this video clip several times and give some thought to what factors were influencing the B-SAHF indicators (particularly smoke, air track, and heat). Were these indicators consistent with your perception of backdraft indicators? Is so, how? If not, what was different? What indicators may have been visible from other vantage points. Remember that the video provides a view from a single perspective (and one that is considerably different than the crews working at this incident).
The next post in this series will take a closer look at the video and key fire behavior indicators.
As discussed in the previous posts in this series, military battle drills are an immediate response to enemy contact that requires fire and maneuver in order to succeed. Battle drills are initiated with minimal commands from the unit leader. Soldiers or marines execute preplanned, sequential actions in response to enemy contact (see Figure 1).
Figure 1. Battle Drill
Battle Drill Part 2 addressed the appropriate reaction of a team of firefighters on a primary hoseline when confronted with rapidly worsening fire conditions that are not readily controllable once they occur (e.g., flashover, wind driven fire conditions). As when a military unit is ambushed, the fire and maneuver of battle drill involves more than one weapon. This post will address the role and reaction of backup lines in the extreme fire behavior battle drill.
Backup Lines
Once a hoseline has been deployed for fire attack it is good practice to stretch a backup line. Klaene and Sanders (2008) observe that backup lines are needed to protect the crew on the initial attack line and to provide additional flow if needed (p. 216). Unfortunately, many firefighters see the backup line as simply another attack line and miss the first and primary function of this hoseline to protect crews on primary hoselines.
The first priority in fire attack operations is to get a hoseline in position to apply water effectively to the fire. To this end, hoselines are deployed in series (attack line first, then backup line) not in parallel, where both lines are attempting to advance and maneuver in the same space. The crew of the backup line can often assist in pulling up additional hose for the attack line (particularly when crews are lightly staffed). As illustrated in Figure 2, the backup line is positioned to protect the means of egress and if necessary support fire attack.
Figure 2. Attack and Backup Line Placement
Extreme Fire Behavior Battle Drill
As discussed in Battle Drill Part 2, the thermal insult experienced in an extreme fire behavior event is dependent on temperature (of gases and compartment linings) and flow of hot gases. The higher the temperature and faster the speed of gas flow, the higher the heat flux. Survival requires that crews on hoselines extinguish or block the flames, cool hot gases, and maneuver out of the flow path to a point of egress or area of safer refuge.
Crews engaged in fire attack or search are often first to encounter rapidly deteriorating fire conditions. Hose Handling and Nozzle Technique Drill 8 outlined the immediate actions that should be taken to support a tactical withdrawal under severe fire conditions. In these circumstances, the crew staffing the backup line has a critical role in supporting withdrawing crews.
Fire conditions that are beyond the capability of a single hoseline may be controlled by the higher flow rate from multiple lines. As noted by Klaene and Sanders (2008) one of the functions of backup lines is to provide additional flow if needed (p. 216). The attack line and backup line operating in a coordinated manner may be able to control fire conditions and allow continuation of fire attack. If this is the case, these lines should be reinforced by deployment of one or more additional backup lines.
If fire conditions cannot be controlled, and the attack line must be withdrawn while maintaining water application to protect the crew, the crew on the backup line can aid in withdrawal of attack and/or search hoselines. If the hoseline is not withdrawn as the firefighter on the nozzle retreats, the hose may kink or become exposed to flames (either of which may result in loss of water supply to the nozzle).
While the attack or search crew is likely to be first to encounter worsening fire conditions, this is not always the case. Depending on fire location and building configuration, fire spread may cut off the attack or search line from behind. In this situation, the backup line becomes the primary means of defense for operating crews.
Regardless of how deteriorating conditions develop, safe and effective tactical withdrawal requires a coordinated effort between interior crews and as soon as possible, report of conditions to Command and if necessary transmit a Mayday message.
Drill 9-Extreme Fire Behavior Battle Drill-The Backup Line:Key hose handling and nozzle techniques when faced with extreme fire behavior are the ability to apply long pulses of water fog or maintaining a continuous flow rate while maneuvering backwards. However, the backup line may initially need to advance to support fire attack, and then if necessary cover and support other crews as they withdraw.
Skill in operation and maneuver of a single hoseline is a foundational firefighting skill. However, in the extreme fire behavior battle drill, coordinated operation of the attack and backup line is essential, making Hose Handling & Nozzle Technique Drill 9 an important step in skill development.
References
Klaene, B. & Sanders, R. (2008) Structural Firefighting Strategy and Tactics (2nd ed.). Sudbury, MA: Jones & Bartlett.
As discussed in the last post in this series, military battle drills are an immediate response to enemy contact that requires fire and maneuver in order to succeed. Battle drills are initiated with minimal commands from the unit leader. Soldiers or marines execute preplanned, sequential actions in response to enemy contact.
This post discusses application of the battle drill concept in training firefighters to react appropriately on contact with our enemy (the fire) which requires fire (application of water) and maneuver (movement to a safer location) in order to succeed.
Remember: The key elements of a battle drill are fire and maneuver! This requires the ability to operate and maintain control of the hoseline while moving backward.
Working Without a Hoseline
In the United States, it is common for some companies working on the fireground to operate inside burning buildings without a hoseline (particularly when performing search). While common, this practice places firefighters at considerable risk when faced with extreme fire behavior. Without a hoseline your only defense against rapid fire progress is recognition of developing conditions and immediate reaction to escape to a safer location (see video below); which is not always possible. In some cases, firefighters fail to recognize developing conditions or the speed with which conditions will change. In other cases, firefighters are unable to escape or take refuge outside the flow path of hot gases and flames quickly enough.
Cl
If your department’s operational doctrine includes companies working on the interior without a hoseline (or without being directly supported by a hoseline), it is essential that firefighters are trained to 1) recognize early indicators of potential for extreme fire behavior and 2) maintain a high level of awareness regarding locations which may provide an area of refuge. When confronted by rapidly worsening conditions, action to escape must be immediate and without hesitation.
Extreme Fire Behavior Battle Drill
Regardless of their assignment (e.g., fire attack, primary search), firefighters with a hoseline have a solid means of maintaining orientation, a defined primary escape route, and the ability to actively control the fire environment through application of water. However, as always, safe and effective operation in the fire environment is dependent on a solid size-up, dynamic risk assessment, maintenance of a high level of situational awareness, and proactively controlling the fire environment. The best way to deal with extreme fire behavior is to avoid it or prevent it from occurring. For more information on reading the fire and key fire behavior indicators related to potential for extreme fire behavior, see:
In situations where you were unable to recognize potential for extreme fire behavior or you have been unable to control the fire environment, immediate action is required!
This is my nozzle, there are many like it but this one is mine. My nozzle is my best friend. It is my life. I must master it as I master my life. Without me it is useless, without my nozzle I am useless.
I will use my nozzle effectively and efficiently to put water where it is needed. I will learn its weaknesses, its strengths, its parts, and its care. I will guard it against damage, keep it clean and ready. This I swear.
As stated in the first paragraph of this adaptation of the United States Marine Corps Riflemans’ Creed, Without my nozzle I am useless.
The extent of thermal insult experienced in an extreme fire behavior event is dependent on both radiant and convective heat flux. Total radiant heat flux is dependent on temperature (of gases and compartment linings) and flow of hot gases. The higher the temperature and faster the speed of gas flow, the higher the heat flux. These scientific concepts drive the key elements of the extreme fire behavior battle drill. Extinguish or block the flames, cool hot gases, and maneuver out of the flow path to a point of egress or area of safer refuge.
Drill 8-Extreme Fire Behavior Battle Drill:Key hose handling and nozzle techniques when faced with extreme fire behavior are the ability to apply long pulses of water fog or maintaining a continuous flow rate while maneuvering backwards. This requires a coordinated effort on the part of the nozzle operator, backup firefighter, and potentially other firefighters working on the hoseline or at the point of entry.
While this drill focuses on single company operations, it is important to extend this training to include crews operating backup lines. The importance, function, and operation of the backup line will be the focus of the next post in this series.
Not all That is Learned is Taught
When training to operate in a hazardous environment, avoid the mindset that it’s only a drill. As often observed, you will play the way that you practice. Extreme stress can activate inappropriate routine responses. For example, a Swedish army officer suddenly stood up while his unit was under fire while engaged in peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia. When asked about this response, he explained that in training, he often stood up while leading exercises (Wallenius, Johansson, & Larsson, 2002).
“A simple set of skills , combined with an emphasis on actions requiring complex and gross motor muscle operations (as opposed to fine motor control), all extensively rehearsed, allows for extraordinary performance levels under stress” (Grossman, 2008, p. 38).
When developing skill in nozzle technique and hose handline, and in particular the critical skills required to effectively perform this extreme fire behavior battle drill, it is essential to maintain critical elements of context such as appropriate use of personal protective equipment, position, and technique.
Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO
References
Grossman, D. (2008). On-combat: The psychology and physiology of deadly conflict in war and peace. Millstadt, IL: Warrior Science Publications.
Wallenius, C. Johansson, C. & Larsson, G. (2002). Reactions and performance of Swedish peacekeepers in life-threatening situations. International Peacekeeping, 9(1), 133-152.
At a formal dinner on 23 January 2010, Chief Ed Hartin was recognized as an honorary member of Company 1 Germania of the Valdivia, Chile Fire Department. In addition, he was awarded a commendation for supporting the ongoing professional development of the members of Company 1 Germania of the Valdivia, Chile Fire Department and encouraging them in their efforts to share their knowledge with Chiles fire service.
Commendation for Support of Company 1 Germania
Left to Right: Teniente Juan Esteban Kunstmann, Chief Ed Hartin, Capitn Francisco Silva V.
On 24-27 January 2007, the Company 1 Germania of the Valdivia, Chile Fire Department hosted the first international fire service congress to be held in South America. Participants included over 150 firefighters and officers from Chile, Peru, Argentina, and the United States. The congress provided an opportunity to participate in both classroom and hands-on workshops on a wide range of fire service topics including fire behavior, ventilation, search, rapid intervention, technical rescue, and extrication. While topical areas were diverse, the congress had a substantive emphasis on compartment fire behavior with lectures presented by CFBT-US Chief Instructor Ed Hartin and Geraldo Crespo of Contraincendio in Buenos Aires, Argentina and practical training sessions conducted by Ed Hartin and Juan Esteban Kunstmann of the Valdivia Company 1 Germania.
Lecture Presentation
Lecture presentations by CFBT-US Chief Instructor Ed Hartin included (click on the links for a copies of the presentations):
CFBT practical skills sessions were held at the Valdivia Fire Departments training center and focused on developing basic skill in nozzle technique and understanding fire development in a compartment.
This is My Nozzle! There are many like it, but this one is mine
Center: Ed Hartin
Practicing Nozzle Techniques
Right: Teniente Juan Esteban Kunstmann
International Collaboration
Left to Right: Battalion Chief Danny Sheridan, FDNY and Capitn Giancarlo Passalacqua Cognoro, Lima, Pe?u Cuerpo General de Bomberos Voluntarios
Congratulations to the members of Company 1 Germania for their success with the first Congreso Internacional Fuego y Rescate! I look forward to working with these outstanding fire service professionals in their ongoing efforts to learn and share knowledge with the fire service throughout Chile, Latin America, and the World.
Two recent events in Baltimore, Maryland and Gary, Indiana point to the criticality of recognizing key fire behavior indicators and understanding practical fire dynamics.
Five Firefighters Injured in Baltimore
Early on the morning of Friday, January 15, 2010, the Baltimore City Fire Department was dispatched to a residential fire Southeast Baltimore. First arriving companies observed a row house of ordinary construction with a large volume of smoke and flames issuing from the basement and extending to the first floor.
According to a department spokesperson, the first engine took a line through the front door to the rear kitchen area where crew had some trouble finding the basement stairs. Another engine company went to the rear with a line to the outside stairwell leading to the basement and was just starting down the stairs. The first truck vented some skylights on the roof as well as the front basement windows. As crews were attempting to access the fire, some type of transient extreme fire behavior resulted in flames blowing through the unit and out the front door, rear stairwell, second floor windows, and skylights. The firefighter from the first arriving truck assigned to the roof described the sound of a freight train coming through.
Five firefighters injured as a result of this explosive fire behavior phenomenon were transported to area hospitals. The officer of the first in engine company was admitted to the Bayview Burn Center, where he is listed in stable condition
As always when a video of an incident involving extreme fire behavior is posted to the web, there is ongoing debate about what happened. Was it a backdraft? Was it a flashover? An interesting debate, but the value is not so much in being right, but in understanding how these phenomena occur, what might have happened in this incident, key indicators that may (or may not) be visible in the video, and most importantly how to prevent this from happening to us and the firefighters that we work with!
Flashover: sudden transition to fully developed fire. This phenomenon involves a rapid transition to a state of total surface involvement of all combustible material within the compartment.
Given adequate fuel and ventilation, a compartment fire may reach flashover as it develops from the growth to fully developed stage. However, when fire development is limited by the ventilation profile of the compartment, changes in ventilation will directly influence fire behavior.
For many years firefighters have been taught that ventilation reduces the potential for flashover. However, when a fire is ventilation controlled, heat release rate is limited by the available oxygen. Under these conditions; increasing air supply by creating opening results in increased heat release rate. This increased heat release rate may result in flashover.
If a fire is sufficiently ventilation controlled and a high concentration of excess pyrolizate and unburned flammable products of combustion accumulate in a compartment, the outcome of increased ventilation may be different.
Backdraft: Deflagration of unburned pyrolyzate and combustion products following introduction of air to a ventilation controlled compartment fire and ignition of the fuel/air mixture. This deflagration results in a rapid increase in pressure within the compartment and extension of flaming combustion through compartment openings. Occurrence of this phenomenon requires an atmosphere in which the fuel concentration is too high to deflagrate without introduction of additional oxygen.
Use of this approach may aid in making sense of what may have occurred in the Baltimore incident. But, it is often difficult to classify extreme fire behavior phenomena into discrete, black and white categories. What is the dividing line between a ventilation induced flashover and a backdraft. One key difference may be the speed with which heat release rate increases, but where is the dividing line (see Figure 2)?
Figure 2. The Gray Area.
Keep in mind that while being right is great, it is more important to work through the process of figuring things out to improve your understanding.
Near Miss in Gary
Monday morning January 18, 2010 firefighters in Gary, Indiana were operating at a residential fire at 24th and Massachusetts when they experienced a near miss involving rapid fire progression. Have a look at video of this incident and give some thought to what influenced fire behavior. Also look at the similarities and differences between the extreme fire behavior that occurred in the Baltimore and Gary incidents.
Back on Task!
I have been extremely busy working on a project for the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health and preparing for the International Fire & Rescue Congress in Valdivia, Chile. Next weeks post will provide a quick update on training conducted at the Congress.
After returning from Chile, I will be back on task with examination of the concept of battle drills to develop effective reaction to worsening fire conditions while operating in an offensive mode.
As we start the New Year it is a good time to reaffirm our commitment to mastering our craft. Developing and maintaining proficiency in reading the Fire using the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame) organizing scheme for fire behavior indicators, requires practice. This post provides an opportunity to exercise your skills using a video segment shot during a residential fire.
Residential Fire
Early on the morning of December 23, 2009, the Cheektowaga Police department was dispatched to 305 Highland Drive in Cheektowaga to investigate a 911 call for an unknown type problem. The female caller was screaming, but the dispatcher was unable to determine the nature of the emergency. The first arriving police unit discovered a residential fire with persons trapped, and requested fire response. The police officers rescued a male victim from just inside the door, but fire and smoke conditions prevented them from assisting the other occupants.
The Hy-View Volunteer Fire Company responded with a first alarm assignment and observed flames showing on Side C.
Watch the first 1 minute 10 seconds (1:10) of the video. This segment was shot from Side B at the B/C Corner. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators; then answer the following five standard questions?
What additional information would you like to have? How could you obtain it?
What stage(s) of development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
What burning regime is the fire in (fuel controlled or ventilation controlled)?
What conditions would you expect to find inside this building? If presented with persons reported (as the first arriving companies were) how would you assess potential for victim survival?
How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes
Now watch the remainder of the video clip and answer the following questions:
Did fire conditions progress as you anticipated?
A voice heard in the video states that this was a backdraft. Do you agree? Why or why not?
Hy-View Volunteer Fire Company personnel recovered two female civilian victims from the residents. However, all three victims died as a result of smoke inhalation.
As discussed in prior Reading the Fire posts and the ongoing series examining fire behavior indicators (FBI), using the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame) organizing scheme, developing proficiency requires practice. This post provides an opportunity to exercise your skills using three video segments shot during an apartment fire.
Apartment Fire
At 2235 hours on November 19th the Bethlehem, PA fire department dispatched Engines 6, 9, 7, Ladder 2 & Chief 205 for an apartment fire with persons reported at 1992 Gatewood Lane. On arrival Engine 6 reported a working fire in an end-of-row unit. Tower Ladder (TL) 2 made two vertical ventilation (exhaust( openings in the roof above the fire. Chief 205 requested a second and then third alarm as the fire extended rapidly into the trussloft.
The video segment was shot after TL 2 opened the roof. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators; then answer the following five standard questions?
What additional information would you like to have? How could you obtain it?
What stage(s) of development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
What burning regime is the fire in (fuel controlled or ventilation controlled)?
What conditions would you expect to find inside this building (on floor 2 and in the attic)?
How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes
Crews use a combination of exterior attack (from the tower ladder and the roof) and interior attack from the second floor to control the fire.
Did fire conditions progress as you anticipated?
What concerns would you have about working on the top floor or roof in the involved area?
How did vertical ventilation influence the fire in the trussloft (think about positives and negatives)?
What alternatives to vertical ventilation of this lightweight roof system could be used to control the fire and prevent extension over uninvolved units?
While this incident had a positive outcome, it is important to recognize the potential for collapse of lightweight, engineered structural systems such as truss roof assemblies. Tactical success in one incident is not necessarily a predictor of future success should conditions be different (e.g., duration of fire impingement on structural members prior to arrival, burning regime, changes to the ventilation profile, etc.).
Remember the Past
Line of duty deaths involving extreme fire behavior has a significant impact on the family of the firefighter or firefighters involved as well as their department. Department investigative reports and NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty reports point out lessons learned from these tragic events. However, as time passes, these events fade from the memory of those not intimately connected with the individuals involved. It is important that we remember the lessons of the past as we continue our study of fire behavior and work to improve firefighter safety and effectiveness on the fireground.
November 23, 2006 Firefighter Steven Mitchell Solomon Atlanta Fire Department, Georgia
Firefighter Solomon was working a 24-hour shift on Thanksgiving Day. Shortly after 2000hrs, Atlanta Fire-Rescue dispatched a full first-alarm assignment for a reported fire in an abandoned house. On arrival, companies encountered heavy smoke showing from a boarded-up single-story brick structure. As other crews removed plywood window coverings and forced entry through the front door, the crew of Engine 16 prepared to advance a 1-3/4inch attack line into the house. Firefighter Solomon was on the nozzle as the line was advanced inside. The attack team immediately encountered high temperature and zero-visibility conditions. Within seconds after they entered, the battalion chief arrived, assumed command, and ordered the companies to operate in a defensive strategy. Before the line could be backed out, the interior became enveloped in flames and the 3 firefighters from Engine 16 lost track of each other. Two of the firefighters managed to escape through the front door. Firefighters who were outside saw the silhouette of a firefighter, enveloped in flames, running past the front door and moving toward the rear of the house. The fire was quickly knocked down and crews made entry from both the front and rear to conduct a search. Firefighter Solomon was located almost immediately by a member who was using a thermal imaging camera and several firefighters quickly removed him from the dwelling. He was unconscious and critically burned. When he was found, Firefighter Solomon had removed his helmet, hood, and SCBA facepiece. One boot was also missing. Although he received immediate treatment from firefighter/paramedics on the scene and was transported within minutes to a level-one trauma center and regional burn unit, Firefighter Solomon died 6 days later without regaining consciousness.
