Posts Tagged ‘situational awareness’

UL’s third tactical implication is that there may be little smoke showing when a fire initially enters the decay stage as a result of limited ventilation. These fire conditions may present similar indicators to an incipient fire. However, fire conditions and the hazards presented to firefighters are considerably different.

Visible Indications of Fire Development

In Reading the Fire: B-SAHF, I introduced Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF) as an organizing scheme for fire behavior indicators. Use of a standardized and organized approach to reading the fire can improve our ability to assess current fire conditions and predict likely fire development and changes that may occur.

Station Officer Shan Raffel of Queensland (Australia) Fire Rescue recently published an excellent article titled The Art of Reading Fire on the FirefighterNation website that provides another view of the B-SAHF indicators and Reading the Fire.

Building factors (particularly the normal ventilation profile, size and compartmentation, and thermal characteristics) can have a significant impact on fire development and how fire conditions present from the exterior of the building. However, this UL tactical implication relates most closely to Smoke and Air Track as well as somewhat indirectly to Heat (but this is the key to understanding what is happening). First a quick review of these key indicators

Smoke: What does the smoke look like and where is it coming from? This indicator can be extremely useful in determining the location and extent of the fire. Smoke indicators may be visible on the exterior as well as inside the building.

Air Track: Related to smoke, air track is the movement of both smoke (generally out from the fire area) and air (generally in towards the fire area).

Heat: This includes a number of indirect indicators. Heat cannot be observed directly, but you can feel changes in temperature and may observe the effects of heat on the building and its contents. Visual clues such as crazing of glass and visible pyrolysis from fuel that has not yet ignited are also useful heat related indicators. Important: Temperature influences smoke and air track indicators such as volume and velocity of smoke discharge.

For a more detailed look at B-SAHF and reading the fire, see the following posts:

How to Improve Your Skills
Building Factors
Building Factors Part 2
Building Factors Part 3
Smoke Indicators
Smoke Indicators Part 2
Air Track Indicators
Air Track Indicators Part 2
Heat Indicators
Heat Indicators Part 2
Heat Indicators Part 3
Flame Indicators
Flame Indicators Part 2
Incipient Stage Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators
Growth Stage Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators
Fully Developed Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators
Decay Stage Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators

Stages of Fire Development, Burning Regime, Smoke, Air Track & Heat

While the “stages of fire” have been described differently in fire service textbooks the phenomenon of fire development is the same. For our purposes, the stages of fire development in a compartment will be described as incipient, growth, fully developed and decay (see Figure 1). Despite dividing fire development into four “stages” the actual process is continuous with “stages” flowing from one to the next. While it may be possible to clearly define these transitions in the laboratory, in the field it is often difficult to tell when one ends and the next begins.

Understanding the stages of fire development is important, but this only provides a limited picture of fire development in a compartment. Conversion of chemical potential energy from fuel depends on availability of adequate oxygen for the combustion reaction to occur. As the ambient air in the compartment provides adequate oxygen, in incipient stage and early growth stage, heat release rate is limited by the chemical and physical characteristics of the fuel. This condition is known as a fuel controlled burning regime. In a compartment fire, combustion occurs in an enclosure where the air available for combustion is limited by 1) the volume of the compartment and 2) ventilation. Ventilation in a compartment fire is limited (particularly if doors and windows are closed and intact), as the fire grows and heat release rate increases, so too does demand for oxygen. When fire growth is limited by the available oxygen, heat release rate is slowed and then diminishes. This condition is known as a ventilation controlled burning regime.

Many if not most fires that have progressed beyond the incipient stage when the fire department arrives are ventilation controlled. This means that the heat release rate (the fire’s power) is limited by the existing ventilation. If ventilation is increased, either through tactical action or unplanned ventilation resulting from effects of the fire (e.g., failure of a window) or human action (e.g., exiting civilians leaving a door open), heat release rate will increase (see Figure 1)

Figure 1. Fire Development Curve (Fuel and Ventilation Controlled Regimes)

Several things happen as a compartment fire develops: Heat release rate increases, smoke production increases, and pressure within the compartment increases proportionally to the absolute temperature. These conditions result in a number of fire behavior indicators that may be visible from the exterior of the building. As a fire moves from the Incipient to the Growth Stage, an increasing volume of smoke may be visible from the exterior (Smoke Indicator) and the velocity of smoke discharge will likely increase (Air Track Indicator and indirect Heat Indicator).

It is a reasonably logical conclusion that a smaller volume of smoke and lower velocity of smoke discharge will be observed in incipient and early growth stage fires and the volume and velocity of smoke discharge will increase as the fire develops. However, what happens when the fire becomes ventilation controlled?

Influence of Ventilation on Residential Fire Behavior

Earlier this year, Underwriters Laboratories (UL) conducted a series of full-scale experiments to determine the influence of ventilation on fire behavior in legacy and contemporary residential construction (see Did You Ever Wonder? and UL Ventilation Course).

These tests were conducted in full-scale one and two-story, wood-frame structures constructed inside the UL laboratory in Northbrook, IL. Fires in the one-story structure were all started in the living room (see Figure 2) and involved typical contents found in a single-family home.

Figure 2: One-Story Structure and Floor Plan

As discussed in UL Tactical Implications Part 1 and Part 2, each of the fires during these tests quickly became ventilation controlled due to the fuel load within the buildings and limited ventilation provided by closed and intact doors and windows.

As each fire developed, the volume of smoke visible from the exterior and velocity of smoke discharge increased. This is consistent with fire development within the structure and increasing heat release rate, temperature, and volume of smoke production from the developing fire. Figure 3 illustrates exterior conditions at 05:05 during Test 5 conducted in the one-story residence.

Figure 3: Conditions at 05:05 (UL Test 5)

Interestingly, as the fire became ventilation controlled (as determined by both measurement of oxygen concentration and the heat release rate in the building), the volume and velocity of smoke discharge decreased to a negligible level as illustrated in Figure 4.

Figure 4: Conditions at 05:34 (UL Test 5)

This change occurred within a matter of 30 seconds! How might this influence firefighters’ perception of fire conditions inside the building if they arrived at 05:34 rather than 05:04? While presenting much the same as an incipient or early growth stage fire, conditions within the building at 05:34 are significantly ventilation controlled and increased ventilation resulted in rapid fire development and transition through flashover to a fully developed fire.

NIST Phoenix Warehouse Tests

In the Hazard of Ventilation Controlled Fires, I discussed a series of tests conducted by the National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) at an ordinary constructed warehouse in Phoenix, AZ. These tests were intended to develop information about performance of ordinary constructed buildings related to structural collapse. However, they also provided some interesting information regarding fire behavior.

One of the tests involved a fire in the front section of the warehouse that measured 50’ x 90’ (15.2 m x 27.4 m) with a height of 15’ (4.6 m) to the top of the pitched truss roof. The fuel load for this test included four stacks of 10 wood pallets and the interior finish and combustible structural elements of the building.  All doors and windows were closed at the start of the test.

Figure 5 illustrates a large volume of dark gray to black smoke discharging from the roof of the structure and flames visible from roof ventilators at 03:57. The B-SAHF indicators visible n this photo indicate a significant growth stage fire within this building.

Figure 5. Conditions at 03:57 (NIST Warehouse Test)

However, at 05:31 conditions visible on the exterior are quite different. The color and volume of smoke discharge (Smoke Indicators) as well as the velocity of discharge (Air Track Indicator) may lead firefighters to believe that this is an incipient or early growth stage fire. Nothing could be further from the truth. This fire is in the decay stage as a result of limited ventilation and any increase in ventilation will result in a rapid and significant increase in heat release rate!

Figure 6. Conditions at 05:31 (NIST Warehouse Test)

For more information on these tests see Structural Collapse Fire Tests: Single Story, Ordinary Construction Warehouse (Stroup, Madrzykowski, Walton, & Twilley, 2003) or view the videos of this series of tests at the NIST Structural Collapse webpage.

The Key

Heat release rate and temperature drop as the fire becomes ventilation controlled. Volume and velocity of smoke discharge are a function of pressure (given a constant opening size). Reduction in temperature and corresponding reduction in pressure will result in a smaller volume and lower velocity of smoke discharge.

When the temperature is the same, the velocity of discharge will likely be similar. Figure 1 shows that the temperature inside a compartment may be the same during the growth and decay stages of the fire. If the ventilation profile (number, size, and location of openings) remains the same, similar Smoke and Air Track indicators can be present.

Decay stage incidators may be subtle. Consider the full range of B-SAHF inciators that may be observed under ventilation controlled, decay stage conditions (see Figure 7.

Figure 7. B-SAHF Decay Stage Indicators.

Durango, Colorado Commercial Fire

CFBT-US developed a case study examining an extreme fire behavior event that occurred during a commercial fire in Durango, CO in 2008 injuring nine firefighters and fire officers. The reporting party indicated that there was a large amount of dark smoke coming from the roof of the building. However, when firefighters arrived, they found nothing showing but a small amount of light colored smoke. Why might this have been the case?

Download a copy of the Fire Behavior Case Study: Durango CO Commercial Fire and see if this may have been a result of similar fire development and presentation of fire behavior indicators as seen in the UL and NIST tests!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Kerber, S. (2011). Impact of ventilation on fire behavior in legacy and contemporary residential construction. Retrieved July 16, 2011 from http://www.ul.com/global/documents/offerings/industries/buildingmaterials/fireservice/ventilation/DHS%202008%20Grant%20Report%20Final.pdf.

Stroup, D., Madrzykowski, D., Walton, W., & Twilley, W. (2003). Structural collapse fire tests: Single story, ordinary construction warehouse, NISTIR 6959. Retrieved July 16, 2011 from http://www.nist.gov/customcf/get_pdf.cfm?pub_id=861215

A recent video posted on the firevideo.net [http://firecamera.net/] web brought to mind a number of painful lessons learned regarding live fire training in acquired structures. When watching video of fire training or emergency incidents, it is essential to remember that video provides only one view of the events. This video, titled Probationary Live House Burn shows a live fire evolution from ignition through fire attack with the comment “Burnin up the probies… LOL”.

This video shows multiple fire locations and an extremely substantial fire load (well in excess of what is necessary to bring typical residential compartments to flashover). I am uncertain if the comment posted with the video “burnin up the probies…LOL [laughing out loud]” was posted by an instructor or learner. Likely this is considered as just a joke, but comments like this point to our collective cultural challenges in providing safe and effective live fire training.

Fuel Load & Ventilation in Live Fire Training

NFPA 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training is reasonably explicit regarding the nature of acceptable fuel, extent of fuel load, as well as number and location of fires used for live fire training in acquired structures.

4.3.1 The fuels that are utilized in live fire training evolutions shall have known burning characteristics that are as controllable as possible.

4.2.17 Combustible materials, other than those intended for the live fire training evolution, shall be removed or stored in a protected area to preclude accidental ignition.

4.3.3* Pressure-treated wood, rubber, and plastic, and straw or hay treated with pesticides or harmful chemicals shall not be used.

A.4.3.3 Acceptable Class A materials include pine excelsior, wooden pallets, straw, hay, and other ordinary combustibles.

Fuel materials shall be used only in the amounts necessary to create the desired fire size.

A.4.3.4 An excessive fuel load can contribute to conditions that create unusually dangerous fire behavior. This can jeopardize structural stability, egress, and the safety of participants.

4.3.5 The fuel load shall be limited to avoid conditions that could cause an uncontrolled flashover or backdraft.

4.4.15 Only one fire at a time shall be permitted within an acquired structure.

4.4.16 Fires shall not be located in any designated exit paths.

While quite explicit regarding fuel requirements and limitations, NFPA 1403 (2007) has little to say about the ventilation with the exception of a brief mention that roof ventilation openings that are normally closed but may be opened in an emergency are permitted (not required as many believe). However, the Appendix has a much more important statement regarding the importance of ventilation to fire development:

A.4.3.7 The instructor-in-charge is concerned with the safety of participants and the assessment of conditions that can lead to rapid, uncontrolled burning, commonly referred to as flashover. Flashover can trap, injure, and kill fire fighters. Conditions known to be variables affecting the attainment of flashover are as follows:

(1) The heat release characteristics of materials used as primary fuels

(2) The preheating of combustibles

(3) The combustibility of wall and ceiling materials

(4) The room geometry (e.g., ceiling height, openings to rooms [emphasis added])

In addition, the arrangement of the initial materials to be ignited, particularly the proximity to walls and ceilings, and the ventilation openings [emphasis added] are important factors to be considered when assessing the potential fire growth.

The building in this video appeared to have been used for multiple evolutions prior to the one depicted in the video. A number of the windows appeared to be damaged, providing increased ventilation to support combustion. The fuel load of multiple pallets and excelsior or straw (acceptable types of fuel) provided an excess of fuel required to reach flashover in typical residential rooms (which may have been an intended outcome and level of involvement given the transitional attack (defense to offense)). If in fact the sets were in multiple rooms, this would be inconsistent with the provisions of NFPA 1403 limiting acquired structure evolutions to a single fire.

It is essential for those of us who conduct live fire training to remember that most of the provisions of NFPA 1403 (2007) are based on line-of-duty deaths of our brothers and sisters. Safe and effective live fire training requires that instructors be technically competent, well versed in the requirements or relevant regulations and standards, and that individually and organizationally we have an appropriate attitude towards safe and effective learning and the process of passing on the craft of firefighting.

One useful case to focus discussion of these issues is the death of Firefighter/Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson of the Baltimore City Fire Department:

Live Fire Training: Remember Rachael Wilson

Live Fire Training Part 2: Remember Rachael Wilson

NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty F2007-09

Independent Investigation Report: Baltimore City Fire Department Live Fire Training Exercise

Door Entry

At 4:56 in the video, accumulation of a layer of smoke is clearly visible under the porch roof. No comment is made about this by the instructors and no action is taken to mitigate the hazard. At 5:55, flames exiting a broken window to the left of the door ignite the smoke layer just prior to when the attack team opens the door.

Figure 1. Fire Gas Ignition Sequence

It is essential to recognize that smoke is fuel and that ignition of this gas phase fuel overhead results in a rapid and signfiicant increase in radiant heat flux (which is dependent largely on temperature and proximity). Cooling the gases overhead and use of good door entry technique can minimize risk of this thermal insult to firefighters and potential for transition to other types of extreme fire behavior such as flashover.

Fire Streams

This video also shows some interesting aspects of fire stream application. A solid (or straight) stream can be quite effective in making a direct attack on the fire. However, when the fire is shielded, the effectiveness of this type of stream is limited. While limited steam production is often cited as an advantage of solid (and straight) streams, initial application of water through the doorway in this video results in significant steam production and limited effect on the fire. This is likely due to shielding of the burning fuel by interior configuration and compartmentation. Remember than no single type of fire stream is effective for all applications.

Perspective

Consider the question posed in the title of this post: Was this a safe and effective live fire training session or a near miss? I suspect that the learners in the video enjoyed this live fire training session and that the instructors desired to provide a quality learning experience. It is even likely that this evolution was conducted substantively (but likely not completely) in compliance with the provisions of NFPA 1403. Like most training exercises and emergency incidents, it is easy to watch a video and criticize the actions of those involved. I do not question the intent of those involved in this training exercise, but point to some issues that we (all of us) need to consider and reflect on as we go about our work and pass on the craft to subsequent generations of firefighters.

What’s Next?

I am working hard at getting back into a regular rhythm of posting and hope to have a post looking at another of the Tactical Considerations from the UL ventilation study up within the next week.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

National Fire Protection Association. (2007). NFPA 1403 Standard on live fire training. Quincy, MA: Author.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2002). Death in the line of duty, F2007-09. Retrieved February 19, 2009 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200709.pdf

Shimer, R. (2007) Independent investigation report: Baltimore city fire department live fire training exercise 145 South Calverton Road February 9, 2007. Retrieved February 19, 2009 from http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/pdf/BaltimoreTrainingLODDFinalReport82307.pdf.

I recently traveled to Peru to deliver a presentation on 3D Firefighting at the First International Congress on Emergency First Response which was conducted by the Cuerpo General de Bomberos Voluntarios del Perú. This congress was being conducted in conjunction with the Peruvian fire service’s 150^th anniversary celebration (establishment of Unión Chalaca No. 1, the first fire company).

In addition to my conference presentation, I spent 10 days teaching fire behavior and working alongside the Bomberos of Lima No.4, San Isidro No. 100, and Salvadora Lima No. 10.

Fire & Rescue Services in Lima, Peru

Lima is a city of 8 million people served by a volunteer fire service which provides fire protection, emergency medical services, hazmat response, and urban search and rescue. The stations that I worked in were busy with call volumes from 2000 to 5000 responses in an urban environment ranging from modern high-rise buildings to poor inner city neighborhoods. Each station was equipped with an engine, truck, rescue, and ambulance. Staffing varied throughout the day with some units being cross staffed or un-staffed due to limited staffing. At other times, units were fully staffed (5-6 on engines and trucks, 4 on rescues, and 3 on ambulances). While the Peruvian fire service has some new apparatus, many apparatus are old and suffer from frequent mechanical breakdown. Faced with high call volume and old apparatus and equipment, the Firefighters and Officers displayed a tremendous commitment to serve their community.

The firefighters I encountered had a tremendous thirst for knowledge and commitment to learning. My friend Giancarlo had arranged for a short presentation on fire behavior for a Tuesday evening and the room was packed. Class was scheduled from 20:00 until 22:00. However, when we reached 22:00, the firefighters wanted to stay and continue class. We adjourned at 24:00. This continued for the next two nights. Sunday, between calls, we had breakfast at San Isidro No. 100 and then conducted a hands-on training session on nozzle techniques and hose handling. At the start of class, Firefighter Adryam Zamora from Santiago Apostol No. 134, related that he used the 3D techniques we had discussed in class at an apartment fire the night before with great success.

Staff Ride

Staff rides began with the Prussian Army in the mid-1800s and are used extensively by the US Army and the US Marine Corps. A staff ride consists of systematic preliminary study of a selected campaign or battle, an extensive visit to the actual sites associated with that campaign, and an opportunity to integrate the lessons derived from these elements. The intent of a staff ride is to put participants in the shoes of the decision makers on a historical incident in order to learn for the future. Wildland firefighters have adapted the staff ride concept and have used it extensively to study large wildland fires, fatalities, and near miss incidents. However, structural firefighters have not as commonly used this approach to learning from the past.

When I traveled to Lima, I only knew two Peruvians; Teniente Brigadier CBP (a rank similar to Battalion Chief in the US fire service) Giancarlo Passalaqua and Teniente CBP (Lieutenant) Daniel Bacigalupo. However, I left Lima with a much larger family with many more brothers and sisters.

Backdraft!

Many firefighters have seen the following video of an extreme fire behavior event that occurred in Lima, Peru. This video clip often creates considerable discussion regarding the type of fire behavior event involved and exactly how this might have occurred. Photos and video of fire behavior are a useful tool in developing your understanding and developing skill in reading the fire. However, they generally provide a limited view of the structure, fire conditions, and incident operations.

Note: While not specified in the narrative, this video is comprised of segments from various points from fairly early in the incident (see Figure 3, to later in the incident immediately before, during, and after the backdraft).

When I was invited to Lima, I asked my friend Teniente Brigadier CBP Giancarlo Passalaqua who worked at this incident, if it would be possible to talk to other firefighters who were there and to walk the ground around the building to gain additional insight into this incident.

The Rest of the Story

The morning after I arrived, I was sitting in the kitchen of San Isidro No. 100 and was joined in a cup of coffee by Oscar Ruiz, a friendly and engaging man in civilian clothing who I assumed was a volunteer firefighter at the station. After my friend Giancarlo arrived, he told me that Oscar was actually Brigadier CBP (Deputy Chief) Oscar Ruiz from Lima No. 4 and one of the two firefighters who had been in the bucket of the Snorkel pictured in the video. Oscar and I had several opportunities to spend time together over the course of my visit and he shared several observations and insights into this incident.

At 11:00 hours on Saturday, March 15, 1997, two engines, a ladder, heavy rescue, medic unit, and command officer from the Lima Fire Department were dispatched to a reported commercial fire at the intersection of Luis Giribaldi Street and 28 de Julio Street in the Victoria section of Lima.

Companies arrived to find a well developed fire on Floor 2 of a 42 m x 59 m (138’ x 194’) three-story, fire resistive commercial building, The structure contained multiple, commercial occupancies on Side A (Luis Giribaldi Street) and Side B (28 De Julio Street). Floors 2 and 3 were used as a warehouse for fabric (not as a plastics factory as reported in the video clip). The building was irregularly shaped with attached exposures on Sides B and C.

Exposure A was a complex of single-story commercial occupancies, Exposure B was an attached two-story commercial complex, Exposure C was an attached three story commercial complex, and Exposure D was a three story apartment building. All of the exposures were of fire resistive construction.

Figure 1. Plot Plan

Floors 2 and 3 had an open floor plan and were used for storage of a large amount of fabric and other materials. As illustrated in Figure 1, there were two means of access to Floors 2 and 3; a stairway on Side A and an open shaft and stairway on Side C.

Due to heavy fire involvement, operations focused on a predominantly defensive strategy to control the fire in this multi-occupancy commercial building. The incident commander called for a second, and then third alarm. Defensive operations involved use of handlines and an aerial ladder working from Side A and in the Side A stairwell leading to Floor 2. However, application of water from the ladder pipe had limited effect (possibly because of the depth of the building and burning contents shielded from direct application from the elevated stream.

Figure 2. Early Defensive Operations

Note: Video screen shot from the intersection of Luis Giribaldi and 28 de Julio.

The third alarm at 14:05 hours brought two engines and articulating boom aerial platform (Snorkel) from Lima 4 to the incident. Snorkel 4, under the command of Captain Roberto Reyna was tasked to replace the aerial ladder which had been operating on Side A and operate an elevated master stream to control the fire on Floor 2 (Figure 2).

Placing their master stream into operation Teniente Oscar Ruiz and Captain Roberto Reyna worked to darken the fire on Floor 2. As exterior streams were having limited effect, Snorkel 4 was ordered to discontinue operation and began to lower the bucket to the ground. At the same time, efforts were underway to gain access to the building from Side C. Using forcible entry tools, firefighters breached the large loading dock door leading to the vertical shaft and stairwell in the C/D quadrant of the building.

Prior to opening the large loading dock door on Side C (Charlie/Delta Corner), a predominantly bi-directional air track is visible at ventilation openings on Side C. Flaming combustion from windows on Side A was likely limited to the area at openings with a bidirectional air track. Combustion at openings on Side A likely consumed the available atmospheric oxygen, maintaining extremely ventilation controlled conditions with a high concentration of gas phase fuel from pyrolyzing synthetic fabrics deeper in the building.

The ventilation profile when Snorkel 4 initially began operations included intake of air through the open interior stairwell (inward air track) serving floors 1-3 and from the lower area of windows which were also serving as exhaust openings (bi-directional air track). Interview of members operating at the incident indicates that there were few if any ventilation openings (inlet or exhaust) on Sides B, C, or D prior to creation of an access opening on Floor 1 Side C.

At approximately 15:50, Snorkel 4 was ordered to stop flowing water. As smoke conditions worsened, they did so and began to lower the aerial tower to the ground. At the same time, crews working to gain access to Floor 1 on Side C, breached the large loading dock door. A strong air track developed, with air rushing in the large opening and up the open vertical shaft leading to the upper floors as illustrated in Figure 3.

Figure 3. Layout of Floors 1 and 2

As the Snorkel was lowered to the ground, Teniente Oscar Ruiz observed a change in smoke conditions, observing a color change from gray/black to “phosphorescent yellow” (yellowish smoke can also be observed in the video clip of this incident). Less than two minutes after the change in ventilation profile, a violent backdraft occurred, producing a large fireball that engulfed Captain Roberto Reyna and Teniente Oscar Ruiz in Snorkel 4 (see Figure 4). The blast seriously injured the crew of Snorkel 4 along with numerous other members from stations Lima 4, Salvadora Lima 10, and Victoria 8 who were located in the Stairwell (these members were blown from the building) and on the exterior of Side A.

This incident eventually progressed to a fifth alarm with 63 companies from 26 of Lima’s 58 stations in attendance.

Figure 4. Backdraft Sequence

Watch the video again; keeping in mind the changes in air track that resulted from breaching the loading dock door on Side C. Consider the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame) indicators that are present as the video progresses.

Luis Giribaldi Street and 28 de Julio Street Today

The building involved in this incident is still standing and while it has been renovated, is much the same as it was in 1997. On December 6, 2010, Teniente Brigadier Giancarlo Passalaqua, myself and Capitáin Jordano Martinez went to Luis Giribaldi and 28 de Julio to walk the ground and gain some insight into this significant incident.

Figure 5. Luis Giribaldi Street

As illustrated in Figure 5, Luis Giribaldi Street is a one-way street with parking on both sides and overhead electrical utility lines.

Figure 6. A/D Corner

There are a number of obvious structural changes that have been made since the fire. Including installation of window glazing flush with the surface of the building (the original windows can be seen behind these outer windows).

Figure 7. Snorkel 4’s Position

Figure 7 shows the view from Snorkel 4’s position, just to the left of center is the entry way leading to the stairwell used to access Floors 2 and 3. Piled fabric and other materials can be seen through the windows of Floors 2 and 3, likely similar in nature to conditions at the time of the incident.

Figure 8. Side A

Figure 8 provides a view of Side A and Exposure B, which appears to be of newer construction and having a different roofline than the fire building. The appearance of the left and right sides of the fire building are different, but this is simply due to differences in masonry veneer on the exterior of the building.

Figure 9. A/B Corner

Figure 10. Side B

Figure 11. B/C Corner

As illustrated in Figures 10-11 this block is comprised of several attached, fire resistive buildings. It is difficult to determine the interior layout from the exterior as there are numerous openings in interior walls due to renovations and changes in occupancy over time. The floor plan illustrated in Figure 4 is the best estimate of conditions at the time of the fire based on interviews with members operating at the incident.

Figure 12. Side C and the Loading Dock Door

Figure 12shows Side C of the fire building and Exposure C and the loading dock door that was breached to provide access to the fire building from Side C immediately prior to the backdraft.

Figure 13. Side D and Exposure D

Figure 13illustrates the proximity of Exposure D, a three-story, fire-resistive apartment building.

Lessons Learned

This incident presented a number of challenges including a substantial fuel load (in terms of both mass and heat of combustion), fuel geometry (e.g., piled stock), and configuration (e.g., shielded fire, difficult access form Side C). Analysis of data from the short video clip and discussion of this incident with those involved provides a number of important lessons.

• Knowledge of the buildings in your response area is critical to safe and effective firefighting operations. While a challenging task, particularly in a large city such as Lima, developing familiarity with common building types and configurations and pre-planning target hazards can provide a significant fireground advantage.
• Reading the fire is essential to both initial size-up and ongoing assessment of conditions. In this incident, fire behavior indicators may have provided important cues needed to avoid the injuries that resulted from this extreme fire behavior event.
• Some fire behavior indicators can be observed from one position, while others may not. It is particularly important that individuals in supervisory positions be able to integrate observations from multiple perspectives when anticipating potential changes in fire behavior.
• Any opening, whether created for tactical ventilation or for entry has the potential to change the ventilation profile. It is important to consider potential changes in fire behavior that may result from changes in ventilation (particularly when the fire is ventilation controlled).
• Communication and coordination are critical during all fireground operations. It is essential to communicate observations of key fire behavior indicators and changes in conditions to Command. Tactical ventilation (or other tactical operations that may influence fire behavior) must be coordinated with fire attack.
• Protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus are a critical last line of defense when faced with extreme fire behavior (even when engaged in exterior, defensive operations).

I would like to recognize the members of the Peruvian fire service who assisted in my efforts to gather information about this incident and identify the important lessons learned. In particular, I would like to thank Teniente Brigadier Giancarlo Passalaqua, Brigadier CBP Oscar Ruiz, and my brothers at Lima 4 who generously shared their home, their time, and their knowledge.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFIreE, CFO

This post continues examination of the incident that took the life of Firefighter Brian Carey and seriously injured Firefighter Kara Kopas on the evening of March 30, 2010  while they were operating a hoseline in support of primary search in a small, one-story, wood frame dwelling with an attached garage at 17622 Lincoln Avenue in Homewood, Illinois.

This post focuses on firefighting operations, key fire behavior indicators, and firefighter rescue operations implemented after rapid fire progression that trapped Firefighters Carey and Kopas.

Firefighting Operations

After making initial assignments, the Incident Commander performed reconnaissance along Side Bravo to assess fire conditions. Fire conditions at around the time the Incident Commander performed this reconnaissance are illustrated in Figure 7. After completing recon of Side B, the Incident Commander returned to a fixed command position in the cab of E-534 (in order to monitor multiple radio frequencies).

Figure 7. Conditions Viewed from Side C during the Incident Commander’s Recon

Note: John Ratko Photo from NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2010-10.

Engine 1340 (E-1340) arrived and reported to Command for assignment. The five member crew of this company was split to assist T-1220 with vertical ventilation, horizontally ventilate through windows on Sides B and D, and to protect Exposures D and D2.

One member of E-1340 assisted T-1220 and the remaining members vented the kitchen windows on SidesD and B, while the E-1340 Officer stretched a 1-3/4” (45 mm) hoseline from E-534 to protect exposures on Side D. However, this line was not charged until signficantly later in the incident (see Figure 14). Figure 8 (a-c) illustrates changing conditions as horizontal ventilation is completed on Sides B and D.

Figure 8. Sequence of Changing Conditions Viewed from the A/B Corner

At 2105 Command reported that crews were conducting primary search and were beginning to vent.

Note the B-SAHF indicators visible from the A/B Corner in Figure 8a: Dark gray smoke from the door on Side A with the neutral plane at approximately 18” (0.25 m) above the floor. Velocity and turbulence are moderate and a bidirectional air track is evident at the doorway.

As the 2-1/2” (64 mm) handline reached the kitchen, flames were beginning to breach the openings in the Side C wall of the house and thick black smoke had banked down almost to floor level. As noted in Figure 3 (and subsequent floor plan illustrations), there were doors and windows between the house and addition in the Utility Room and Bedroom 2 . The Firefighter from E-534 had a problem with his protective hood and handed the nozzle off to Firefighter Carey and instructed him to open and close the bail of the nozzle quickly. After doing so, the Firefighter from E-534 retreated along the hoseline to the door on Side A to correct this problem (he is visible in the doorway in Figure 8c).

As E-1340 vents windows on Sides B (see Figure 8b) and D, the level of the neutral plane at the doorway on Side A lifts, but velocity and turbulence of smoke discharge increases. Work continues on establishing a vertical vent, but is hampered by smoke discharge from the door on Side A.

After horizontal ventilation of Sides B and D, velocity and turbulence of smoke discharge continues to increase and level of the upper layer drops to the floor as evidenced by the neutral plane at the door on Side A (see Figures 8b and 8c)

The photo in Figure 8c was taken just prior to the rapid fire progression that trapped Firefighters Carey & Kopas. The Firefighter from E-534 is visible in the doorway correcting a malfunction with his protective hood.

As T-1220B reached the hallway leading to the bedrroms, they felt a significant increase in temperature and visibility worsened. After searching Bedroom 2 and entering Bedroom 1 temperature contiued to increase and T-1220B observed flames rolling through the upper layer in the hallway leading from Bedroom 2 and the Bathroom. Note: NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report 2010-10 does not specify if T-1220B searched Bedroom 2, but this would be consistent with a left hand search pattern. They immedidately retreated to the Living Room looking for the hoseline leading to the door on Side A. As they did so, they yelled to the crew on the 2-1/2” (64 mm) handline to get out.

Extreme Fire Behavior

Firefighter Kopas felt a rapid increase in temperature as the upper layer ignited throughout the living room and the fire in this compartment transitioned to a fully developed stage. She yelled to Firefighter Carey, but received no response as she turned to follow the 2-1/2” (64 mm) hoseline back to the door on Side A. She made it to within approximately 4’ (1.2 m) of the front door when her protective clothing began to stick to melted carpet and she became stuck. T-1220B saw that she was trapped, reentered and pulled her out.

Figure 12. Position of the Crews as the Extreme Fire Behavior Phenomena Occurred

Note: It is unknown if T-1220B searched Bedroom 2 before entering Bedroom 1. However, this would be consistent with a left hand search pattern.

Figure 13. Conditions Viewed from the Alpha/Bravo Corner as the Extreme Fire Behavior Occured

Note: Warren Skalski Photo from NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2010-10.

Figure 14. Conditions Viewed from the Alpha/Delta Corner as the Extreme Fire Behavior Occured

Note: Warren Skalski Photo from NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2010-10.

Following the transition to fully developed fire conditions in the living room, the Incident Commander ordered T-1220 off the roof. As illustrated in Figure 14, the exposure protection line stretched by E-1340 was not charged until after Firefighter Carey was removed from the building.

Figure 15. Position of Search and Fire Control Crews after Rapid Fire Progress

Firefighter Rescue Operations

The Incident Commander and Firefighter from E-534 (who had retreated to the door due to a problem with his protective hood), pulled a second 1-3/4” (45 mm) line from E-534. T-1220B re-entered the house with this hoseline to locate Firefighter Carey.

While advancing into the living room, T-1220B discovered that E-534’s 2-1/2” (64 mm) handline. They controlled the fire in the living room using a direct attack on burning contents and advanced to the kitchen where they discovered Firefighter Carey entangled in the 2-1/2” (64 mm) handline. Firefighter Carey’s helmet and breathing apparatus facepiece were not in place.

T-1220B removed Firefighter Carey from the building where he received medical care from T-1145. A short time later, Firefighter Carey became apenic and pulseless. After the arrival of Ambulance 2101 (A-2101), Firefighter Carey was transported to Advocate South Suburban Hospital in Hazel Crest, IL where he was declared dead at 10:03 pm.

According to the autopsy report, Firefighter Carey had a carboxyhemoglobin (COHb) of 30% died from carbon monoxide poisoning. The NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report (2010) did not indicate if the medical examiner tested for the presence of hydrogen cyanide (HCN) or if thermal injuries were a contributing factor to Firefighter Carey’s death.

Timeline

Review the Homewood, Illinois Timeline (PDF format) to gain perspective of sequence and the relationship between tactical operations and fire behavior.

Contributing Factors

Firefighter injuries often result from a number of causal and contributing factors. NIOSH Report F2010-10 identified the following contributing factors in this incident that led to the death of Firefighter Brian Carey and serious injuries to Firefighter Kara Kopas.

• Well involved fire with trapped civilian upon arrival.
• Incomplete 360^o situational size-up
• Inadequate risk-versus-gain analysis
• Ineffective fire control tactics
• Failure to recognize, understand, and react to deteriorating conditions
• Uncoordinated ventilation and its effect on fire behavior
• Removal of self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) facepiece
• Inadequate command, control, and accountability
• Insufficient staffing

Questions

The following questions focus on fire behavior, influence of tactical operations, and related factors involved in this incident.

1. What type of extreme fire behavior phenomena occurred in this incident? Why do you think that this is the case (justify your answer)?
2. How did the conditions necessary for this extreme fire behavior event develop (address both the fuel and ventilation sides of the equation)?
3. What fire behavior indicators were present in the eight minutes between arrival of the first units and occurrence of the extreme fire behavior phenomena (organize your answer using Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF) categories)? In particular, what changes in fire behavior indicators would have provided warning of impending rapid fire progression?
4. Did any of these indicators point to the potential for extreme fire behavior? If so, how? If not, how could the firefighters and officers operating at this incident have anticipated this potential?
5. What was the initiating event(s) that lead to the occurrence of the extreme fire behavior that killed Firefighter Carey and injured Firefighter Kopas?
6. How did building design and construction impact on fire behavior and tactical operations during this incident?
7. What action could have been taken to reduce the potential for extreme fire behavior and maintain tenable conditions during primary search operations?
8. How would you change, expand, or refine the list of contributing factors identified by the NIOSH investigators?

Reading the Fire

Before returning to discussion of the science underlying gas cooling as a fire control technique, I wanted to share a video of an industrial fire in Maidencreek Township, Pennsylvania that provides an excellent illustration of smoke and air track indicators. Watch the first minute (1:00) of the video and answer the following questions:

• Consider how you would read the smoke and air track indicators (particularly the level of the neutral plane and velocity) if this was a single family dwelling. How is air track indicators are different in a large building (with multiple ventilation openings) such as was the case in this incident?
• What stage of development (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay) and burning regime (fuel or ventilation controlled) is this fire in?
• Watch the remainder of the video and examine the effectiveness of the master stream application? Are the streams effective? Why or why not? What could be done to increase the effectiveness of application?

For additional information on reading the fire, see the following posts:

• How to Improve Your Skills
• Building Factors
• Building Factors Part 2
• Building Factors Part 3
• Smoke Indicators
• Smoke Indicators Part 2
• Air Track Indicators
• Air Track Indicators Part 2
• Heat Indicators
• Heat Indicators Part 2
• Heat Indicators Part 3
• Flame Indicators
• Flame Indicators Part 2
• Reading the Fire: Putting it all Together
• Incipient Stage Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators
• Growth Stage Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators
• Fully Developed Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators
• Decay Stage Fires: Key Fire Behavior Indicators

Gas Laws

Paraphrasing Albert Einstein, British science writer Simon Singh stated that, “Science has nothing to do with common sense. Common sense is a set of prejudices” (Capps, 2010, p. 115). One of the challenges faced by firefighters engaging with the science of their craft is the common sense understanding of the fire environment and firefighting practices. This post continues examination of gas cooling as a fire control technique, by peeling off a few more layers and digging deeper into the underlying science related to the behavior of gases.

Readers who have worked through Gas Cooling Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3 have a reasonable idea how a small volume of water can reduce the temperature of the upper layer in a compartment and also reduce the volume of the upper layer (raising the level of the lower boundary of the layer). In addition, readers are likely to also understand the limitations of the simple explanation provided in prior posts.

In Water and Other Extinguishing Agents (Särdqvist,2002), Dr. Stefan Särdqvist provides a fairly detailed explanation of volume changes during smoke cooling and examines how the percentage of water vaporizing in the upper layer influences these changes. Understanding Stefan’s explanation requires a good understanding of the ideal gas law and a willingness to work through the math.

Gas Laws

The introduction to the gas laws and overview of Charles’s Law was provided in Gas Cooling: Part 3. This content has been repeated in this post, to save you from going back to the previous post.

While gases have different characteristics and properties, the behavior of gases can be described in general terms using the ideal gas law. This physical law describes the relationship between absolute temperature, volume, and pressure of a given amount of an ideal gas.

Figure 1. Temperature, Volume, Pressure & Amount

The concept of an ideal gas is based on the following assumptions:

• Gases consist of molecules in random motion
• The volume of the molecules is negligible in comparison to the total volume occupied by the gas
• Intermolecular forces (i.e., attractive forces between molecules) are negligible
• Pressure is the result of gas molecules colliding with the walls of its container

The ideal gas law is actually a synthesis of several other physical laws that each describes a single characteristic of the behavior of gases in a closed system (enclosed in some type of container).

Charles’s Law: In the 1780s, French scientist Jacques Charles studied the effect of temperature on a sample of gas at a constant pressure. Charles found that as the gas was heated, the volume increased. As the gas was cooled, the volume decreased. This finding gave rise to Charles’s Law which states that at a constant pressure the volume of a given amount (mass or number of molecules) of an ideal gas increases or decreases in direct proportion with its absolute (thermodynamic) temperature. The symbol  is used to express a proportional relationship (much the same as = is used to express equality), so this relationship can be expressed as:

Where:

V=Volume

T=Temperature

When two values (such as volume and temperature in Charles’s Law) are proportional, one is a consistent multiple of the other. For example If one value was consistently eight times the other, the values would also be proportional. In the case of Charles’s Law when the absolute temperature of a gas doubles, the pressure doubles. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between absolute temperature in Kelvins (K) and volume in cubic millimeters (mm³).

Figure 2. Charles’s Law

This relationship can also be stated using the following equation:

Where

V=Volume

T=Temperature

Subscript of 1 refers to initial conditions

Subscript of 2 refers to final conditions

Gay-Lussac’s Law: When Jacques Charles discovered the relationship between temperature and volume, he also discovered a similar relationship between temperature and pressure. However, Charles never published this discovery. Charles’s work on temperature and pressure was recreated by French chemist Joseph-Louis Gay-Lussac. Gay Lussac’s Law states that if the volume of an ideal gas is held constant, the pressure of a given amount (mass or number of molecules) of an ideal gas increases or decreases proportionally with its absolute temperature. As with Charles’s Law, Gay-Lussac’s law can be expressed mathematically as:

Where

V=Volume

P=Pressure

Figure 3. Gay-Lussac’s Law

Boyle’s Law: in the 1660s, Irish physicist Robert Boyle studied the relationship of pressure and volume of gases. Boyle discovered that as pressure on a gas was increased, its volume decreased. Boyle’s Law states that if the temperature of an ideal gas is held constant, the pressure and volume of a given amount (mass or number of molecules) of an ideal gas are inversely proportional, as pressure increases, the volume occupied by the gas decreases. Boyle’s Law can be expressed mathematically as:

Where:

V=Volume

P=Pressure

Figure 4. Boyle’s Law

General Gas Law: The General Gas Law simply integrates Charles’s, Gay-Lussac’s, and Boyle’s Laws to state that the volume of an ideal gas is proportional to the amount (number of molecules) and absolute temperature and inversely proportional to pressure. The General Gas Law can be expressed mathematically as:

Where:

V=Volume

n=Mole (mol)

T=Temperature

P=Pressure

The General Gas Law defines the amount of gas in terms of the number of molecules, measured in moles (which has nothing to do with the animal having the same name).

Mole: While related to Avogadro’s Law, the term mole as a unit of measure was conceived by German chemist Wilhelm Ostwald in 1893. Unlike liters or grams, a mole is not a unit of volume or mass, but a counting unit. A mole is defined as the quantity of anything that has the same number of particles found in 12 grams of carbon-12. As atoms and molecules are extremely small, a mole is a large number of molecules. Specifically a mole contains 602,510,000,000,000,000,000,000 (more commonly written 6.0251 x 10²³ in scientific notation) molecules of a substance. The number of moles of a substance is denoted by the letter n. In SI units, a kilogram mole (Kmol) is often used instead of the mole. A Kmol is 1000 mol or 6.0251 x 10²⁶ molecules of a substance.

It may seem that using the mole to measure an amount of a substance makes this more complicated. After all, why not use a measure of volume such as liters or cubic meters or mass such as grams or kilograms? Chemical formula (such as H₂O for water) describes the makeup of a chemical compound in terms of the numbers of atoms of each element comprising a single molecule of the substance.

While not a unit of mass, moles can be related to mass (just as you can determine the mass of a dozen eggs of a given size, by multiplying the mass of one of the eggs by 12).

Molar Mass: The molar mass of a compound is the mass of 1.0 moles of the substance in grams. Molar mass is determined by the sum of the standard atomic weights of the atoms which form the compound multiplied by the molar mass constant (M_u) of 1 g/mol. Figure 5 illustrates how the molar mass of water is calculated.

Figure 5. Molar Mass of Water

Molar mass can also be calculated for mixtures of substances. When dealing with mixtures, the molar mass of each constituent is calculated and applied proportionately on the basis of the percentage of that substance in the mixture. For example air is comprised of 78% Nitrogen, 21% Oxygen, and 1% of other gases such as Argon (Ar) and Carbon Dioxide (CO₂). Nitrogen (N2) and Oxygen (O2) molecules are each comprised of two atoms (and are referred to as diatomic molecules). This means that the molar mass of Nitrogen and Oxygen molecules is twice the atomic mass.

Figure 6. Molar Mass of Air

Hopefully how the concepts of the mole and molar mass can be applied will become clear after examining the expansion of water when turned to steam and application of the gas laws to integrate steam expansion and changes in volume of the upper layer during gas cooling under a variety of circumstances.

Avogadro’s Law: In 1811, Italian physicist and mathematician Amedeo Avogadro published a theory regarding the relationship of the number of molecules in a gas if temperature, pressure, and volume are held constant. Avogadro’s Law states that samples of ideal gasses, at the same absolute temperature, pressure and volume, contain the same number of molecules regardless of their chemical nature and physical properties. More specifically, at a temperature of 273 K (0^oC) and absolute pressure of 101300 Pa, 22.41 L (0.001 m³) of an ideal gas contains 6.0251 x 10²³ molecules (1.0 mol)

Ideal Gas Law: This gas law integrates Avogadro’s law with the Combined Gas Law. If the number of molecules in a specific volume of an ideal gas at a consistent temperature and pressure (273 K and 101300 Pa) is always the same, then the proportional relationship between pressure, volume, temperature, and amount can be defined as having a constant value (Universal Gas Constant).

Where:

P=Pressure (Pa)

V= Volume (m³)

T=Temperature (K)

n=Moles

R_u=Universal Gas Constant (8.3145 J/mol K)

Universal Gas Constant (R_u): This physical constant identifies the internal kinetic energy per mole of an ideal gas for each Kelvin of temperature (J/mol K). As it is universal this constant is the same for all gases that demonstrate the properties of an ideal gas.

If the pressure, volume, and temperature of an ideal gas can be observed and Avogadro’s Law is accepted as being true (making the amount of gas also known), the value of the Universal Gas Constant can be determined empirically (based on observation) by solving the ideal gas law equation for R_u.

Where:

V=Volume

R_u=Universal Gas Constant

n=Moles

T=Temperature

P=Pressure

Figure 7 illustrates each of the gas laws and how they are integrated into the Ideal Gas Law.

Figure 7. Gas Laws

Application-Steam Expansion

As stated in Gas Cooling: Part 3, the 5^th Edition of the Essentials of Firefighting (IFSTA, 2008) states that the volume of water expands 1700 times when it is converted to steam at 100^o C (212^o F). However, this information is presented as a fact to be memorized and no explanation is provided as to why this is the case or that if temperature is increased further, that the volume of steam will continue to expand. In the previous post, I asked the reader to accept this assumption with assurance that an explanation would follow. Application of the ideal gas law to expansion of steam provides an excellent opportunity to exercise your understanding of the gas laws and other scientific concepts presented in this post.

What we know:

• Molecular Mass of Water: 18 g/mol
• Boiling Point of Water at Atmospheric Pressure: 100^o C (373.15 K)
• Density of Water at 20^o C (293.15 K): 1000000 g/m³
• Atmospheric Pressure: 101325 Pa
• Ideal Gas Constant (R_u): 8.3145 J/mol K

What we need to find out:

1. What is the volume of 1 mole of steam
2. What is the density (mass per unit volume) of steam at 100^o C
3. What is the ratio between the density of water and the density of steam at 100^o C

The volume of 1 mole of pure steam can be calculated by solving the ideal gas equation for V.

As 1 mole of water (in the liquid or gaseous phase) contains the same number of molecules, it’s molar mass will be the same. 1 mole of water has a mass of 18 grams. Density is calculated by dividing mass by volume, so the density of steam at 100^o C can be calculated as follows:

Dividing the density of water by the density of steam at 100^o C determines the expansion ratio when a specific mass of water is vaporized into steam at this temperature.

This means that if a specific mass of water is vaporized into steam at 100^o C, its volume will expand 1700 times. So the 5^th Edition of the Essentials of Firefighting (IFSTA, 2008) is correct, but now you know why. However, what would happen if the steam continued to absorb energy from the upper layer and its temperature increased from 100^o C to 300^o C, the mass of the steam would remain the same, but what would happen to the volume? You can use the Ideal Gas Law to solve this question as well.

The Next Step

Just as the Ideal Gas Law can be used to determine the expiation ratio of steam, it can also be used to calculate contraction of the upper layer as it is cooled. The next post will examine how Dr. Stefan Särdqvist integrates these two calculations to determine changes in the volume of the upper layer under a variety of conditions.

New Book

Greg Gorbett and Jim Phar of Eastern Kentucky University (EKU) have written a textbook titled Fire Dynamics focused on meeting the Fire and Emergency Services Higher Education (FESHE) curriculum requirements for Fire Behavior and Combustion. I just received my copy and at first glance it appears to be an excellent work (as I would expect from these outstanding fire service educators). One useful feature of the text is a basic review of math, chemistry, and physics as it relates to the content of the course. I will be dong a more detailed review of the book in a subsequent post, but wanted to give readers of the CFBT-US Blog a heads up that it had been released.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

International Fire Service Training Association (IFSTA). (2008). Essentials of firefighting (5^th ed). Stillwater, OK: Fire Protection Publications.

Särdqvist, S. (2002) Water and other extinguishing agents. Karlstad, Sweden: Räddnings Verket

My last two posts (Hazards Above, Hazards Above: Part 2)examined a series of incidents involving firefighter injuries or near miss incidents involving fires occurring in or extending into void spaces in wood frame, residential structures. Yesterday, two members of the Bridgeport, Connecticut Fire Department lost their lives under similar circumstances.

Bridgeport, CT LODD

At 1553 hours on Saturday, July 24, 2010, the Bridgeport, Connecticut Fire Department was dispatched for a residential fire at 41 Elmwood Avenue. First arriving companies found heavy smoke from Floors 2 and 3 of a 2-1/2 story, wood frame, multi-family dwelling. Lieutenant Steven Velazquez and Firefighter Michael Baik were performing a search of the third floor when they transmitted a Mayday. Lieutenant Velazquez and Firefighter Baik were located on Floor 3 by the Rapid Intervention Team (RIT), but were not breathing and in cardiac arrest when removed from the building. CPR was initiated and they were transported to Bridgeport and St. Vincent’s Hospitals where they were pronounced dead.

More information on this tragic incident will be provided as it becomes available.

FBI and Ventilation Controlled Fires-the UL Experiments

As discussed in Hazards Above: Part 2, obvious smoke and air track indicators of a ventilation controlled fire may become diminished as the fire transitions from growth to decay stage. The decay stage ventilation controlled fire may present similar (but not identical) indicators to an incipient or early growth stage fire.

Underwriters Laboratories (UL) recently conducted a study of the effects of horizontal, natural ventilation on fires in residential structures (see Did You Ever Wonder. The results of this research will be released this fall along with a free on-line training program through UL University. During this research 15 experiments were conducted in two different residential structures. Fuel loading was consistent and the point of origin was a couch in the living room for each of the tests. The variable was the location, size, and sequence of horizontal ventilation. Interestingly, one observation remained remarkably consistent throughout the tests: Diminished smoke and air track indicators as the ventilation controlled fire transitioned from growth to decay stage. This is illustrated by a series of screen captures from video shot from Side A of the one-story structure used in these experiments.

Figure 1. Early Growth Stage

Figure 2. Growth Stage (Peak HRR Prior to Ventilation)

Figure 3. Decay Stage (Reduced HRR)

Figure 4. Conditions Immediately Following Ventilation (HRR Increasing)

Another commonality between each of the experiments was a fairly rapid and significant increase in HRR after ventilation was performed. In no case did ventilation (alone) improve conditions at any location or level inside the test buildings. Horizontal, natural ventilation (tactical or unplanned) with a delay in application of water to the seat of the fire will result in worsening conditions.

Situational Awareness

As illustrated in Figure 3, lack of obvious indicators can be deceptive. The structure used in the UL tests did not have normal window glazing as this would have resulted in less predictability in the exact location and sequence of ventilation. However, in an actual structure fire, observation of smoke conditions through windows, condensation on window glazing (incipient or early growth stage) and condensed pyrolizate (decay stage), and heat effects on window treatments (e.g., curtains, blinds) can provide important cues related to the stage of fire development and burning regime.

It is critical to take a holistic approach to observation of fire behavior indicators, to begin this process from the exterior, and to continue this process while operating on the interior.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFIreE, CFO

My last post, Hazards Above, provided a brief overview of three incidents involving extreme fire behavior in the attic or truss loft void spaces of wood frame dwellings. This post will examine the similarities and differences between these lessons and identify several important considerations when dealing with fires occurring in or extending to void spaces. At the conclusion of Hazards Above, I posed five questions:

1. What is similar about these incidents and what is different?
2. Based on the limited information currently available, what phenomena do you think occurred in each of the cases? What leads you to this conclusion?
3. What indicators might have pointed to the potential for extreme fire behavior in each of these incidents?
4. How might building construction have influenced fire dynamics and potential for extreme fire behavior in these incidents?
5. What hazards are presented by fires in attics/truss lofts and what tactics may be safe and effective to mitigate those hazards?

Similarities and Differences

The most obvious similarities between these incidents was that the buildings were of wood frame construction, the fire involved or extended to an attic or truss loft void space, and that some type of extreme fire behavior occurred. In two of the incidents firefighters were seriously injured, while in the other firefighters escaped unharmed.

Given the limited information available from news reports and photos taken after the occurrence of the extreme fire behavior events, it is not possible to definitively identify what types of phenomena were involved in these three incidents. However, it is interesting to speculate and consider what conditions and phenomena could have been involved. It might be useful to examine each of these incidents individually and then to return to examine fire behavior indicators, construction, and hazards presented by these types of incidents.

Minneapolis, MN

In the Minneapolis incident the fire occurred in an older home with legacy construction and relatively small void spaces behind the knee walls and above the ceiling on Floor 3. The triggering event for the occurrence of extreme fire behavior is reported to be opening one of the knee walls on Floor 3. As illustrated in Figure 1, the fire appeared to transition quickly to a growth stage fire (evidenced by the dark smoke and bi-directional air track from the windows on Floor 3 Side A. However blast effects on the structure are not visible in the photo and were not reported.

Figure 1. Minneapolis MN Incident: Conditions on Side A

Note: Photo by Steve Skar

Potential Influencing Factors: While detail on this specific incident is limited, it is likely that the fire burning behind the knee wall was ventilation controlled and increased ventilation resulting from opening the void space resulted in an increase in heat release rate (HRR). Potential exists for any compartment fire that progresses beyond the incipient stage to become ventilation controlled. This is particularly true when the fire is burning in a void space.

Extreme Fire Behavior: While statements by the fire department indicate that opening the knee wall resulted in occurrence of flashover, this is only one possibility. As discussed in The Hazard of Ventilation Controlled Fires and Fuel and Ventilation, increasing ventilation to a ventilation controlled fire will result in increased HRR. Increased HRR can result in a backdraft (if sufficient concentration of gas phase fuel is present), a vent induced flashover, or simply fire gas ignition (such as rollover or a flash fire) without transition to a fully developed fire.

Harrisonburg, VA

The Harrisonburg incident involved extreme fire behavior in Exposure D (not the original fire unit). The extreme fire behavior occurred after members had opened the ceiling to check for extension. However, this may or may not have been the precipitating event. As illustrated in Figure 2, as members prepare to exit from the windows on Floor 3 , Side C, flames are visible on the exterior at the gable, but it appears that combustion is limited to the vinyl siding and soffit covering. There are no indicators of a significant fire in Exposure D at the time that the photo was taken. However, it is important to remember that this is a snapshot of conditions at one point in time from a single perspective.

Figure 2. Harrisonburg, VA Incident: Conditions on Side C

Note: Photo by Allen Litten

Potential Influencing Factors: The truss loft was likely divided between units by a 1 hour fire separation (generally constructed of gypsum board over the wood trusses). While providing a limited barrier to fire and smoke spread, it does not generally provide a complete barrier and smoke infiltration is likely. Sufficient smoke accumulation remote from the original fire location can present risk of a smoke explosion (see NIOSH Report 98-03 regarding a smoke explosion in Durango, Colorado restaurant). Alternately, fire extension into the truss loft above an exposure unit can result in ventilation controlled fire conditions, resulting in increased HRR if the void is opened (from above or below).

Extreme Fire Behavior: Smoke, air track, and flame indicators on Side C indicate that the fire in the truss loft may not have continued to develop past the initial ignition of accumulated smoke (fuel). It is possible that smoke accumulated in the truss loft above Exposure B and was ignited by subsequent extension from the fire unit. Depending on the fuel (smoke)/air mixture when flames extended into the space above Exposure B ignition could have resulted in a smoke explosion or a less violent fire gas ignition such as a flash fire.

Sandwich, MA

In the Sandwich incident, the extreme fire behavior occurred shortly after the hose team applied water to the soffit. However, this may or may not have been the precipitating event. As illustrated in Figure 3, the fire transitioned to a fully developed fire (likely due to the delay in suppression as the injured members were cared for). Blast effects on the structure are obvious.

Figure 3: Sandwich, MA: Conditions on Sides C and D

Note: Photos by Britt Crosby (http://www.capecodfd.com)

Potential Influencing Factors: The roof support system in this home appears to have been constructed of larger dimensional lumber (rather than lightweight truss construction). In addition, it is likely that the attic void spaces involved in this incident were large and complex (given the size of the dwelling and complex roof line). It appears that at least part of the home had a cathedral ceiling. Fire burning in the wood framing around the metal chimney would have allowed smoke (fuel) and hot gases to collect in the attic void in advance of fire extension.

Extreme Fire Behavior: The violence of the explosion (see blast damage to the roof on Side D in Figure 3) points to the potential for ignition of pre-mixed fuel (smoke) and air, resulting in a smoke explosion. However, it is also possible that failure of an interior ceiling (due to water or steam production from water applied through the soffit) could have increased ventilation to a ventilation controlled fire burning in the attic, resulting in a backdraft).

Fire Behavior Indicators

The information provided in news reports points to limited indication of potential for extreme fire behavior. One important question for each of us is how we can recognize this potential, even when indicators are subtle or even absent.

Important! A growth stage fire can present significant smoke and air track indicators, with increasing thickness (optical density), darkening color, and increasing velocity of smoke discharge. However, as discussed in The Hazard of Ventilation Controlled Fires, when the fire becomes ventilation controlled, indicators can diminish to the point where the fire appears to be in the incipient stage. This change in smoke and air track indicators was consistently observed during the full-scale fire tests of the influence of ventilation on fires in single-family homes conducted by UL earlier this year.

Even with an opening into another compartment or to the exterior of the building, a compartment fire can become ventilation controlled. Consider building factors including potential for fire and smoke extension into void spaces in assessing fire conditions and potential for extreme fire behavior. A ventilation controlled fire or flammable mixture of smoke and air may be present in a void space with limited indication from the exterior or even when working inside the structure.

Building Construction

Each of these incidents occurred in a wood frame structure. However, the construction in each case was somewhat different.

In Minneapolis, the house was likely balloon frame construction with full dimension lumber. As with many other structures with a “half-story”, the space under the pitched roof is framed out with knee walls to provide finished space. This design is not unique to legacy construction and may also be found with room-in-attic trusses. The void space behind the knee wall provides a significant avenue for fire spread. When involved in fire, opening this void space can quickly change fire conditions on the top floor as air reaches the (likely ventilation controlled) fire.

The incident in Harrisonburg involved a fire in a townhouse with the extreme fire behavior phenomena occurring in an exposure. While not reported, it is extremely likely that the roof support system was comprised of lightweight wood trusses. In addition, there was a reverse gable (possibly on Sides A and C) that provided an additional void. As previously indicated, the truss loft between dwelling units is typically separated by a one-hour rated draft stop. Unlike a fire wall, draft stops do not penetrate the roof and may be compromised by penetrations (after final, pre-occupancy inspection). Installed to code, draft stops slow fire spread, but may not fully stop the spread of smoke (fuel) into the truss lofts above exposures.

Firefighters in Sandwich were faced with a fire in an extremely large, wood frame dwelling. While the roof appeared to be supported by large dimensional lumber, it is likely that there were large void spaces as a result of the complex roofline. In addition, the framed out space around the metal chimney provided an avenue for fire and smoke spread from the lower level of the home to the attic void space.

Hazards and Tactics

Forewarned is forearmed! Awareness of the potential for rapid fire development when opening void spaces is critical. Given this threat, do not open the void unless you have a hoseline in hand (not just nearby).

Indirect attack can be an effective tactic for fires in void spaces. This can be accomplished by making a limited opening and applying water from a combination nozzle or using a piercing nozzle (which further limits introduction of air into the void).

If there are hot gases overhead, cool them before pulling the ceiling or opening walls when fire may be in void spaces. Pulses of water fog not only cool the hot gases, but also act as thermal ballast; reducing the potential for ignition should flames extend from the void when it is opened.

Lastly, react immediately and appropriately when faced with worsening fire conditions. Review my previous posts on Battle Drill (Part 1, Part 2, and Part 3). An immediate tactical withdrawal under the protection of a hoseline is generally safer than emergency window egress (particularly when ladders have not yet been placed to the window).

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

As a critical friend of the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program, I have provided testimony at public hearings and engaged in discussions with NIOSH staff regarding improvement of the quality of information provided in Death in the Line of Duty Reports, particularly in incidents involving extreme fire behavior. In addition, I have provided expert review on a number of Death in the Line of Duty Reports (including F2009-11). The discussion of fire dynamics, fire behavior indicators, and influence of ventilation and wind effects in Report F2009-11 is evidence that this feedback has been heard! I would like to thank Tim Merinar and the other NIOSH staff for their efforts in this area.

However, more work is needed. Just over a year ago, I read a news report about the deaths of Captain James Harlow and Firefighter Damion Hobbs of the Houston Fire Department during operations at a residential fire. I recalled Houston had seen a number of fatalities during structural firefighting over a reasonably short period of time. Curious, I reviewed reports on these incidents developed by NIOSH and the Texas State Fire Marshal�s Office. Seeing some commonality in the circumstances surrounding these incidents, I called a colleague at NIOSH and recommended that the investigation of the incident in which Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs lost their lives, include review of prior incidents (and near miss data if available) to identify underlying causal or contributing factors that may not be evident from examination of a single incident.

While we often want to know the cause of a tragic event, the reality is that it is often much more complicated that we would like. Investigative reports such as those prepared by NIOSH focus a bright light on the what and how, but often leave the question of why hidden in the shadows. Observations and questions in this post are not presented as an indictment of the Houston Fire Department, or to question the commitment and bravery of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs, but simply to encourage each and every one of us to look more deeply; more deeply at our profession, at our own organizations, and at ourselves.

Epidemiology

Epidemiology is the study of factors affecting the health and illness of populations. Epidemiological research is the foundation of public health intervention and preventative medicine. This research is focused at identifying relationships between exposures and disease or death. Identification of causal relationships between exposures and outcomes is critical. However, correlation does not determine cause, and identification of causality is often complex and tentative.

For the fire service, epidemiological study has and continues to focus on heart disease, stress, and cancer (see USFA, NIOSH Launch Cancer Study). However, these same concepts can be applied to traumatic fatalities as well.

R-Fire 7811 Oak Vista, Houston TX

On April 12, 2009 Captain James Harlow and Firefighter Damion Hobbs lost their lives in a residential fire at 7811 Oak Vista in Houston, Texas. On April 9, 2010, the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health released Death in the Line of Duty Report F2009-11 summarizing their investigation of this incident. Overall, this report is well written and provides an excellent examination of the events involved in this incident. The Texas State Fire Marshal�s Office also conducted an investigation of this incident and released a report a short time prior to release of NIOSH Report F2009-11.

• NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty F2009-11
• Texas State Fire Marshal�s Office Firefighter Fatality Investigation FY09-01

Contributing Factors

NIOSH identified eight items as key contributing factors in the deaths of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs:

• An inadequate size-up prior to committing to tactical operations
• Lack of understanding of fire behavior and fire dynamics
• Fire in a void space burning in a ventilation controlled regime
• High winds
• Uncoordinated tactical operations, in particular fire control and tactical ventilation
• Failure to protect the means of egress with a backup hose line
• Inadequate fireground communications
• Failure to react appropriately to deteriorating conditions.

What is missing from this list? Six of the seven items on this list relate to human action or inaction. The report points out the need for policy, procedures, and additional training to address the contributing factors. While this is undoubtedly necessary, does this provide the entire answer?

The Remaining Question

As with all NIOSH firefighter fatality investigations, the focus of this report is on the circumstances and events surrounding a single incident. In this report, there is a brief mention of investigation of the deaths of other firefighters from this department, but no analysis of commonality or underlying contributing factors is provided. This leaves the question, to what extent did organizational culture impact on the circumstances and events involved in this tragic incident?

In his keynote presentation at the 2010 Fire Department Instructor�s Conference, Lieutenant Frank Ricci of the New Haven (CT) Fire Department indicated that the culture of the fire service is wrongly blamed for many of it�s problems. Lieutenant Ricci indicated that a large percentage of firefighter injuries and deaths are not due to inherent risks, but to an �unwillingness to take personal responsibility for safety� (Thompson, 2010). I would ask, why are firefighters unwilling to take personal responsibility? What factors influence this pattern of behavior? I suspect that it is our unquestioned assumptions about the way that things are (part of our culture). In this sense, culture is not to blame, but is simply one of a number of contributing and causal factors in many firefighter fatalities.

Common Elements

A cursory examination of the facts presented in the reports of NIOSH investigation of traumatic fatalities in the Houston Fire Department since 2000 shows a distinct pattern. Each of the fatalities involved members of the first arriving company where a fast attack was initiated without adequate size up and in most (and likely all) cases failure to assess risk versus gain. A more detailed examination of these events would likely provide a more finely grained picture of organizational expectations that make extremely aggressive fire attack without adequate size-up and risk assessment the norm, rather than the exception.

Table 1. Traumatic Line-of-Duty-Deaths in Houston, Texas 2000-2009

Report		Event Type		Commonality
F2000-13		Collapse (2 LODD) Commercial Fire-Collapse		Victims were part of first in company Inadequate size-up Failure to assess risk versus gain
F2001-33		Rapid Fire Progress (1 LODD) High-Rise Apartment Fire-Wind Driven Fire		Victim was part of the first in company Inadequate size-up (consideration of wind)
F2004-14		Rapid Fire Progress (1 LODD) Commercial Fire-Disorientation Subsequent to Rapid Fire Progress		Victim was part of the first in company Inadequate size-up Failure to assess risk versus gain
F2005-09		Collapse & Rapid Fire Progress (1 LODD) Residential Fire (Vacant)-Rapid Collapse Subsequent to Fire Progress		Victim was part of the first in company Inadequate size-up Failure to assess risk versus gain
F2009-11		Rapid Fire Progress (2 LODD) Residential Fire-Wind Driven Fire		Victim was part of the first in company Inadequate size-up Failure to assess risk versus gain

A Comparison

On September 11, 1991, Continental Express Flight 2574 crashed in Eagle Lake Texas killing all 14 people aboard. As with all commercial aircraft accidents, this incident was investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board.� The board identified the cause as failure of maintenance and inspection personnel to adhere to proper maintenance and quality assurance procedures. However, the board also identified failure of management to ensure compliance with approved procedures and failure of Federal Aviation Administration to detect and correct this problem as contributing factors. Board member John K. Lauber, filed a dissenting statement. �It is clear based on this record alone, that the series of failures which led directly to the accident were not the result of an aberration, but rather resulted from the normal accepted way of doing business at Continental Express� (NTSB, 1992, p. 53). Lauber advocated restating the probable cause of this accident as �the failure of Continental Express management to establish a corporate culture which encouraged and enforced adherence to approved maintenance and quality assurance procedures� (NTSB, 1992, p. 54).

It is essential to look at the five events identified in reports F2000-13, F2001-33, F2004-14, F2005-09, and F2009-11 (NIOSH, 2001, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2010) from a longitudinal perspective to identify in greater detail and understand the common elements and potential systemic cultural issues that influenced the actions of those involved. While the influence of organizational culture is more difficult to identify than failure to comply with good practice, failure to recognize a hazardous condition, or an error in decision-making, it has a far more pervasive influence on fire fighter safety than these specific, individual acts.

Based on limited research, it is apparent that the Houston Fire Department (like many others) places an extremely high value on rapid and aggressive offensive firefighting operations. While the outcome of this incident resulted from a wide range of interrelated contributing factors, organizational culture and lack of knowledge regarding fire behavior and the influence of tactical operations were likely the most significant.

Identification of organizational culture as a contributing factor in this incident is based on data included in the DRAFT report as well as review of NIOSH Reports F2000-13, F2001-33, F-2004-14, F2005-09, and F2009-11 (NIOSH, 2001, 2002, 2005a, 2005b, 2010) as well as review of the Houston Fire Department Strategic Plan FY2008-2012 (n.d., HFD) and Philosophy of Firefighting (2003, HFD).

A memorandum from the Office of the Fire Chief defining the Houston Fire Department�s philosophy of firefighting (HFD, 2003) after the McDonald�s (NIOSH, 2001) and Four Leaf Tower (NIOSH, 2002) fires reinforced the importance of risk assessment in selecting strategies and tactics. In this memo, the chief identified the importance of organizational culture, stating �we pride ourselves in being very aggressive interior fire fighters and look down on those that fight fire from the street� (p. 1). While this memorandum was written in 2003, lack of adequate size up and risk assessment was a contributing factor in three incidents resulting in four line-of-duty deaths involving Houston Fire Department members in subsequent six years.

The Houston Fire Department Strategic Plan for FY2008-2012 (n.d., HFD) identifies safety as a core organizational value, stating: �preservation of life remains the number one goal of the HFD beginning with the responder and extending to the public� (p. 5). This focus continues with enhancement of the health and safety of HFD members as the first goal within the strategic plan. However, while the strategic plan provides a detailed blueprint for action, no objective or action plan element addresses the predominant contributory factors that are common in the seven line-of-duty deaths of Houston Fire Department members resulting from traumatic cause between 1999 and 2009. For example, Objective 1.5 of the strategic plan focuses on National Fallen Fire fighter Initiative #1 which states �define and advocate the need for cultural change within the fire service relating to safety; incorporating leadership, management, supervision, accountability and personal responsibility (HFD, n.d., p. 8). However, the sub elements of this objective focus on near miss reporting, roadway emergency safety, and response to violent incidents.

In the incident that took the lives of Captain Harlow and Firefighter Hobbs, several elements point to the focus on speed and aggressive action. Despite his seniority and experience, the captain of the first arriving engine quickly initiated an interior attack without adequate size-up and risk assessment (or performed a size-up and failed to recognize critical fire behavior indicators). In addition, he left his portable radio on the apparatus, E-26s thermal imaging camera (TIC) was left outside the front door. Any one of these elements alone might indicate a simple error, but in combination along with the context provided by previous LODD incidents (NIOSH, 2001, 2002, 2005a, 2005b) this is likely evidence of the cultural value of speed and aggressive action over deliberate assessment of conditions and decision-making based on risk assessment.

While increased protection through the use of the reed hood has significant potential benefits (similar technology is used by the Swedish fire service), it is quite possible that this type of personal protective clothing (which is somewhat unique to the Houston Fire Department) is used to permit fire fighters to penetrate deeper into hostile environments, rather than simply to provide improved protection with the ordinary or hazardous range of conditions encountered during structural firefighting.

Recommendation

Based on these factors identified in NIOSH Report F2009-11 (2010) as well Reports F2000-13, F2001-33, F2004-14, F2005-09 (2001, 2002, 2005a, 2005b), I recommend that fire service organizations assess the impact of their organizational culture on fire fighter safety and operational performance.

Note that this recommendation is not simply focused on the Houston Fire Department. It is a global recommendation, that each of us examine the influence of culture within our respective organizations.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Houston Fire Department. (2003) Philosophy of firefighting. Retrieved January 24, from http://www.houstontx.gov/fire/reports/philoff.pdf

Houston Fire Department. (n.d.) Houston Fire Department Strategic Plan FY2008-2012. Retrieved January 24 from http://www.houstontx.gov/fire/reports/SP0811.pdf

National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB). Aircraft accident report: Britt Airways, Inc. d/b/a/ Contenental Express Flight 2474 in flight structural breakup, EMB-120RT, N33701, Eagle Lake, Texas, September 11, 1991, NTSB/AAR-92/04. Washington, DC: Author.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2001). Death in the line of duty, Report F2000-13. Retrieved January 24, 2010 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200013.pdf.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2002). Death in the line of duty, Report F2001-33. Retrieved January 24, 2010 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200133.pdf.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2005a). Death in the line of duty, Report F2004-14. Retrieved January 24, 2010 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200414.pdf.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2005b). Death in the line of duty, Report F2005-09. Retrieved January 24, 2010 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200509.pdf.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2010). Death in the line of duty, Report F2009-11. Retrieved April 25, 2010 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200911.pdf

Thompson, J. (2010) FDIC keynote: Fire service culture not to blame for problems. Retrieved May 3, 2010 from http://www.firerescue1.com/firefighter-safety/articles/810852-FDIC-keynote-Fire-service-culture-not-to-blame-for-problems/

It has been a number of months since the last Reading the Fire post. It is essential to continue the process of deliberate practice in order to continue to improve and refine skill in Reading the Fire.

As we start the New Year it is a good time to reaffirm our commitment to mastering our craft. Developing and maintaining proficiency in reading the Fire using the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame) organizing scheme for fire behavior indicators, requires practice. This post provides an opportunity to exercise your skills using a video segment shot during a residential fire.

Residential Fire

In mid-January 2010, the Gary, Indiana Fire Department was dispatched to a residential fire on Massachusetts Street at East 24^th Avenue, on arrival Battalion 4 advised of a working fire in a 2 story dwelling. While the first arriving engine was laying a supply line from a nearby hydrant, the first in truck forced entry.

Download and the B-SAHF Worksheet.

Watch the first 35 seconds (0:35) of the video. This segment was shot from Side A. �First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators; then answer the following five standard questions?

1. What additional information would you like to have? How could you obtain it?
2. What stage(s) of development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel controlled or ventilation controlled)?
4. What conditions would you expect to find inside this building? If presented with persons reported (as the first arriving companies were) how would you assess potential for victim survival?
5. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes

Now watch the remainder of the video clip and answer the following questions:

1. Did fire conditions progress as you anticipated?
2. A voice heard in the video states that this was a backdraft. Do you agree? Why or why not?

It is likely that the first in truck company in this incident made entry to search for occupants and to locate the fire. Regardless of your perspective on search with or without a hoseline, this video clip provides lessons.

• It is essential to read the fire, recognize the stage(s) of fire development and burning regime(s) in the involved compartments.
• In addition to reading current conditions, anticipate likely fire development and potential for extreme fire behavior.
• Making entry (and leaving the door fully open) creates a ventilation opening (inlet, exhaust, or both). Recognize the potential influence of changes to the ventilation profile on fire behavior.
• To borrow a phrase from a number of National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Death in the Line of Duty reports; �Ventilation and fire attack must be closely coordinated�. One key element in this coordination is that charged lines must be in place before completion of ventilation openings. This is critical when dealing with a ventilation controlled fire.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFIreE, CFO

Quick Review

The previous post in this series presented a video clip of an incident on the afternoon of February 18, 2010 that injured four Chicago firefighters during operations at a residential fire at 4855 S. Paulina Street.

First arriving companies discovered a fire in the basement of a 1-1/2 story, wood frame, single family dwelling and initiated fire attack and horizontal ventilation of the floors above the fire. Based on news accounts, the company assigned to fire attack was in the stairwell and another firefighter was performing horizontal ventilation of the floors above the fire on Side C when a backdraft or smoke explosion occurred. Two firefighters on the interior, on at the doorway and the firefighter on the ladder on Side C were injured and were transported to local hospitals for burns and possible airway injuries.

In analyzing the video clip shot from inside a nearby building, we have several advantages over the firefighters involved in this incident.

Time: We are not under pressure to make a decision or take action.

Reduced Cognitive Workload: Unlike the firefighters who needed to not only read the fire, but also to attend to their assigned tactics and tasks, our only focus is analysis of the fire behavior indicators to determine what (if any) clues to the potential for extreme fire behavior may have been present.

Repetition: Real life does not have time outs or instant replay. However, our analysis of the video can take advantage of our ability to pause, and replay key segments, or the entire clip as necessary.

Perspective: Since the field of view in the video clip is limited by the window and the fidelity of the recording is less than that seen in real life, it presents a considerably different field of view than that of the firefighters observed in operation and does not allow observation of fire behavior indicators and tactical operations on Sides A, B, and D.

Initial Size-Up

What B-SAHF indicators could be observed on Side C up to the point where firefighters began to force entry and ventilate the basement (approximately 02:05)?

Figure 1. Conditions at 01:57 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Building: The structure is a 1-1/2 story, wood frame, dwelling with a daylight basement. The apparent age of the structure makes balloon frame construction likely, and the half story on the second floor is likely to have knee walls, resulting in significant void spaces on either side and a smaller void space above the ceiling on Floor 2. One window to the left of the door on Side C appears to be covered with plywood (or similar material). Given the location of the door (and door on Side A illustrated in the previous post in this series), it is likely that the stairway to the basement is just inside the door in Side C and a stairway to Floor 2 is just inside the door on Side A.

Smoke: A moderate volume of dark gray smoke is visible from the Basement windows and windows and door on Floor 1 as well as a larger volume from above the roofline on Side B. While dark, smoke on Side C does not appear to be thick (optically dense), possibly due to limited volume and concentration while smoke above the roofline on Side B appears to be thicker. However smoke on Side C thickens as time progresses, particularly in the area of the door on Floor 1. The buoyancy of smoke is somewhat variable with low buoyancy on Side C and greater buoyancy on Side B. However, smoke from the area of the door on Floor 1 Side C intermittently has increased buoyancy.

Air Track: Smoke on Side C appears to have a faintly pulsing air track with low velocity which is masked to some extent by the effects of the wind (swirling smoke due to changes in low level wind conditions). Smoke rising above the roofline on Side B appears to be moving with slightly greater velocity (likely due to buoyancy).

Heat: The only significant heat indicators are limited velocity of smoke discharge and variations in buoyancy of smoke visible from Sides B and C. Low velocity smoke discharge and low buoyancy of the smoke on Side C points to relatively low temperatures inside the building. The greater buoyancy and velocity of smoke observed above the roofline on Side B indicates a higher temperature in the area from where this smoke is discharging (likely a basement window on Side B).

Flame: No flames are visible.

Initial Fire Behavior Prediction

Based on assessment of conditions to this point, what stage(s) of development and burning regime(s) is the fire likely to be in?

Dark smoke with a pulsing air track points to a ventilation controlled, decay stage fire.

What conditions would you expect to find inside the building?

Floors 1 and 2 are likely to be fully smoke logged (ceiling to floor) with fairly low temperature. The basement is likely to have a higher temperature, but is also likely to be fully smoke logged with limited flaming combustion.

How would you expect the fire to develop over the next few minutes?

As ventilation is increased (tactical ventilation and entry for fire control), the fire in the basement will likely remain ventilation controlled, but will return to the growth stage as the heat release rate increases. Smoke thickness and level (to floor level) along with a pulsing air track points to potential for some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior such as ventilation induced flashover (most likely) or backdraft (less likely). Another possibility, would be a smoke explosion; ignition of premixed gas phase fuel (smoke) and air that is within its flammable range (less likely than some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior)

Ongoing Assessment

What indicators could be observed while the firefighter was forcing entry and ventilating the daylight basement on Side C (02:05-02:49)?

There are few changes to the fire behavior indicators during this segment of the video. Building, Heat, and Flame indicators are essentially unchanged. Smoke above the roofline appears to lighten (at least briefly) and smoke on Side C continues to show limited buoyancy with a slightly pulsing air track at the first floor doorway.

What B-SAHF indicators can be observed at the door on Side C prior to forced entry (02:49-03:13)?

Figure 2. Conditions at 03:06 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Figure 3. Conditions at 03:08 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Building, Smoke, Heat and Flame indicators remain the same, but several more pulsations (03:05-03:13) providing a continuing, and more significant indication of ventilation controlled, decay stage fire conditions.

What indicators can be observed at the door while the firefighter attempts to remove the covering over the window adjacent to the door on Floor 1 (03:13-13:44)?

No significant change in Building, Heat, or Flame Indicators. However, smoke from the doorway has darkened considerably and there is a pronounced pulsation as the firefighter on the ladder climbs to Floor 2 (03:26). It is important to note that some of the smoke movement observed in the video clip is fire induced, but that exterior movement is also significantly influenced by wind.

What B-SHAF indicators do you observe at the window on Floor 2 prior to breaking the glass (03:44)?

Figure 4. Conditions at 03:43 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

The window on Floor 2 is intact and appears to be tight as there is no smoke visible on the exterior. It is difficult to tell due to the angle from which the video was shot (and reflection from daylight), but it would be likely that the firefighter on the ladder could observe condensed pyrolizate on the window and smoke logging on Floor 2. It is interesting to note limited smoke discharge from the top of the door and window on Floor 1 in the brief period immediately prior to breaking the window on Floor 2.

What indicators are observed at the window on Floor 2 immediately after breaking the glass (03:44-03:55)?

Figure 5. Conditions at 03:52 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

No significant changes in Building, Heat, or Flame indicators. Dark gray smoke with no buoyancy issues from the window on Floor 2 with low to moderate velocity immediately after the window is broken.

What B-SAHF indicators were present after the ventilation of the window on Floor 2 Side C was completed and 04:08 in the video clip (03:44-04:08)?

Buoyancy and velocity both increase and a slight pulsing air track develops within approximately 10 seconds. In addition, the air track at the door on Floor 1 shifts from predominantly outward with slight pulsations to predominantly inward, but with continued pulsation (possibly due to the limited size of the window opening on Floor 2, Side C.

Anticipating Potential Fire Behavior

Unlike the firefighters in Chicago who were operating at this incident, we can hit the pause button and consider the indicators observed to this point. Think about what fire behavior indicators are present (and also consider those that are not!).

Initial observations indicated a ventilation controlled decay stage fire and predicted fire behavior is an increase in heat release rate with potential for some type of extreme fire behavior. Possibilities include ventilation induced flashover (most likely) or backdraft (less likely), or smoke explosion (less likely than some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior).

Take a minute to review the indicators of ventilation controlled, decay stage fires as illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1. Key Fire Behavior Indicators-Ventilation Controlled, Decay Stage Fires

Which of these indicators were present on Side C of 4855 S. Paulina Street?

Building: The building appeared to be unremarkable, a typical single family dwelling. However, most residential structures have more than enough of a fuel load to develop the conditions necessary for a variety of extreme fire behavior phenomena.

Smoke: The dark smoke with increasing thickness (optical density) is a reasonably good indicator of ventilation controlled conditions (particularly when combined with air track indicators). Lack of buoyancy indicated fairly low temperature smoke, which could be an indicator of incipient or decay stage conditions or simply distance from the origin of the fire. However, combined with smoke color, thickness, and air track indicators, this lack of buoyancy at all levels on Side C is likely an indicator of dropping temperature under decay stage conditions. This conclusion is reinforced by the increase in buoyancy after ventilation of the window on Floor 2 (increased ventilation precipitated increased heat release rate and increasing temperature).

Air Track: Pulsing air track, while at times quite subtle and masked by swirling smoke as a result of wind, is one of the strongest indications of ventilation controlled decay stage conditions. While often associated with backdraft, this indicator may also be present prior to development of a sufficient concentration of gas phase fuel (smoke) to result in a backdraft.

Heat: Velocity of smoke discharge (air track) and buoyancy (smoke) are the only two heat indicators visible in this video clip. As discussed in conjunction with smoke indicators, low velocity and initial lack of buoyancy which increases after ventilation is indicative of ventilation controlled, decay stage conditions.

Flame: Lack of visible flame is often associated with ventilation controlled decay and backdraft conditions. However, there are a number of incidents in which flames were visible prior to occurrence of a backdraft (in another compartment within the structure). Lack of flames must be considered in conjunction with the rest of the fire behavior indicators. In this incident, lack of visible flames may be related to the stage of fire development, but more likely is a result of the location of the fire, as there is no indication that flames were present on Side C prior to the start of the video clip.

What Happened?

Firefighters had entered the building for fire attack while as illustrated in the video clip, others were ventilating windows on Side C. It is difficult to determine from the video if a window or door at the basement level on Side C was opened, but efforts were made to do so. A window on Floor 2 had been opened and firefighters were in the process of removing the covering (plywood) from a window immediately adjacent to the door on Floor 1. At 04:12, an explosion occurred, injuring two firefighters on the interior as well as the two firefighters engaged in ventilation operations on Side C.

Starting at approximately 03:59, velocity of smoke discharge from the window on Floor 2 Side C increases dramatically. At 04:08 discharge of smoke begins to form a spherical pattern as discharged from the window. This pattern becomes more pronounced as the sphere of smoke is pushed away from the window by increasing velocity of smoke discharge at 04:12, immediately prior to the explosion. Velocity of smoke discharge at the door increases between 03:59 and -4:12 as well, but as the opening is larger, this change is less noticeable. As pressure increases rapidly during the explosion a whooshing sound can be heard. After the explosion, there was no noticeable increase in fire growth.

Figure 6. Conditions at 04:08 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Figure 7. Conditions at 04:09 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Figure 8. Conditions at 04:10 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Figure 9. Conditions at 04:11 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Figure 10. Conditions at 04:12 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Figure 11. Conditions at 04:13 Minutes Elapsed Time in the Video Clip

Based on observation of fire behavior indicators visible in the video clip, we know that a transient extreme fire behavior event occurred while a crew was advancing a hoseline on the interior and ventilation operations were being conducted on Side C. What we don�t know is what firefighting operations were occurring on the other sides of the building or in the interior. In addition, we do not have substantive information from the fire investigation that occurred after the fire was extinguished.

The Ontology of Extreme Fire Behavior presented in an earlier post classifies these types of phenomena on the basis of outcome and conditions. As a transient and explosive event, this was likely a backdraft or smoke explosion. In that this occurred following entry and during ongoing ventilation operations, I am inclined to suspect that it was a backdraft.

Indicators visible on Side C provided a subtle warning of potential for some type of ventilation induced extreme fire behavior, but were likely not substantially different from conditions observed at many fires where extreme fire behavior did not occur.

As the title of the wildland firefighting course S133 states; Look Up, Look Down, Look Around! Anticipation of fire development and extreme fire behavior requires not only recognition of key indicators, but that these indicators be viewed from a holistic perspective. Firefighters and/or officers performing a single task or tactical assignment may only see part of the picture. It is essential that key indicators be communicated to allow a more complete picture of what is occurring and what may occur as incident operations progress.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO