Posts Tagged ‘Fire Behavior Training’

Live Fire Simulations: Key Elements of Fidelity examined some of the important elements in physical fidelity, the extent to which the simulation looks and feels real. This post will begin the process of identifying key aspects of functional fidelity, the extent to which the simulation works and reacts realistically.

Maintaining the Balance

One important factor to consider in live fire training simulation is that despite the fact that it is a training exercise, the fire is real. While I too use the terms training fire and real fire, the combustion processes and fire dynamics in live fire training are the same as encountered in a structure fire. What is different is the type, amount, and geometry of the fuel used and the ventilation profile.

Providing complete functional fidelity (as well as physical fidelity) simply requires that structural environment, fuel loading, and ventilation be the same as would be encountered in an actual incident. However, this substantially increases variability of outcome and the risk to participants.

Use of a purpose built structure allows control of variability and provides the ability for repetitive and ongoing training. Purpose-built structures are often designed to use either solid Class A fuel or gaseous Class B fuel. Facility design and selection of fuel type should be based on a wide range of factors including provision of adequate fidelity for the type of training to be conducted, environmental issues, health and safety of participants, anticipated duty cycle (i.e., frequency and duration of training activity) and life-cycle cost (e.g., initial purchase price, ongoing maintenance costs).

Figure 1. Live Fire Simulation with Gas (left) and Class A Fuel (right)

As illustrated in Figure 1, there can be obvious and substantial differences in physical fidelity when gas fired props are used to simulate a typical compartment fire. Depending on the purpose of the simulation these physical differences can be important. However, differences in functional fidelity may be even more important.

Functional Fidelity

As stated earlier, functional fidelity is the extent to which the simulation works and reacts realistically. I have tentatively identified five subsystems related to functional fidelity of live fire simulation as illustrated in Figure 2.

Figure 2. Functional Fidelity Concept Map

This concept map is a simple and preliminary look at the elements of functional fidelity. Each of the concepts illustrated can be further refined and elaborated on to provide a clearer picture of physical fidelity in live fire training.

Physiology & Personal Protective Ensemble

Live fire simulation places the participant in a hostile environment requiring the use of personal protective clothing and self-contained breathing apparatus. Functional fidelity in these subsystems and their interaction with the thermal environment may or may not be a critical element of context, depending on the intended learning outcomes of the simulation. However, insulation of firefighters from the thermal environment encountered in structural firefighting delays, modifies, and my limit perception of critical thermal cues (e.g., high temperature, changes in temperature). Overcoming this challenge requires training in a realistic thermal context.

Fire Suppression System

One of the most critical elements in functional fidelity of the fire suppression system involves interaction with fire dynamics: Does the fire and fire environment (e.g., hot gas layer) react appropriately to extinguishing agent application? In some respects there may be a conflict between the desire for physical fidelity of the fire suppression system and functional fidelity of the interaction between extinguishing agent application and fire dynamics. For example, it may be desirable for participants to use the same flow rate (providing realistic nozzle reaction) in simulations as will be used in the structural firefighting environment. However, the limited fuel load typically used to provide a safe training environment do not result in the same required flow rate for fire control as fire in a typical residential or commercial compartment. Does use of a high flow handline in live fire simulation with limited fuel load create an unrealistic expectation of the performance under actual incident conditions? Which is more effective, realistic flow rate with a limited fuel load or matching of flow rate and fuel load to provide a realistic interaction between the fire and fire attack? This question remains to be answered.

The type of nozzle used presents a simpler issue related to functional fidelity in live fire simulation. Most combination nozzles have similar operational controls for controlling the flow of water (i.e. on and off) and pattern adjustment. However, there are subtle differences such as the extent of movement needed to adjust from straight stream to wide angle fog. Flow control mechanisms vary more widely from fixed flow rate, to variable flow and automatic nozzles. Firefighters must be able to select pattern and flow as necessary based on conditions encountered in the fire environment and intended method of water application. Use of a substantively different nozzle in training than during incident operations is likely to result in less than optimal performance. However, as with the question of flow rate, the extent to which this is a concern is unknown.

Fire Dynamics

Likely the greatest concerns with regards to functional fidelity are in the area of fire dynamics. If firefighters are to learn how fires develop and the impact of changes to ventilation profile and application of extinguishing agents, the fire must behave as it would under actual incident conditions (or as close to this ideal as can be safely and practically accomplished).

Most fuels encountered in structure fires are solids (e.g., furniture, interior finish, structural materials). Class A fuel used in live fire training, often has a lower heat of combustion and heat release rate than typical fuel in the built environment, but is similar in that it must undergo pyrolysis in order to burn; providing similar (but not identical) combustion performance. Combustion of Class A fuel also results in generation of significant smoke, another similarity to typical fuels in the built environment. Class B (gas) fuel used in structure fire simulations has a high heat of combustion with heat release rate controlled through engineering and design of the burner system. However, this fuel generally burns cleanly, necessitating introduction of artificial smoke to provide higher fidelity. Flaming combustion and smoke production must be mechanically controlled by a computerized system, a human operator, or both. The nature of the fuel and design of the combustion system also impact on the fires reaction to changes in ventilation and application of extinguishing agents such as water.

Changes to ventilation will not substantively influence fire behavior if the fire is fuel controlled. However, if the fire is ventilation controlled, changes in ventilation can have a significant impact on fire behavior (which may or may not be desirable, depending on the intended learning outcomes).

With Class A fuel, water applied to cool the hot gas layer or to fuel packages has a similar impact as it would in actual structural firefighting operations. The degree of similarity is dependent on the design of the compartment in which the training is being conducted as well as fuel factors and ventilation profile. With Class B fuel, temperature sensors, computerized controls, and a human operator all must interact to ensure that water application results in appropriate changes to combustion.

System Latency

In general, live fire training simulations are conducted in real time. However, time lag due to system limitations in Class B (gas) fired props or delay in instructor or operator perception of changing conditions in either Class A or B fueled props can influence system latency, resulting in faster or slower than normal interaction between� fire dynamics and fire control subsystems.

Closing Thoughts

While I admit I am (currently) biased in favor of live fire training simulation using Class A fuel, there is no reason why other systems such as those using Class B (gas) fuel could not be designed in such a way to provide higher fidelity. However, this would likely increase both complexity and cost. I have been also discussing the potential of computer based (non-live-fire) fire training systems to develop some (but likely not all) of the skills necessary to safely operate in the structural firefighting environment. This is something else to think about!

I will come back to this topic again from time to time as I gain additional insight into the elements of physical and functional fidelity in live fire training.

Remember the Past

Last Tuesday, was the second anniversary of the deaths of Captain Mathew Burton and Engineer Scott Desmond of the Contra Costa County Fire Protection District in California.

Figure 1. 149 Michele Drive-Alpha/Delta Corner

Note: Contra Costa Fire Protection District (Firefighter Q76) Photo, Investigation Report: Michele Drive Line of Duty Deaths. This photo illustrates conditions shortly after 0159 (Q76 time of arrival).

July 21, 2007
Captain Matthew Charles Burton
Fire Engineer Scott Peter Desmond
Contra Costa County Fire Protection District, California

Captain Burton, Engineer Desmond, and another engineer were the crew of Engine 70. At 0143 hours, Engine 70 was dispatched to a residential fire alarm. As additional information was received, the incident was upgraded to a structural fire response with the addition of two engines, a quint, and a command officer.

Engine 70 arrived on the scene at 0150 hours and reported heavy fire and smoke from a small single-family residence. Firefighters reported that they had confirmed reports that two occupants of the home were still inside.

Captain Burton and Engineer Desmond advanced an attack line into the structure and flowed water on the fire. They reported that the fire had been knocked down and requested ventilation at 0155 hours. Captain Burton and Engineer Desmond exited the structure temporarily to retrieve a TIC, then re-entered the structure and went to the left toward the bedrooms with an attack line, while another crew went to the right without an attack line.

The engineer for Engine 70 placed a PPV fan at the front door. One of the civilian fire victims was located by the crew that had gone to the right; her removal was difficult and firefighters had to exit the building to ask for help. During this time, the fire inside the house advanced rapidly.

Firefighters had difficulty venting the roof due to multiple roofs, built-up roofing materials, and the type of construction.

A command officer arrived on the scene at approximately 0202 hours and began to look for Captain Burton to assume Command. The command officer tried to contact the Engine 70 crew by radio but was unsuccessful. A second alarm was requested, and a report of a missing firefighter was transmitted at approximately 0205 hours.

The fire had advanced within the structure and had to be controlled before firefighters could search for the missing crew. Captain Burton and Engineer Desmond were located and removed from the structure between 0212 and 0226 hours. The firefighters were found in a bedroom.

For additional information, see my earlier posts on this incident, the Contra Costa County Fire District Investigative Report, and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Death in the Line of Duty Report.

Contra Costa County LODD: Part 1

Contra Costa County LODD: Part 2

Contra Costa County LODD: What Happened

Contra Costa County Fire Protection District Investigation Report: Michele Drive Line of Duty Deaths

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH) Death in the Line of Duty Report F2007-28

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

Several earlier posts (Training Fires Versus Real Fires, Live Fire Training: Important Questions) introduced the concepts of live fire training as simulation, physical fidelity, and functional fidelity. This post will dig a bit deeper into what aspects of fidelity may be important in live fire training.

Interesting Puzzle

Physical fidelity is the extent to which the simulation looks and feels real. Functional fidelity is the extent to which the simulation works and reacts realistically. In Live Fire Training: Important Questions, I presented a puzzle provided by Roy Reyes of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency. He forwarded me the following photo (Figure 1) from a fire behavior instructor course that he had conducted in Valencia, Spain and posed two questions, one quite general and the other very specific:

1. What do you see in the photo?
2. Why are the flames in the hot gas layer in the center, and not across the entire width of the compartment?

Figure 1. Participants Conducting Fire Behavior Demonstration 2

Physical and functional fidelity are potentially quite important in developing firefighters understanding of fire behavior and skill in application of fire control techniques. The two questions that Roy asks are important (and I will get back to them). However, two more fundamental questions could be asked: 1) To what extent is the fire behavior in this container based prop reflective of conditions that would be encountered in a “real” fire? 2) Does it matter (given the learning outcomes intended for this training session)?

Physical Fidelity

Physical fidelity is important in providing visual, audible, and tactile cues that are essential to developing and maintaining situational awareness. In addition, physical fidelity is a key component in firefighters’ perception of the realism of the simulation.

The concept of physical fidelity is simple. However, when you start to think about the live fire training environment, it quickly becomes more complex. The elements of fidelity related to flight simulation discussed in Live Fire Training: Important Questions as a starting point. Physical fidelity may include the firefighters’ personal protective ensemble, tools, and equipment as well as visual, audio, and thermal aspects of the environment. As illustrated in Figure 2, a number of these elements of physical fidelity are interrelated.

Figure 2. Physical Fidelity Concept Map

This concept map is a simple and preliminary look at the elements of physical fidelity. Each of the concepts illustrated can be further refined and elaborated on to provide a clearer picture of physical fidelity in live fire training.

Functional Fidelity

While physical fidelity is important, functional fidelity; realistic functioning of the simulation, is likely even more important. Development of critical skills and the ability to read the impact of tactical action is dependent on adequate functional fidelity.

As with physical fidelity, the concept is straight forward, the simulation should function in a realistic manner. However, this is likely to be even more complex than simply looking realistic.

Roy’s puzzle provides an interesting starting point to think about the nature, function, and importance of functional fidelity.

The first question asked, what do you see in the photo? Firefighters are engaged in a training session in a container based CFBT cell with a fire located in the front on the right side. A well defined hot gas layer has developed with flames extending through the hot gas layer at the center of the compartment.

The second question is more significant. Why are the flames extending in the hot gas layer in the center of the compartment and not across the full width of the compartment? There could be a number of possible explanations, but it is likely that the metal walls of the container are acting as thermal ballast. Energy used to increase the temperature of the metal compartment walls (which have excellent thermal conductivity) is not being used in the combustion process (preventing flaming combustion next to the walls). The same phenomenon can be demonstrated by placing a coil of copper wire into a candle flame. This causes a reduction in flaming combustion, and in many cases the wire absorbs sufficient energy to extinguish the flame.

So, the thermal conductivity of the container walls can at times influence the behavior of flaming combustion in CFBT cells. Does this present a problem or is it simply an opportunity to present the puzzle to the learners and engage in a discussion about thermal ballast?

A subsequent post will examine this concept in greater depth and present a preliminary concept map illustrating key dimensions of functional fidelity.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

In their article Realistic Live Burn Training You Can Afford published in the May 2009 issue of Fire Engineering, Kriss Garcia and Reinhard Kauffmann extolled the advantages of constructing a panelized wood frame structure lined with several layers of 5/8″ sheetrock (see Figure 1) as an alternative to other types of structural live fire training props and facilities. I have to admit; I am intrigued by the potential advantages of this prop for demonstration of the influence of horizontal ventilation (both natural and positive pressure) and tactical training in fire attack operations. However, I am not convinced that this prop is universally superior to other types of purpose built structures used for live fire training. Choice of live fire training facilities needs to consider a range of factors including intended learning outcomes, cost (both initial and life-cycle), and environmental considerations and constraints.

Figure 1. Build and Burn Single Family Dwelling

Photo provided by Kriss Garcia (positivepressureattack.com)

Response to Garcia and Kauffmann

The most important factor to consider in design, selection, and use of live fire training props and facilities is that all live fire training is a simulation. The fire is real, but the fuel load and conditions are managed to create a specific effect (unlike in the “real world”). This does not necessarily mean that the training is ineffective, simply that each evolution is intended to provide the participants with a specific opportunity to learn and develop skills.

Having conducted a substantial number of live fire training exercises in purpose built props and acquired structures, I have found that each has its advantages. Kriss and Reinhard are particularly critical of props constructed from steel containers. They state that these type of props do not provide a realistic context for showing fire development or honing fire tactical skills. I would respectfully disagree with several caveats. 1) A single compartment prop (such as a demonstration or attack cell) is not designed or intended for tactical training. This type of prop is designed to provide a safe and effective environment to demonstrate fundamental fire development in a compartment and the opportunity for learners to practice nozzle technique. 2) Multi-compartment container-based props do provide a reasonable context for tactical training with interior doors, obstructions, potential for varied fire location, etc. However, as with all other types of prop using Class A fuel (including the build and burn structure), the fuel load and configuration is considerably different than in an actual dwelling or commercial structure. Kriss also points to the severe fire conditions and damage to both equipment and participants when working in container based props. This is the result of inappropriate use, not a defect in the type of prop used. Conditions are set and controlled by the instructors.

I have greater agreement with Kriss’s and Reinhard’s observations on high-tech gas fired props in that they often fail to replicate key fire behavior indicators and may not respond appropriately to ventilation and application of water, providing poor feedback to the learners on their performance.

I also agree with many of Kriss’s and Reinhard’s observations on acquired structures. However, their example illustrating “unpredictable fire behavior” due to medium density fiberboard that had been plastered over, resulting in ignition of pyrolysis products behind the attack crew is inaccurate. This fire behavior was entirely predictable, but unanticipated (the big difference here is that unanticipated fire behavior is simply the result of a lack of information on the part of the instructors, not by random action by the fire). Kriss states that when working with acquired structures, you need to strictly adhere to the requirements of NFPA 1403. This may be a bit misleading in that this standard applies to all live fire training (including use of the build and burn structure).

Kriss and Reinhard make a good case for the ideal live fire training structure. However, it is critical to also give some thought to the intended purpose of the building or prop. Single compartment props (regardless of what they are constructed out of) may be a tremendous tool for practicing door entry and nozzle technique much like a putting green or driving range when practicing golf. The putting green and driving range are useful tools in developing specific skills, but they are not the game of golf. The ideal live fire training prop is designed to provide a means to safely, effectively, and efficiently achieve specified learning outcomes. Much the same as there is no single tactic that will solve all problems presented on the fireground, there is no single type of live fire training prop that provides the ideal context for all types of live fire training evolutions. Again, it is critical to remember that all live fire training is a simulation. The key is to provide an adequate degree of physical and functional fidelity (look real enough and behaves real enough) to achieve the intended learning outcomes.

Intended Use and Learning Outcomes

Pilots in the United States Air Force follow an exacting course of study which includes classroom instruction, simulation, and flight instruction in trainer aircraft such as theT6 and T38 before progression to more advanced aircraft such as the F22 Raptor. Each simulator and aircraft used in this progression is intended to provide the pilot with a specific learning context. After transition to high performance aircraft, pilots continue to use simulators to practice skills that may be too high risk to perform in flight.

Figure 2. T6, T38, & F22 Aircraft

The same concept can be applied to live fire training. Observing fire development and the effect of water application may require a somewhat different context than evolutions involving door entry procedures and integration of fire control and tactical ventilation. In an ideal world, fire service agencies would have access to various types of live fire training props, each suited to providing the best context for specific levels of training and learning outcomes. Container based props and burn buildings may be simple or complex dependent on their intended purpose and learning outcomes that they are designed to support (see Figures 3-5)

Figure 3. Split Level Cell, Palm Beach County Fire Rescue

Note: This prop was constructed by Fire Training Structures, LLC and is most effective for demonstrating compartment fire behavior.

Figure 4. Large Volume Container, Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, Sand�, Sweden

Note: This prop was constructed on site and is designed to demonstrate fire behavior and the impact of tactical operations in large compartments such as found in commercial buildings.

Figure 5. Large Masonry Burn Building, British Fire Service College

Note: This is one of many live fire training facilities at the college (including container based props and other masonry burn buildings). This building provides an industrial context for advanced firefighter training.

However, for most of us it is not a perfect world. Fire departments faced with limited fiscal resources are often limited in their options for live fire training. If they are fortunate, they have or have access to a purpose built structure that provides a safe and effective environment for a variety of types of live fire training. Each of these types of structures has limitations. The major problem encountered is when instructors and learners believe that the purpose built structure is intended to fully replicate a realistic fire environment as encountered during emergency incidents. It cannot, much the same as a flight simulator cannot fully replicate flying a high performance aircraft. However, it can replicate critical elements of context that help develop knowledge, skill, and a high level of proficiency.

Instructors must 1) identify the intended learning outcomes and critical elements of context necessary to develop learner proficiency to ensure participant safety and 2) recognize both the capabilities and limitations of the props and facilities available.

Other Considerations

Fire departments often face a more difficult challenge than determining what type of prop or facility is most effective or how to best use available facilities. The cost of live fire training is a major concern and unfortunately is often a major determining factor in the availability and type of live fire training conducted. The initial cost for purpose built props and facilities can be a large hurdle with simple commercially built props and structures costing from $40,000 to hundreds of thousands of dollars (or even more for a commercial fire simulator as illustrated in Figure 5). �However, initial cost of the prop or facility is the tip of the iceberg. Ongoing costs include fuel, maintenance, as well as instructor and student costs.

While somewhat beyond the scope of this post, environmental considerations and restrictions can also have a significant impact on both design and operation of live fire training facilities and can also have a significant impact on initial and ongoing cost.

The Way Forward

In general, there has not been a concerted and scientifically based effort to determine the critical elements of context required for live fire training. As discussed in Training Fires and Real Fires, live fire training must look real enough (physical fidelity) and react realistically to tactical operations (functional fidelity). However, we have not defined to what extent this is necessary to develop critical skills.

The variety of props, structures, and facilities available for live fire training is substantial, as is the difference in initial, ongoing, and life-cycle cost. While some work has been done comparing these various options, it is often left to individual departments to sort this out without a consistent framework or methodology.

Subsequent posts will examine these two issues in a bit more depth.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

Reference

Garcia, K. & Kaufmann, R. (2009, 2009). Realistic live-burn training you can afford. Fire Engineering, 162(5), 89-93.

The theme for the 2009 meeting Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) Compartment Firefighting Special Interest Group (SIG) in Sydney, Australia was Finding the Common Ground. The 15 participants represented 12 fire service organizations from Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, the UK, Spain, Croatia, China, Canada, and the United States.

Figure 1. 2009 IFE Compartment Firefighting SIG Participants

Understanding & Application

The dominant common theme identified by the participants is the need for firefighters and fire officers to have a solid understanding of fire dynamics and the ability to apply that knowledge in an operational context. Achieving this goal cannot be accomplished simply by delivering a course or training program, it requires a fundamental shift in perspective and ongoing effort to support individual and organizational learning.

Simply achieving knowledge of fire dynamics and skill in task and tactical activity is necessary but not sufficient. Achieving increased safety and effectiveness requires that firefighters and fire officers effectively apply this knowledge on the fireground. Facilitating this transfer from training to operational context is a challenge is a significant challenge.

Dr. Stefan Svensson of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency posed the question: How do we get learners to understand the differences between training fires and “real fires”. This is an interesting question in that training conducted in a container, burn building, or acquired structure is in fact a “real fire”, but has considerably different characteristics than a fire occurring in a house, apartment, or commercial building. Improperly designed training may provide the learner with an inaccurate perspective on the fire environment which can lead to disastrous consequences. The challenge is managing risk while developing a realistic understanding of fire behavior.

What is the Difference?

Compartment fires in the training environment differ from those encountered during emergency operations differ on the basis of compartment characteristics, fuel, ventilation profile, heat release rate, and time scale. In addition to differences related to fire dynamics, firefighters and fire officers also encounter psychological stress resulting from a sense of urgency, organizational and community expectations (particularly in situations where persons are reported to be trapped in the building).

Other than acquired buildings, structures used for fire training are generally designed and built for repetitive use and not for regular human habitation. Structural characteristics that make a durable live fire training facility are considerably different than most if not all other structures in the built environment. Density, thermal conductivity, and specific heat of training structures can be considerably different than a dwelling or commercial structure, which has a significant impact on fire behavior.

The ventilation profile of a purpose built prop or burn building is also likely to have significantly different compartmentation and ventilation profile than a typical residential or commercial structure. Live fire training facilities often (but not always) are designed with burn compartments. This speeds fire development and minimizes both initial and ongoing cost. However, fire behavior and the impact of fire control tactics can be considerably different in a large area and/or high ceiling compartment. Many modern structures are designed with open floor plans that are challenging to duplicate in the training environment. Energy efficient structures limit ventilation (air exchange), while training structures are often quite leaky, particularly after extensive use. This can have a significant influence on development of a ventilation controlled burning regime and influence of ventilation on the concentration of gas phase fuel in smoke. Failure of glass windows in ordinary structures should be anticipated, as this changes the ventilation profile and resulting fire behavior. Training structures on the other hand provide a more consistent ventilation profile as durable (e.g., metal) windows do not present the same potential for failure.

While structural characteristics, compartmentation, and ventilation differ between typical structures in the built environment and those used for live fire training, one of the most significant differences lies in the types, quantity, and configuration of fuel.

National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training is fairly explicit regarding fuel characteristics and loading for live fire training evolutions. Most of these provisions can be tied directly to incidents in which participants in live fire training exercises lost their lives. Unfortunately, there are not the same provisions in fire and building codes. Fuel load is considerably higher in most residential and commercial occupancies than is typically used in live fire training, even in advanced tactical evolutions.

Together these differences provide considerably different fire dynamics between the training and operational environments. How much and in what ways does this impact on the effectiveness of compartment fire behavior training (CFBT)?

Fidelity

As discussed, CFBT, even when conducted in an acquired structure does not completely replicate fire conditions encountered in an operational context. All CFBT involves simulation. The extent to which a simulation reflects reality is referred to as fidelity:

The degree to which a model or simulation reproduces the state and behavior of a real world object or the perception of a real world object, feature, condition, or chosen standard in a measurable or perceivable manner; a measure of the realism of a model or simulation; faithfulness… 2. The methods, metrics, and descriptions of models or simulations used to compare those models or simulations to their real world referents or to other simulations in such terms as accuracy, scope, resolution, level of detail, level of abstraction and repeatability. (Northam, n.d.)

CFBT can involve a wide range of simulations, from the use of photos and video, non-fire exercises, small scale props such as doll’s houses, single and multi-compartment props, and burn buildings, and acquired structures. Each provides differing degrees of fidelity.

Fidelity can be described in a number of different ways. One fairly simple approach is to examine physical and functional fidelity (see Figure 2). Physical fidelity is the extent to which the simulation looks and feels real. Functional fidelity is based on the extent to which the simulation works and reacts realistically.

Figure 2. Two-Dimensional Fidelity Matrix

Note: Adapted from Fidelity Versus Cost and its Effect on Modeling & Simulation (Duncan, 2007)

While describing fidelity of a simulation as low, moderate, or high, this is likely to be inadequate. A more useful description of fidelity includes both qualitative and quantitative measures on multiple dimensions. But what measures and what dimension? In a compartment firefighting simulation, key elements of physical fidelity will likely include fire behavior indicators such as Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame (B-SAHF). Important aspects of physical fidelity would include the characteristics of doors and windows (e.g., opening mechanism), hose and nozzles, and influence of tactics such as gas and surface cooling on fire behavior.

On the surface it makes sense that increased fidelity would result in increased effectiveness and transfer of knowledge and skill. However, it is important to remember that “All models are wrong, but some models are useful” (Box & Draper, 1987, p. 424). The importance the various aspects of fidelity depend on the intended learning outcome of the simulation. In fact, a simulation that focuses on critical contextual elements may be more effective than one that more fully replicates reality.

Figure 3. Door Entry Drill

For example, teaching the mechanics and sequence of door entry procedures (see Figure 3) might be more effectively accomplished using a standard door without smoke and flame than under more realistic live fire conditions. On the other hand, reading fire behavior indicators at the door and effectively predicting interior conditions is likely to require substantively different elements of context. However, at this point, we simply have unsupported opinion and in some cases anecdotal evidence of the effectiveness or lack of effectiveness of current training practices. The key to this puzzle is to clearly define the intended learning outcomes and identify the critical elements of context that are required.

Questions Remain

The IFE Compartment Firefighting SIG identified the need for a greater emphasis on fire behavior training at all levels (e.g., entry level firefighters, incumbent firefighters, and fire officer) as well as ongoing professional development and skills maintenance. However, a number of interesting questions remain, including:

• What are the most effective methods of developing firefighters understanding of compartment fire behavior?
• What is necessary to effectively facilitate transfer of this knowledge from training to the operational context?
• What level of fidelity is necessary in live fire training do develop and maintain critical skills?
• How can technological simulation (computer or video based) simulation be used to augment live fire training to maintain proficiency?
• To what extent might non-live fire simulation (e.g., CFBT for the Wii) be used to develop compartment firefighting competencies?

Professor David Morgan of Portland State University observes that “A successful research project requires two things: Meaningful research questions and appropriate means to answer those questions” (Morgan, 2005, p. 1-2). One of the greatest potential benefits resulting from collaboration between members of the IFE Compartment Firefighting SIG is the integration of the skills of academics and practitioners, scientists and firefighters. During the 2009 workshop, SIG member Steve Kerber from Underwriters Laboratory (formerly with the National Institute for Standards and Technology) emphasized the importance of scientists and engineers doing research with, not simply for the fire service. This has the potential to not only identify meaningful questions, but also to provide the knowledge and skills necessary to answer them.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Northam, G. (n.d.). Simulation fidelity – Getting in touch with reality. Retrieved May 2, 2009 from http://www.siaa.asn.au/get/2395365095.pdf

Box, G. & Draper, N. (1987). Empirical model-building and response surfaces. San Francisco: Wiley.

Duncan, J. (2007). Fidelity versus cost and its effect on modeling & simulation. Paper presented at Twelfth International Command and Control Research and Technology Symposium (12^th ICCRTS), 19-21 June 2007, Newport, RI.

Morgan, D. (2005). Introduction [to integrated methods] (Unpublished Manuscript). Portland, OR: Portland State University.

Greetings from Australia

As I mentioned in an earlier post, I am in Sydney, Australia to participate in the Institution of Fire Engineers (IFE) Compartment Fire Behavior Special Interest Group (SIG) International Instructor’s Workshop and present at International Firefighting Safety Conference 2009 which is being held in Sydney and Perth, Australia. I am energized by the unique opportunity to be involved with these two events.

In 2008, Dr. Stefan Svensson of the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency (formerly Raddningsverket or the Swedish Rescue Services Agency), had an idea to invite a number of instructors, fire officers, and researchers with an interest in compartment fires to Sweden. His purpose was to “see what would happen” if he put a dozen or so highly motivated, passionate, and generally opinionated fire service professionals from around the world who share a common interest in the same room for a couple of days. Stefan in an interesting guy, he is a fire protection engineer who conducts research on fire behavior and firefighting operations and teaches at the national Fire College in Revinge. However, he is also an part time firefighter and crew commander assigned to a fire station in a small village outside Malmo, Sweden.

I was fortunate enough to be one of those invited to Stefan’s experiment. Last spring we traveled to the Fire College in Revinge, Sweden and spent several days listening to presentations participating in a wide range of live fire training exercises and observing demonstrations of fire control techniques and training methods. Interestingly, we found that we had much in common (both personally and professionally) and all learned a great deal.

At the workshop we discussed how this collaborative effort could be continued. Shan Raffel from Queensland, Australia, suggested forming a SIG within the IFE as one way to help maintain momentum and provide an means to bring the range of fire service professionals engaged in research, study, and application of knowledge related to fire behavior. As a significan number of the group were IFE members, this semed like an excellent idea. At the time, Shan was the President of the Australia Branch of the IFE and served as the principle organizer and driving force behind accomplishing this task and bringing the group to Australia for our next meeting.

Working Collaboratively

I had an interesting dinner conversation with Stefan Svensson Saturday night. We were talking about the importance of our network, working together, and sharing knowledge. Neither scientists nor firefighters have a complete understanding of fire behavior; both have part, but not the entire picture. However, working together, we are more likely to be asking the right questions and gain an improved understanding.

Stefan shared that he had tried to figure out how many firefighters there are in the world. Likely this estimate was far from accurate, but the number is quite large. He observed that many firefighters do not collaborate with others outside their own agency (and in some cases even within their own agency). We puzzled over why this was the case. All of us are engaged in essentially the same types of work (at least in the firefighting domain), we use the same technology (water, hose, nozzles, tools, ladders), and share the same passion for our work. Why is it often so difficult for agencies and individuals to work across borders (local, national, or international)?

Over the last year, a number of the participants in the first international workshop have maintained contact and collaborated using e-mail and Skype (free voice over internet protocol voice and video phone). I am equally as likely to collaborate with colleagues in Sweden, Australia, the UK, Croatia, Canada, or Chile as those in neighboring jurisdictions. While it is great to travel, meet face to face and share information, today’s technology provides a great (and considerably less expensive) way to do so. For example, I had never met Shan and John McDonough when Paul Grimwood and I worked with them to write 3D Firefighting: Training, Techniques, & Tactics. We accomplished that task simply using e-mail. I think that with current technology (e.g., Skype) this would have been an easier task.

My next post will be following the conclusion of the International Fire Instructor’s Workshop and I will share our experiences and accomplishments. The challenge for you is to look for opportunities to share your knowledge, collaborate with and learn with others and develop a broader community of practice as a fire service professional!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

In May 2008 I was fortunate to be one of 12 instructors, fire officers, and fire scientists who met in Revinge, Sweden at the invitation of Dr. Stefan Svensson of R�ddnings Verket (Swedish Rescue Services Agency). Stefan was intrigued by the idea of putting a dozen or so leading fire service professionals with an interest in fire behavior, but divergent perspectives on strategies and tactics in the same room. His research question was to “see what would happen”. Stefan invited participants from Sweden, the United Kingdom, Australia, Poland, Germany, Spain, France, and the United States to this unique event.

Figure 1. Participants in the 2008 International Fire Instructors Workshop

What happened was that we found tremendous commonality of interest and commitment to improving firefighter safety and fire protection across the world. Surprisingly, while we often disagreed on technical issues and discussion was at times quite vigorous, we left the workshop with greater understanding and a stronger bond.

Special Interest Group

As an outgrowth of our meeting in Sweden, we formed a special interest group (SIG) under the umbrella of the Institution of Fire Engineers. The Compartment Fire Behavior Special Interest Group serves to construct knowledge by integrating fire behavior research, instruction, and practical application.

The first meeting of this newly formed SIG will be held 27-28 April 2009 in Sydney, Australia with the theme Finding the Common Foundation. Participants from around the world will be examining compartment fire behavior training principles and practices to find common ground and identify best practices. Immediately following the workshop, the participants will be presenting at the International Firefighting Safety Conference in Sydney on 29 April through 1 May and in Perth on 4-5 May 2009.

International Firefighting Safety Conference

The conference theme is Protecting the Protectors with a wide range of presentations on fire science, strategy and tactics, and fire behavior training.

I will be making two presentations in Sydney and one in Perth:

• How Much Science? (Sydney)
• Extreme Fire Behavior: Understanding the Hazard (Sydney)
• Fire Development in a Compartment (Perth)

Additional information and a complete outline of the program is available on the conference web site .

Critical NIOSH Recommendation

On Thursday morning, I will be somewhere over the western Pacific, but use WordPress’ automated publishing feature to upload a post on NIOSH Report F2007-28 on the line-of-duty deaths of Captain Matthew Burton and Engineer Scott Desmond of the Contra Costa Fire Protection District while conducting primary search at a residential fire. In a groundbreaking first, NIOSH has identified the need for improvement in Firefighter and Fire Officer Professional Qualifications Standards in the area of fire behavior knowledge:

Standard setting agencies, states, municipalities, and authorities having jurisdiction should: consider developing more comprehensive training requirements for fire behavior to be required in NFPA 1001 Standard for Fire Fighter Professional Qualifications and NFPA 1021 Standard for Fire Officer Professional Qualifications and states, municipalities, and authorities having jurisdiction should ensure that fire fighters within their district are trained to these requirements.

Following the conference, I will publish a series of posts from a CFBT-US case study on this incident and the potential influence of the ventilation tactics used on the extreme fire behavior phenomena that occured.

Reports from the Workshop and Conference

I will be posting on information presented at the workshop conference over the next two weeks.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

25 Years Later

Firefighters Scott Smith and William Duran died as a result of flashover during a search and rescue drill in Boulder, Colorado on January 26, 1982 (Demers Associates, 1982, August). This incident has particular significance in that it was one of the major influences in the development of National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) Standard 1403 Live Fire Training Evolutions in Structures (NFPA, 1986). 25 years after the deaths of the two firefighters in Boulder, rapid fire progress during live fire training claimed the life of Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson in Baltimore, Maryland (Shimer, 2007; NIOSH, 2008)

What makes this even more tragic is that unlike the incident in Boulder, for the last 20 years the fire service has had a national consensus standard that defines minimum acceptable practice for live fire training.

Training Exercise on South Calverton Road

Information on the incident that resulted in the death of Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson was drawn from the Independent Investigation Report: Baltimore City Fire Department Live Fire Training Exercise 145 South Calverton Road February 9, 2007 (Shimer, 2007) and NIOSH Death in the Line of Duty Report F2007-09 (NIOSH, 2008).

On February 9, 2007 twenty-two members of Baltimore City Fire Department Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Class 19 were participating in live fire training in an acquired structure. The objectives of this training exercise included practice in fire attack, primary search, forcible entry, and ventilation. The building used for this training exercise was a three story, single family row house of ordinary (masonry and wood joist) construction. The building was of somewhat unusual design with the front (A Side) of the building constructed at an angle (parallel to the street) resulting in a trapezoidal floor plan as illustrated in Figure 1. The third floor was considerably smaller than the first two floors with third floor windows on Side C looking out over the second floor roof. The building had previously been used for training and ceilings and portions of the walls on the second and third floors had been opened up during ventilation and forcible entry practice.

Five instructors assigned to the Training Academy and six adjunct instructors were responsible for managing the live fire training exercise and providing instruction. Lieutenant Crest (Training Academy staff) served as Incident Commander and Division Chief Hyde served as the Safety Officer. Two instructors were assigned as the ignition team and others were assigned to supervise assigned crews of Firefighter Paramedic Apprentices. An engine and truck from the Training Academy were positioned on the A Side of the building. The engine was supplied by a hydrant through a single large diameter hoseline.

The plan for the training exercise called for eight separate fuel packages on Floors 2 (two fuel packages) and 3 (six fuel packages) to be ignited. Each fuel package consisted of one or three pallets and excelsior (soft shredded wood packing material). Crews would be assigned to fire attack on floors two and three while other crews performed forcible entry (in support of fire attack) primary search, ventilation. The trainees were divided into five companies, designated Engine 1 (fire attack on Floor 3), Engine 2 (fire attack on Floor 2), Truck 1 (placement of ladders and then search and rescue), Truck 2 (assist with forcible entry on Side C), and Truck 3 (vertical ventilation). While the Incident Commander outlined the plan for the instructors, the trainees were not provided with a walkthrough of the building or safety briefing prior to the start of the live fire exercise.

The Incident Commander (Lieutenant Crest) accompanied the ignition team into the building and supervised ignition of the fires on Floors 3 and 2. While none of the instructors indicated doing so, a fire was also lit in debris (three mattresses, automobile tire, upholstered chair, and other combustible materials) located just inside the doorway on Floor 1 Side C.

Fire Attack

The crew designated Engine 1 consisted of Emergency Vehicle Driver Wenger (Instructor) and Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Wilson (nozzle), Paramedic Cisneros (2^nd on the line), and Firefighter Paramedic Apprentices Perez, and Lichtenberg. Engine 1 was tasked with fire attack on Floor 3. None of the crew from Engine 1 was equipped with a portable radio and received their orders face-to-face from Command. When the instructor questioned passing the fire on Floor 2, Command indicated that another line would be coming in right behind them and to go directly to Floor 3. Engine 1 entered from Side A with a 1-3/4″ (45 mm) hoseline and proceeded up the interior stairwell. None of the members of this crew indicated seeing fire on Floor 1 at the time they made entry.

Figure 1. Baltimore Floor Plan.

Note: Adapted from City of Baltimore.� Independent investigation report: The Baltimore city fire department live fire training exercise 145 South Calverton Road February 9, 2007, (Shimmer, 2007, pp. 13)

Upon reaching Floor 2, Engine 1 encountered severe fire conditions and the instructor did not feel comfortable proceeding to Floor 3 without controlling the fire on Floor 2. He instructed Apprentice Wilson to open the nozzle and put water on the fire. In the process of doing so, she fell and the instructor took over the nozzle. He (the instructor) knocked the fire down to the point where he felt that his crew could advance to Floor 3 (bud did not completely control or extinguish the fire on Floor 2). At this point he returned the nozzle to Wilson. Wilson and Cisneros and the instructor proceeded to Floor 3 while Perez, and Lichtenberg remained in the stairwell pulling hose.

Trapped Above the Fire

After reaching Floor 3, Cisneros (2^nd on the line behind Wilson) advised the instructor that Floor 2 was well involved. He instructed her to go into the stairwell and pull up additional hose. She felt intense heat on her legs and advised the instructor that she needed to get out of the building. The instructor climbed through the egress window (see Figure 2) and assisted Cisneros out the window and onto the second floor roof. At this point, Wilson was maintaining a position at the egress window (located at the top of the stairwell) with the nozzle.

Figure 2. Baltimore Cross Section of Floor 3

Note: Adapted from City of Baltimore. Independent investigation report: The Baltimore city fire department live fire training exercise 145 South Calverton Road February 9, 2007, (Shimmer, 2007, pp. 13 & 21-27)

While Engine 1 was making their way to Floor 3, Engine 2 entered from Side C with a 1-3/4″ (45 mm) hoseline, intending to proceeding to Floor 2 as ordered, but encountered a significant fire on Floor 1 with flames beginning to roll across the ceiling. Engine 2 attacked the fire on Floor 1 (which delayed their advancement to Floor 2).

Perez and Lichtenberg (members of Engine 1’s crew pulling hose in the stairwell) felt a rush of air followed by flames rapidly extending up the stairwell from Floor 2 to Floor 3. They moved to the top of the stairs and observed Wilson trying to climb through the egress window. Wilson warned them to get out of the building. Heeding her warning, they proceeded down the stairway with the hoseline and controlled the fire on Floor 2 sufficiently to permit them to exit the building, meeting the crew of Engine 2 who were making their way to Floor 2.

Wilson advised Wenger (instructor with Engine 1) that she needed to get out. She had dropped the nozzle (still operating) and was trying to climb out the window. Wenger tried unsuccessfully to pull her out the window (note the height of the window sill in Figure 2). Wenger asked Wilson if she could help him get her out the window. She replied that she could not and that she was burning up. Wenger lost his grip on Wilson and she fell back into the building. Regaining his grip he pulled her partially out the window again, noticing that her breathing apparatus facepiece was partially displaced. Wenger called for help (shouting as he had no radio). Three members of Truck 3 who were working on the third floor roof dropped down to the second floor roof to assist, but were unable to pull Wilson from the window.

Emergency Vehicle Driver Hiebler (instructor with Engine 2) heard a commotion on Floor 3. He ordered one of his crew to accompany him to Floor 3 with the hoseline and the others to remain in place on Floor 2. Reaching Floor 3, they observed Wilson at the window and Wenger (instructor from Engine 1) working from the second floor roof trying unsuccessfully to pull her out the window. Concerned about the fire on Floor 3, Hiebler instructed the trainee to extinguish the fire while he assisted in getting Wilson out the window.

Wilson was unconscious, pulseless and apnic when she was removed from Floor 3. Her breathing apparatus and protective clothing was removed and cardio pulmonary resuscitation (CPR) was initiated while she was on the second floor roof. At the Incident Commander’s direction she was moved up to the third floor roof so that she could be brought down an aerial ladder that had been placed to the roof from Side A. Prior to being brought down from the third floor roof, Wilson was packaged on a backboard and placed in a stokes basket. On reaching the ground advanced life support medical care was initiated and Wilson was transported to the local trauma center where she was pronounced dead. Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson died as a result of thermal injuries and asphyxia.

The Aftermath

The initial investigation of this incident was conducted by the Baltimore City Fire Department, Baltimore City Police Department Arson Unit, and United States Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms. Subsequently, Mayor Sheila Dixon commissioned an independent investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Rachael Wilson lead by Deputy Chief Chris Shimer of the Howard County Department of Fire and Rescue Services. This investigation concluded that there were in excess of 50 deviations from accepted practice as defined by National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training Evolutions (2002). In addition, the investigators identified significant issues related to the organizational culture of the Baltimore City Fire Department that resulted in a lack of accountability compliance with accepted safety practices (Shimer, 2007)

The Maryland Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation cited the Baltimore City Fire Department for 33 safety violations and singled out the fire officers who served as Incident Commander and Safety Officer for the haphazard planning and execution of this live fire training exercise (Linskey, 2007a)

The Baltimore City Fire Department fired Training Division Chief Kenneth Hyde who was the Safety Officer and senior fire officer present at the fatal incident. Citing negligence and incompetence in their roles as Incident Commander (Crest) and supervisor of the rapid intervention team (Broyles) during this incident (Linskey, 2007b) Lieutenants Joseph Crest and Barry Broyles were also terminated.

Following votes of no confidence from the Baltimore City Firefighters and Fire Officers unions and continuing criticism, Fire Chief William Goodwin resigned in November 2007, ten months after the death of Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson (Fritze & Reddy, 2007)

Now What?

Rachael Wilson’s death was the result of a complex web of contributing factors. It is easy to say that failure to comply with the provisions of standards and regulations regarding live fire training was the problem. But it is more complex than that.� It is essential that we examine our organizational culture and training practices on an ongoing basis and ask hard questions regarding the safety and effectiveness of what we do.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Demers Associates. (1982, August) Two die in smoke training drill. Fire Service Today, 17-63.

Fritze, J. & Reddy, S. (2007) City’s fire chief resigns. Retrived June 5, 2008 from http://baltimoresun.com/recruit

Linsky, A. (2007c) Baltimore fire department cited in cadet’s death. Retrieved June 4, 2008 from http://baltimoresun.com/recruit

Linsky, A. (2007d) City dismisses two more fire officials. Retrieved June 4, 2008 from http://baltimoresun.com/recruit

National Fire Protection Association. (1986). Standard on live fire training evolutions in structures. Quincy, MA: Author.

National Fire Protection Association. (2002). Standard on live fire training. Quincy, MA: Author.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2002). Death in the line of duty, F2007-09. Retrieved February 19, 2009 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200709.pdf

Shimer, R. (2007) Independent investigation report: Baltimore city fire department live fire training exercise 145 South Calverton Road February 9, 2007. Retrieved February 19, 2009 from http://www.firefighterclosecalls.com/pdf/BaltimoreTrainingLODDFinalReport82307.pdf.

This is the first of a series of posts that will examine the events and circumstances surrounding the death of a Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice in Baltimore Maryland in 2007. Unfortunately many of the factors involved in this incident are not unique, but are common to many live fire training fatalities that have occurred over more than 25 years.

Last Monday marked the second anniversary of the death of Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson. The death of this young mother in Baltimore, Maryland during live fire training on February 9, 2007 raised many questions.

The investigations conducted by the Baltimore City Fire Department, an independent commission appointed by the Mayor of Baltimore (Shimer, 2007), and National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (2008) determined that this training exercise was not conducted in compliance with National Fire Protection Association (NFPA) 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training in Structures (2002). �But does this answer the question of how this happened or why Rachael Wilson died? I contend that lack of compliance with existing standards provides only a partial answer.

Historical Perspective

It is unknown exactly when fire service agencies began the practice of live fire training to develop and maintain skill in interior firefighting operations. However, it is likely that firefighter fatalities have occurred during this type of training activity since its inception

Two Firefighters Die in Fire Training Flashover – On January 26, two firefighters died from burns and smoke inhalation during a search and rescue drill held in a vacant single story building (Demers Associates, 1982, August).

Two Firefighters Die in Fire Training Flashover – On July 30, two firefighters died from burns and smoke inhalation during a search and rescue drill held in a vacant single story building (National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health, 2003)

At first glance, the only difference between these two incidents is the month and day of occurrence. However, a major difference between these two tragic events is that the first occurred in Boulder, Colorado in 1982 while the second occurred 20 years later in Kissimmee, Florida in 2002. Five years later a similar story is repeated with the death of Firefighter Paramedic Apprentice Rachael Wilson.

This comparison provides a dramatic example of the limited impact that existing live fire training policy has had on the safety of individuals participating in this essential training activity. This observation is not to minimize the important guidance provided by NFPA 1403 (2007), but to point to several limitations in the scope of this standard and examining this critical type of training activity simply from a reactive, rules based approach.

A fire in a structure presents complex and dynamic challenges. Firefighters are faced with the need to protect the lives of the building occupants as well as their own while controlling the fire and protecting the uninvolved areas of the structure and its contents. Structure fires develop quickly requiring decision-making and action under extreme time pressure. These conditions require a high level of situational awareness and decision-making skill that is dependent on recognition of complex patterns of information presented by the fire environment (Klein, 1999; Klein, Orasanu, Calderwood, & Zsambok, 1995).

Firefighters learn their craft through a mix of classroom and hands-on training. A majority of skills training is performed out of context (i.e. no smoke or fire) or in a simulated fire environment (i.e. using non-toxic smoke). However, this alone does not prepare firefighters to operate in the heat and smoke encountered in an actual structure fire nor to develop critical decision-making skills. Developing this type of expertise requires live fire training!

Live fire training presents the same types of hazards encountered during emergency response operations. However, as a planned activity, training requires a higher standard of care to ensure the safety of participants. This is consistent with standard risk management practices in firefighting operations outlined by Chief Alan Brunacini (2002).

• We will risk our lives a lot, in a calculated manner to save savable lives.
• We will risk our lives a little, in a calculated manner to save savable property.
• We will not risk our lives at all for lives or property that are already lost.

This perspective on risk management is commonly accepted throughout the fire service in the United States. Live fire training parallels the second element of the risk management profile: We will risk our lives a little in a calculated manner to develop competence in structural firefighting operations.

NFPA 1403

In 1986, the National Fire Protection Association first published NFPA 1403 Standard on Live Fire Training. This important standard has been updated and revised five times since its inception. Often, revisions reflect the conditions and actions surrounding the deaths of firefighters during live fire training since the last revision.

Detailed review of the latest revision of NFPA 1403 (National Fire Protection Association, 2007) shows little substantive change in areas that potentially have the most impact on firefighter safety. The 2007 edition of this standard prohibits location of fires in designated exit paths (a reasonable idea) and increases emphasis on the responsibility of the instructor-in-charge, stating: “It shall be the responsibility of the instructor-in-charge to coordinate overall acquired structure (or training structure) fireground activities to ensure correct levels of safety.” While this too is a reasonable idea, what exactly is the “correct level of safety” and how is the instructor-in-charge to coordinate this effort?

NFPA 1403 (National Fire Protection Association, 2007) places specific emphasis on addressing unsafe acts and conditions directly connected to accidents that have occurred during live fire training (e.g., removal of low density fiberboard, prohibiting the use of flammable liquids except under specific conditions, prohibiting fires in exit paths and use of live victims). However, it does not explicitly address the primary causal factor influencing traumatic fatalities during live fire training. Most firefighters who die from traumatic injuries during live fire training die as a result of human error, often on the part of the individuals charged with ensuring their safety, the instructors. Reducing the risk of error requires both technical proficiency and competence in leadership, communication, and teamwork (i.e., crew resource management).

Learning from the Past

Unfortunately many firefighters and fire officers have not heard of Firefighters Scott Smith and William Duran (Boulder Fire Department), Lieutenant� John Mickel and Firefighter Dallas Begg (Osceola County Fire-Rescue), and Rachael Wilson (Baltimore City Fire Department).

In each of the incidents that resulted in firefighter fatalities during live fire training, those involved did not intend for it to happen. The purpose of live fire training is to develop the knowledge and skills necessary to safely and effectively engage in firefighting operations. Firefighters Scott Smith and William Duran died before the development of national consensus standards on safe practices for live fire training. In other cases the instructors and other participants were unaware of the standard or lacked detailed knowledge of how it should be applied. But in each case where firefighters were caught by rapid fire progress, they did not understand fire behavior and practical fire dynamics.

Subsequent posts will examine the incident in which Rachael Wilson lost her life, the lessons that can be learned from live fire training fatalities, and action steps we can take to reduce the risk to participants while conducting realistic and effective live fire training.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Brunacini, A. (2002). Fire command (2nd ed.). Quincy, MA: National Fire Protection Association.

Demers Associates. (1982, August) Two die in smoke training drill. Fire Service Today, 17-63.

Klein, G. A. (1999). Sources of power. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Klein, G. A., Orasanu, J., Calderwood, R., & Zsambok, C., E. (Eds.). (1995). Decision making in action: Models and methods. Norwood, NJ: Ablex.

National Fire Protection Association. (2002). Standard on live fire training. Quincy, MA: Author.

National Fire Protection Association. (2007). Standard on live fire training. Quincy, MA: Author.

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2003). Death in the line of duty (Report Number F2002-34). Retrieved February 16, 2009, from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/pdfs/face200234.pdf

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. (2008). Death in the line of duty (Report Number F2007-09). Retrieved February 16, 2009, from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200709.pdf

Shimer, R. (2007) Independent investigation report: Baltimore city fire department live fire training exercise 145 South Calverton Road February 9, 2007. Baltimore, MD: City of Baltimore.

Structural firefighting agencies can draw some valuable lessons from the wildland firefighting community. Fire behavior training in many structural agencies often begins and ends in recruit academy. For wildland firefighters, fire behavior training involves an extensive, multi-level curriculum (S-190, S290, S-390, S-490 and so on). The wildland community is also more substantively engaged in analysis of fatalities, accidents, and near miss events with the intention of impacting policy, procedure, and performance. This is not to say that they have a perfect safety record, far from it. However, this ongoing effort to identify and implement best practice based on lessons learned is worthy of emulation.

The US Forest Service Technology & Development Program produced a document titled Investigating Wildland Fire Entrapments which outlines the process that should be used and documentation required for entrapment related incidents. Entrapments are:

A situation where personnel are unexpectedly caught in a fire behavior related, life-threatening position where planned escape routes and safety zones are absent, inadequate, or have been compromised…These situations may or may not result in injury. They include”near misses”�.

The concept of entrapment applies equally in the structural firefighting environment. I read news accounts of extreme fire behavior related events (e.g., flashover, backdraft) from around the United States on a weekly basis. Flashover, backdraft, or other extreme fire behavior often results in a near miss or minor injury and less frequently in serious injury or fatality. Some (actually very few) of these incidents are documented in the National Firefighter Near Miss Program. As discussed in my last post, the near miss program uses self-reported data. This is extremely useful in determining the individual’s perception of the event and what lessons they took away from the experience. However, the individual reporting the event may or may not have the training or education to recognize what actually happened, determine multiple causal factors, and provide a reasonably objective analysis.

Formal Investigation

If a significant injury occurs, some level of investigation is likely to take place (even if it is limited to a cursory examination of circumstances and conditions by the individual’s supervisor). Traumatic fatalities result in more significant and in many cases multiple investigations by the agency involved, law enforcement agencies, Occupational Safety and Health Administration (state or federal), and potentially the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). The purpose of these various investigations is different and not all focus on identifying lessons learned and opportunities for improving organizational performance. However, some reports by the agencies involved, state fire service agencies, and NIOSH take positive steps in this direction. For example:

• Prince William County (Virginia) Department of Fire & Rescue
  Line of Duty Death (LODD) Report for Technician I Kyle Robert Wilson
• Texas State Fire Marshal’s LODD Investigation Program
• New Jersey Division of Fire and Life Safety Firefighter Fatality and Serious Injury Report Series
• NIOSH Fire Fighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program

Limitations

Near miss events and events involving extreme fire behavior resulting in minor injuries or damage to equipment frequently are not or are inadequately investigated to identify causal factors and lessons learned. Investigation of serious injuries and fatalities in many cases do not adequately address fire behavior and interrelated human factors that may be directly or indirectly related to the cause of the incident. This results in lost opportunities for individual and organizational learning.

Two interrelated challenges make investigating extreme fire behavior events or structural fire entrapments difficult. First is the lack of a formal process or framework for this specific type of investigation and second is potential for investigators lack of specific technical expertise in the area of fire behavior.

A Solution

The US Forest Service uses a team approach to investigating entrapment incidents. The team may include (but is not limited to):

• Fire Operations Specialist (Operations Section Chief level)
• Fire Safety Officer
• Fire Behavior Analyst, with experience in the incident fuel type
• Fire Weather Meteorologist
• Fire Equipment Specialists who develop the personal protective equipment (including fire shelters) used on wildland fires
• Technical Photographer
• Fire Information Officer

This team is established and begins the investigation as soon as possible after the occurrence of the event to ensure that critical information and evidence is not lost. The investigative process and documentation focuses on accurately describing what happened, when it happened, causal and contributing factors, and recommendations to reduce the risk of future occurrence.

What might this look like in the structural firefighting environment?

Communicating Lessons Learned

Lessons learned must be integrated into appropriate training curriculum to ensure that the lessons are built into organizational culture.

Some agencies have taken steps in this direction. Following the line-of-duty death of Technician Kyle Wilson, Prince William County Department of Fire & Rescue conducted an in-depth investigation which integrated use of computational fluid dynamics (CFD) modeling to describe likely fire conditions and the influence of wind on fire behavior. Following the conclusion of this investigation, the report and related presentations have been distributed widely.

Investigating Wildland Fire Entrapments identifies timeliness as being essential in dissemination of the lessons learned. This presents a significant challenge when faced with a complex event involving a major injury or fatality. However, it is likely that timeliness in communicating lessons learned can be improved without compromising the thoroughness and quality of the investigation.

My next post will examine the US Forest Service’s less formal Peer Review Process which may be used following near miss events or significant events regardless of outcome (possibly concurrently with a formal investigation). Like the entrapment investigation procedure, there are likely some lessons here for the structural firefighting community!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

In 2007, twenty firefighters in North America lost their lives due to extreme fire behavior while engaged in interior structural firefighting operations. The United States Fire Administration Report 2007 Firefighter Fatalities in the United States and the NFPA Report Firefighter Fatalities in the United States-2007 provide analysis of firefighter fatalities that occurred during this year. Neither report specifically addressed the issue of firefighter fatalities as a result of extreme fire behavior. In fact the NFPA report classified a significant number of these fatalities as being the result of structural collapse (despite the fact that collapse occurred some time after rapid fire development trapped the firefighters involved).

Thus far in 2008, eight more firefighters have died due to extreme fire behavior while working inside burning buildings. This is the tip of the iceberg! Since January 2008, there have been several incidents in which rapid fire progress trapped multiple firefighters. In each of these incidents the firefighters escaped with serious injuries.

• May 25, 2008 – Four firefighters trapped on the second floor by a flashover, Loudon County, Virginia
• October 7, 2008 – Four firefighters trapped on the second floor by a flashover, Sacramento, California

In What’s Changed Over the Last 30 Years, Fahy, LaBlanc, and Molis state that the rate of traumatic fatalities while engaged in offensive firefighting operations inside burning building has been increasing.

In many cases, extreme fire behavior is a causal or contributing factor. It is critical that firefighters understand compartment fire behavior and can apply that knowledge to maintain situational awareness and make effective decisions on the fireground. Fire behavior training for most firefighters and fire officers is limited to a few hours during recruit academy and possibly brief mention during tactical training. This is not adequate!

At the 2008 International Association of Fire Chiefs Conference in Denver, Colorado, Chief Fire Officer Charlie Hendry of Kent Fire Rescue Service and President of the United Kingdom (UK) Chief Fire Officers Association discussed a number of significant incidents that impacted his nation’s fire service. One of these incidents was a backdraft in townhouse apartment in rural Wales that killed Firefighters Kevin Lane and Stephen Griffin. This incident and the subsequent investigation by the British Fire Brigades Union and the Health and Safety Executive identified major training deficiencies, resulting in changes in fire behavior training across the UK. For a brief overview of the incident and discussion of its impact on the UK fire service, see Blaina: A Perpetual Legacy.

Where is the recognition that the American fire service faces the same problem on an even larger scale?

What can we do, individually and collectively to address this issue? I will be writing about this topic for the next couple of weeks. Add a comment to this post with your ideas!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO