Posts Tagged ‘deliberate practice’

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire.

This post uses a short video clip from Providence, RI to provide an opportunity to practice reading the fire.

Taxpayer Fire

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet. Consider the information provided in the short video clip. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five standard questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have? How could you obtain it?
2. What stage(s) of development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel controlled or ventilation controlled)?
4. What conditions would you expect to find inside this building?
5. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes

In addition give some thought to the following four questions focused specifically on this incident:

1. Where do you think the fire is located? Why?
2. Do you observe any changes in conditions? What might these changes indicate?
3. What avenues of fire spread would be of concern? How does this relate to building factors?
4. It appears that horizontal ventilation is being conducted by interior crews on Floor 2, Side A. How is this likely to influence interior conditions and fire behavior?

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

My last post examined National Institute for Standards and Technology (NIST) tests of wind control devices to mitigate hazards presented during wind driven compartment fires (Fire Fighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions). Heat release rate (HRR)� data from Experiment 1 (baseline test with no wind) and Experiment 3 (wind driven) illustrates the dramatic influence of increasing ventilation to a ventilation controlled fire and even more dramatic impact when increased ventilation is coupled with wind (see Figure 1). This post posed several questions related to the HRR data from these experiments.

Figure 1. Heat Release Rates in Experiments 1 (Baseline) and 3 (Wind Driven)

Note: Adapted from Firefighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions.

Questions

Examine the HRR curves in Figure 1 and answer the following questions:

• What effect did deployment of the wind control device have on HRR and why did this change occur so quickly?
• How did HRR change when the wind control device was removed and why was this change different from when the window was vented?
• What factors might influence the extent to which HRR changes when ventilation is increased to a compartment fire in a ventilation controlled burning regime?

Answers: Application of the wind control device rapidly decreased heat release rate from approximately 19 MW to 5 MW. With the window covered, the fire lacked sufficient oxygen to maintain the higher rate of HRR. As oxygen was quickly consumed (and oxygen concentration was decreased) by the large volume of flaming combustion in the compartments, heat release rate was rapidly reduced.

As with the change in HRR when the window was vented, removal of the wind control device resulted in an extremely rapid increase in HRR as additional oxygen was provided to the ventilation controlled fire inside the structure. In this case, the increase was even more significant with the peak HRR reaching approximately 32 MW. Examination of the oxygen concentration curve provides a hint of why this might have been the case (see Figure 2). The oxygen concentration was higher before the window was vented than when the wind control device was removed. The more rapid and greater rise in HRR is likely a result of the extent to which the fire was ventilation controlled and the available concentration of gas phase fuel. After the wind control device was removed, note that the oxygen concentration increased sharply (which relates to the rapid increase in HRR), followed by a rapid decrease as ventilation was inadequate to maintain that rate of combustion.

Figure 2. Oxygen Concentration in the Bedroom

Note: Adapted from Firefighting Tactics Under Wind Driven Conditions.

Practical Application

The results of the NIST research are extremely interesting to students of fire behavior. However, it is essential that we be able to transform this information into knowledge that has practical application. This gives rise to three fundamental questions:

• How do changes in ventilation influence fire behavior? Note that this is always a concern, not just under wind conditions!
• What impact will wind have if the ventilation profile changes?
• What tactical options will be effective in mitigating hazards presented by extreme fire behavior under wind driven conditions?

It is important to consider air track and the flow path from inlet to exhaust opening and the potential consequences of introducing air under pressure without (or with an inadequate) exhaust opening. Both can have severe consequences!

Tactical Problem

One good way to wrestle with the influence of wind on compartment fire behavior is to put it into a realistic context. In the following tactical problem you will be presented with an incident scenario and a series of questions. Apply what you have learned and consider how you would approach this incident.

Resources: You have what you have! Use your normal apparatus assignment and staffing levels when working through this tactical problem.

Weather Information: Conditions are clear with a temperature of 20^o C (68^o F) and a 24 kph (15 mph) wind out of the Northwest.

Dispatch Information: You have been dispatched to a residential fire at 0700 on a Sunday morning. The caller reported seeing smoke from a house at 1237 Lakeview Drive. After companies go enroute, the dispatcher provides an update that she is receiving multiple calls for a fire at this location.

Conditions on Arrival: Approaching the incident location you observe a moderate volume of medium gray smoke from a wood frame, single family dwelling (most structures in this area are of lightweight construction). Smoke is blowing towards the A/D corner of the structure. As illustrated in Figure 3, smoke is visible from the front entry (window and door) of the house and it appears that smoke is showing from Side C as well. On closer examination, you observe that the upper level of the windows on Side A are stained with condensed pyrolysis products, but are intact.

Figure 3. View from Side A

360^o Reconnaissance: Moving down Side B, you observe a substantial body of fire in the center of the house. Smoke is pushing from around several sliding glass doors on Side B (see Figure 4) and flames are visible in the upper layer. The glass in the sliding doors is blackened and cracked, but is still intact. Smoke is also visible from around a large window on Side B Floor 2. Smoke discharge on Side B is swirling and being pushed up over the roof by the wind.

Figure 4. View from the BC Corner

Proceeding around the structure to Sides C and D, you observe a small amount of smoke pushing out from around the windows on Side D.

Questions: The first set of questions deals with size-up and development of an initial plan of action.

• What B-SAHF indicators do you observe in Figures 2 and 3?
• What stage(s) of fire development is (are) likely to exist in the structure?
• What burning regime is the fire in?
• How is the fire likely to develop in the time that it will take to develop and implement your incident action plan?
• Would you have given orders to your crew (or would they have taken pre-planned standard actions) based on your observation of conditions on Side A (Figure 1)? If so what would have been done? Why?
• Would your action plan have changed based on your observations from the B/C corner? What would you do differently? Why?
• What is your action plan at this point? Do you have sufficient resources? What orders would you give the first alarm companies? What actions would you have your crew take? Why?

Your action plan is dependent on size-up and assessment of incident conditions.� Variation in conditions may result in a change in the priority or sequence of tactical action. Would your action plan have been different if the dispatcher had indicated that the caller was trapped in the house? If it would have, what would you have done differently? Why?

Things to Think About

This tactical problem presents a number of challenges. Click on the link to examine the Floor Plan and then consider the following questions:

• What conditions would firefighters have encountered if they made entry through the door on Side A (front door)? Why?
• How would these conditions have changed if glass in one or more of the sliding doors on Side B had failed after firefighters had made entry? Why?
• What conditions would have resulted if the glass in one or more of the sliding doors on Side B had failed and the door on Side A was not open? Why?
• What options for fire attack and tactical ventilation would have been effective in this situation? Would your choice fire attack and tactical ventilation location, sequence, and coordination have varied based on the report of occupants? Why?
• How did your knowledge of the results of the NIST tests on wind driven fires impact your understanding of this incident? How did this understanding influence your tactical decision-making?

It is important to practice strategic and tactical decision-making. However, it is also important to think about how and why we make these decisions. This meta-learning (learning about our learning) has a significant impact on our professional development and ability to learn our craft.

Remember the Past

As discussed in previous posts, it is important to honor the sacrifices of firefighters who have died in the line of duty and not lose lessons learned as time passes. The following narratives were taken from the United States Fire Administration (USFA) reports on Firefighter Line of Duty Deaths (1994 and 2004).

March 29, 1994
Captain John Drennan, 49, Career
Firefighter James Young, 31, Career
Firefighter Christopher Seidenburg, 25, Career
Fire Department of the City of New York, New York

On March 29, three firefighters trapped in the stairwell of a brownstone were burned when they were enveloped in fire while attempting to force their way through a heavy steel door to a second floor apartment. Captain John Drennan, Firefighter James Young, and Firefighter Christopher Seidenburg of the New York City Fire Department were conducting a search when the hot air and toxic gases that collected in the stairwell erupted into flames as other fire crews forced entry into the first floor apartment where the fire had originated. The fire exhibited characteristics of both a backdraft and a flashover. Firefighter Young, in the bottom position on the stairs, was burned and died at the scene. Firefighter Seidenberg and Captain Drennan were rescued by other firefighters. They were transported to a burn unit with third and fourth degree burns over 50 of their bodies. Seidenburg died the next day. Drennan passed away several weeks later. The fire cause was determined to be a plastic bag left by the residents on top of the stove of the floor apartment.

For additional information on this incident see:

Bukowski, R. (1996). Modeling a backdraft: The 62 Watts Street incident. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from http://fire.nist.gov/bfrlpubs/fire96/PDF/f96024.pdf

March 21, 2003 – 0850
Firefighter Oscar “Ozzie” Armstrong, III, Age 25, Career
Cincinnati Fire Department, Ohio

Firefighter Armstrong and the members of his fire company responded to the report of a fire in a two-story residence. The first fire department unit on the scene, a command officer, reported a working fire.

Firefighter Armstrong assisted with the deployment of a 350-foot, 1-3/4-inch handline to the front door of the residence. Once the door was forced open, firefighters advanced to the interior. The handline was dry as firefighters advanced; the hose had become tangled in a bush.

As the line was straightened and water began to flow to the nozzle, a flashover occurred. The firefighters on the handline left the building and were assisted by other firefighters on the front porch of the residence. All firefighters were ordered from the building, air horns were sounded to signal a move from offensive to defensive operations.

Several firefighters saw Firefighter Armstrong trapped in the interior by rapid fire progress. These firefighters advanced handlines to the interior and removed Firefighter Armstrong. A rapid intervention team assisted with the rescue.

Firefighter Armstrong was severely burned. He was transported by fire department ambulance to the hos�pital where he later died.

The origin of the fire was determined to be a pan of oil on the stove.

For additional information on this incident see:

National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). (2005). Death in the line of duty report F2003-12. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/fire/pdfs/face200312.pdf

Laidlaw Investigation Committee. (2004)Line of duty death enhanced report Oscar Armstrong III March 21, 2004. Retrieved March 14, 2009� from http://www.iafflocal48.org/pdfs/enhancedloddfinal.pdf

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Madrzykowski, D. & Kerber, S. (2009). Fire fighting tactics under wind driven conditions. Retrieved (in four parts) February 28, 2009 from http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/Research/Wind_Driven_Report_Part1.pdf; http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/Research/Wind_Driven_Report_Part2.pdf;http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/Research/Wind_Driven_Report_Part3.pdf;http://www.nfpa.org/assets/files//PDF/Research/Wind_Driven_Report_Part4.pdf.

United States Fire Administration (USFA). (1995) Analysis report on firefighter fatalities in the United States in 1994. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/ff_fat94.pdf

United States Fire Administration (USFA). (2005). Frefighter fatalities in the United States in 2004. Retrieved March 14, 2009 from http://www.usfa.dhs.gov/downloads/pdf/publications/fa-299.pdf

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire. While video provides the opportunity to observe fire behavior indicators over time, still photos also an excellent tool for practice your skill in reading the fire.

Smoke Showing Photography

This Reading the Fire exercise is based on a photo taken by Scott LaPrade, a firefighter assigned to Ladder 1 in Leominster, Massachusetts. Scott has been photographing fires around New England for 25 years. His website, Smoke Showing Photography is an excellent resource when looking for fire photos to practice reading the fire.

Apartment Fire

On February 6, 2009, the Leominster Fire Department received a call for smoke in the building at 77 Cedar Street. Ladder 1 was first due and reported smoke showing from a three-story wood frame apartment building originally built in the 1900s.

Initially light smoke was showing from the roof, but then appeared to dissipate. After companies made entry to investigate, the fire progressed rapidly.

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet. Consider the information provided above and examine the following photo. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following six questions:

1. What stage(s) may the fire be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
2. What burning regime is the fire likely to be in (fuel or ventilation controlled)?
3. What conditions would you expect to find inside the doorway in the photo?
4. What hazards does the firefighter in does the firefighter in the photo face while working in the doorway?
5. How could these hazards be mitigated?
6. If the fire is on Floor 1 (it was), what are likely avenues for extension in this type of building construction?

Note the kink in the 1-3/4″ (45 mm) hoseline behind the firefighter. Kinks can dramatically reduce flow rate. Watch your hoseline as well as the B-SAHF indicators!

Visit Scott’s website Smoke Showing Photography for additional photos of this incident and extend your practice in Reading the Fire.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

Deliberate Practice

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire. As you complete this Reading the Fire exercise, think about what you saw and what you did not see. Did you recognize developing conditions, what might you have missed? Watch the video several times. Remember that deliberate practice is focused on continuous improvement and requires repetition of critical skills.

Residential Fire

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and then view the first 25 seconds of the following video of conditions on Side A of a residential fire. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have? How could you obtain it?
2. Where do you think the fire is located?
3. What stage(s) of fire development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)?
4. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel or ventilation controlled)?
5. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes?

FlashoverTV is powered by FireRescue1.com

Back the video up to the beginning and then watch the first 45 seconds of the clip. Consider the following questions:

1. What changes in in fire behavior did you observe?
2. What fire behavior phenomena occured? What changes in conditions were the likely cause?
3. How could the crew on the hoseline have mitigated the hazards presented by this change in fire behavior?

After completing the B-SAHF exercise, view the remainder of the video. Safe and effective fireground operations require that firefighters and officers are proficient at reading the fire and managing the fire environment. Developing proficiency requires ongoing deliberate practice.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

Deliberate Practice

As discussed in my posts on Outstanding Performance and Reading the Fire improving proficiency requires sustained deliberate practice!

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire.

Residential Fire

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and then view the first 45 seconds of the following video of conditions on Side C of a residential fire as the crew of Toronto Pumper 223 makes entry into a window on Floor 2, Side A to check for extension from a fire in the basement. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have> How could you obtain it?
2. What state(s) of fire development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)? Remember that fire in adjacent compartments can be in a different stage of development?
3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel or ventilation controlled)?
4. What conditions would you expect to find on Floor 2? Is the environment tenable for properly protected firefighters?
5. Is it likely that the fire has extended to Floor 2? Why or why not?
6. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net

Back the video up to the beginning and then watch the first three minutes of the clip and consider the following questions:

1. What changes in indicators did you observe prior to the egress of the crew of Pumper 223 from Floor 2?
2. What changes in indicators did you observe following their egress from Floor 2?
3. What might have caused the change in conditions while the crew of Pumper 223 was checking for extension
4. Were there significant indicators of worsening fire behavior visible from the exterior prior to the egress of the members working on Floor 2?
5. What indicators of changing conditions would you have expected on the interior of Floor 2?
6. What tactical options might have reduced the probability of developing untenable conditions on Floor 2?
7. Review your answers on the B-SAHF worksheet. Did any of your answers change based on the additional information provided by the second segment of the video clip? Did you successfully predict the fire behavior that occurred?

After completing the B-SAHF exercise, view the remainder of the video. Placement of the tip of the ladder above the window sill made egress from Floor 2 a bit more difficult. However, Captain Mark Fitzsimmons and Firefighters Geoff Mortimer and Mark Ashcroft from Toronto Pumper 223 escaped without serious harm because they recognized changing conditions and quickly made the decision to exit.

As noted in my earlier post on Flashover & Survival Skills it is essential to train on emergency procedures, but it is even more important to ensure that firefighters and officers are proficient at reading the fire and managing the fire environment to reduce the probability that emergency procedures will be required.

Comments Fixed!

Thanks to Dr. Stefan Svensson for alerting me to a problem with the comments feature of the blog. The problem has been fixed and you can now provide feedback on the posts in the CFBT Blog. Please feel free to do so!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

LODD in 2008

In 2008, six firefighters in the United States lost their lives in extreme fire behavior events occurring while they were engaged in interior firefighting operations. In 2008 there was only one multiple fatality line of duty death as the result of extreme fire behavior. Of this six, three were career, two were volunteers, and one was paid on call. They ranged in age from 19 to 54 years of age with an average age of 34.8 years. However, this does not give us the real picture, it is important to look at each of these events.

Firefighter Rick Morris (54, Career), Sedalia, Missouri: Firefighter Morris died April 8, 2008, nine days after being burned in a flashover that occurred while attempting to locate the fire in a small single family dwelling He was survived by his wife and four children.

Firefighter Bret Lovrien (35, Career), Los Angeles, California: Firefighter Lovrien died and Engineer Anthony Guzman was seriously injured March 26, 2008 from traumatic injuries occurring as the result of a smoke explosion while forcing entry into a commercial building to investigate smoke from a fire in a utility vault. Firefighter Lovrien was survived by his brother, parents, stepmother, and grandfather.

Firefighter Justin Monroe (19, Paid On-Call) and Firefighter Victor Isler (40, Career), Salisbury, North Carolina: Firefighters Monroe and Isler died March 7, 2008 of thermal insult and carbon monoxide exposure following rapid fire progress (likely flashover) in a commercial fire. Three other firefighters also suffered burns in this incident. Firefighter Monroe was survived by his parents and brother. Firefighter Isler was survived by his wife and two children.

Lieutenant Nicholas Picozzi (35, Volunteer), Linwood, Pennsylvania: Lieutenant Picozzi died March 5, 2008 as a result of injuries received due to rapid fire progress (likely flashover) while searching for the seat of the fire in the basement of a small single-family dwelling. Assistant Chief Kenny Dawson Jr., Assistant Chief Chris Durbano, and Firefighter Tom Morgan Jr. were injured while attempting to rescue Lieutenant Picozzi. Lieutenant Picozzi was survived by his wife and two children.

Firefighter Brad Holmes (21, Volunteer) , Grove City, Pennsylvania: Firefighter Holmes died three days after he and and Lieutenant Scott King were burned as the result of flashover while conducting primary search on the second floor of a small two-family home on February 29, 2008. Firefighter Holmes is survived by his parents and brother.

Two of these incidents have been documented by an investigative report. NIOSH Report F2008-06 examines the incident in which Firefighter Brad Holmes died. The Post Incident Report on the Salisbury Millwork Fire by the Salisbury Fire Department examines the circumstances surrounding the deaths of Firefighters Justin Monroe and Victor Isler (NIOSH Report F2008-07 is pending). NIOSH is also investigating the deaths of Lieutenant Nick Pilozzi (NOSH F2008-08) and Firefighter Brett Lovrien (NIOSH F2008-11). The status of these reports is listed on the NIOSH Firefighter Fatality Investigation and Prevention Program Pending Investigations page.

Similarities and Differences

Three of these fatalities occurred in small residential structures. Of these, one occurred on the second floor, one on the first floor, and the other in the basement. Two of these fatalities occurred in an exposure, not initially involved in the fire. Three of these fatalities occurred in commercial occupancies. Two of the fatalities occurred at a major, greater alarm fire. In one of these incidents, firefighters were searching for a trapped occupant, in all other cases; the firefighters were searching for the fire.

It is critical to remember that extreme fire behavior can occur in any type of structure. In some cases, severe fire conditions are evident on arrival, but in others, there is little evidence of a significant fire. The sense of urgency resulting from persons reported, or a rapidly developing fire can result in tunnel vision and reduce focus on key fire behavior indicators (B-SAHF). It is essential to ensure that members have adequate training so that reading the fire is both second nature and a conscious part of their size-up and dynamic risk assessment process.

Are We Making Progress?

This number is considerably lower than the 18 firefighters who died in 2007 where extreme fire behavior was a causal or contributing factor (four events accounted for 15 of the 18 fatalities). Does this reduction indicate that we are doing a better job of recognizing potential for extreme fire behavior and are controlling the fire environment more effectively to reduce risk during offensive operations? Examining not only line of duty deaths, but department incident reports, data submitted to the National Firefighter Near Miss Program and news reports of fire incidents involving extreme fire behavior I have the feeling that this reduction is not completely due to improved safety and operational performance.
There have been a number of incidents over the last year that point to the need for continued efforts in the improvement of fire behavior training. Incidents in Loudoun County, Virginia (see Loudon County Virginia Flashover, Loudoun County Flashover: What Happened, Loudoun County Flashover: Escape from Floor 2, and Flashover & Survival Skills Training); Sacramento, California and Edmonton, Alberta resulted in multiple firefighters being trapped by rapid fire progress while working above the fire. In these incidents, a slight variation in circumstances or any delay in the action of those involved might have resulted in multiple line of duty deaths.

These three incidents do not necessarily make a trend, but examining near miss, injury, and line of duty death data points to lack of or loss of situational awareness as a factor in this type of incident. Situational awareness is inclusive of the ability to recognize key fire behavior indicators, prediction of likely fire development, and recognizing the impact (or lack of impact) of tactical operations on fire progression.

The Way Forward

In an earlier post, Outstanding Performance I discussed the importance of deliberate practice in developing expertise. Numerous studies have identified that world class performance requires 10,000 hours of intensive and deliberate practice. While engaging in deliberate practice several hours a day, every day for ten years might seem a bit excessive to the average firefighter, performance is strongly correlated with an individual’s level of deliberate practice. Hard work pays off!

Regardless of your level of knowledge and skill, I challenge you to increase your efforts to engage in deliberate practice. As a student of your craft it is critical to deepen your knowledge of fire behavior, examine incidents you respond to with a critical eye, and use case studies to gain insight into fire behavior, building construction, and the effect of tactical operations. Engage in safe and effective live fire training to provide an opportunity to apply your knowledge and skill in a realistic context.

CFBT-US is using the following logo to identify training materials and activities that promote deliberate practice.

Resolutions

Many people make New Year’s Resolutions to lose weight and exercise more. Given the firefighter fatality statistics related to heart disease and stress, these are important goals. I share these goals with many of you. However, I have a few other professional resolutions for 2009 (and beyond):

• Continue to be a student of my craft as a fire officer and educator, finding the time to engage in an increased level of deliberate practice.
• Continue working to reducing firefighter injuries and deaths due to extreme fire behavior by increasing firefighter’s knowledge of practical fire dynamics.
• Work to improve the quality of NIOSH Firefighter Death in the Line of Duty Reports by continuing to be a critical friend of the program.
• Work to improve the quality and focus of fire service training curriculum and training materials in the area of fire behavior.
• Work to ensure that professional qualifications and other consensus standards adequately identify the requisite fire behavior knowledge and skills for safe and effective operation on the fireground.
• Work to ensure that live fire training instructors have the knowledge and skills necessary to conduct safe and effective training.

I encourage you to join me in this effort. These improvements will not happen overnight, but we can accomplish a great deal if we persist and work together. It is easy to complain and find fault. It is much more difficult to step up and do the right thing to make things better, but that is what is needed.

Thanks for reading the CFBT Blog and best wishes for a safe and happy 2009.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFIreE, CFO

Deliberate Practice

As discussed in my posts on Outstanding Performance and Reading the Fire improving proficiency requires sustained deliberate practice!

Application of the B-SAHF (Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, & Flame) organizing scheme for critical fire behavior indicators to photographs or video of structure fires provides an excellent opportunity to develop your knowledge of fire behavior and skill in reading the fire.

Commercial Fire

Download and print the B-SAHF Worksheet and then view the first 8 seconds of the following video of conditions on Side C of a commercial fire. First, describe what you observe in terms of the Building, Smoke, Air Track, Heat, and Flame Indicators. Second, answer the following five questions:

1. What additional information would you like to have?
   How could you obtain it?
2. What state(s) of fire development is the fire likely to be in (incipient, growth, fully developed, or decay)? Remember that fire in adjacent compartments can be in a different stage of development?
3. What burning regime is the fire in (fuel or ventilation controlled)?
4. What conditions would you expect to find inside this building? Is this likely to be a survivable environment for unprotected occupants? For firefighters?
5. How would you expect the fire to develop over the next two to three minutes?

Find more videos like this on firevideo.net
Back the video up to the beginning, watch the first 15 seconds, and review your answers on the B-SAHF worksheet. Did any of your answers change based on the additional information provided by the view of Side A?
After completing the B-SAHF exercise, view the remainder of the video. Did you successfully predict the fire behavior that occurred? This video provides excellent examples of smoke and air track indicators. However, sometimes the indicators of potential for extreme fire behavior might not be so obvious. Under these circumstances, you will need a higher level of skill to anticipate fire development.

Make it a Habit!

As Geoff Colvin emphasizes in Tallent is Overrated the quantity and quality of deliberate practice is the major determinant in expertise at all levels from novice to expert. Developing skill in reading the fire requires practice. Additional B-SAHF exercises will be posted on a regular basis at cfbt-us.com. Also check the CFBT-US Resources page for additional information on Reading the Fire!

Consider making B-SAHF exercises a regular part of your training schedule. During a recent Compartment Fire Behavior Training (CFBT) Instructor course conducted at Tualatin Valley Fire & Rescue we used B-SAHF drills each morning to help the participants develop skill in reading the fire. However, these drills are equally appropriate for recruit firefighters. Understanding fire behavior and the ability to read the fire and anticipate changes in fire development are critical for everyone working on the fireground!

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

Exptertise

Knowledge and skill are critical to safe and effective performance during emergency operations and firefighters and officers who perform well on the fireground are respected by their peers. What does it take to develop a high level of expertise?

Believing that they are masters of their craft, some firefighters resist engaging in practice of basic skills such as door entry, nozzle technique, and hose handling (even when their demonstrated skill is far from proficiency). Others engage in this type of practice enthusiastically, serving as their own critic and identifying potential areas of improvement.

In the fire service, years of service is often perceived as a measure of experience. But is this really true? In The Making of an Expert, Ericsson, Prietula, and Cokely (2007) observe that “living in a cave does not make you a geologist. Not all practice makes perfect”�. Developing proficiency requires deliberate practice that focuses not on specific areas in need of improvement or development of new knowledge and skill.

Is Going to Fires Enough?

Can a firefighter or fire officer develop the knowledge and skills necessary for a high level of performance on the fireground predominantly from going to fires? Actual performance is important, but it is not sufficient.

Ericsson, Prietula, and Cokely (2007) use learning to play golf as an example of the need for deliberate practice. In the early stages of learning the game, players often begin by learning individual skills and then playing on the course. This generally leads to rapid development of a fundamental level of skill. However, additional time on the course will not necessarily lead to improved performance. Why?

You don’t improve because when you are playing a game, you get only a single chance to make a shot from any given location. You don’t get to figure out how you can correct mistakes. If you were allowed to take five to ten shots from the exact same location on the course, you would bet more feedback on your technique and start to adjust your playing style to improve your control.

Firefighting is similar, probationary firefighters spend considerable time practicing individual skills and learning to integrate them into the team context of company operations. However, after they leave the academy, how much time is spent in deliberate practice? Working on the fireground, you don’t get the opportunity for repetitive practice, and seldom have the opportunity to think about how to improve the effectiveness or efficiency of your work until after the fact. This often becomes even more difficult when individuals advance to the officer’s role.

Deliberate Practice

In his recent book Talent is Overrated: What Really Separates World-Class Performers from Everybody Else, Geoff Colvin (2008) explores the mystery of where great performance really comes from. This text provides a straightforward examination of current research on expertise the application of deliberate practice and examines how these concepts can be applied in a variety of contexts.

Colvin (2008) identifies that deliberate practice may involve activities specifically focused on performance improvement and practice that is integrated with actual work performance. He describes direct practice using three types of activity as models, music, chess, and sports.

• In the music model, you practice application of the skill and receive immediate feedback from a teacher or by reviewing a recording (audio or video) of your performance.
• The chess model involves examination of prior performance by others (i.e., studying the games of chess grand masters). In other domains such as business and the law, this model involves the use of case studies.
• Effective performance may include both physical and mental elements. The sports model involves conditioning. This is readily applicable to physical skills, but applies to cognitive demands as well. Conditioning in this case may involve developing a deeper level of knowledge or use of simulations to practice decision skills.

When applying the concept of deliberate practice to work activities it is important to identify your goals, what aspect of performance are you trying to improve. During work activity, pay attention to your performance. After the work feedback is critical. This may involve self-reflection, feedback from others, or preferably a combination of both.

Each of these approaches has direct applicability to the fire service. However, it is necessary to approach deliberate practice in an intentional manner by identifying areas of performance that can be improved and developing a plan that includes direct practice and integrates practice and work activity.

Coaching

We can’t necessarily improve our performance without help. Even highly accomplished performers have teachers, coaches, or mentors to help design practice programs, provide feedback on performance and help maintain the motivation and commitment necessary to continued improvement.

Teachers, coaches, and mentors are important to both individual and organizational performance. It is important to identify who will serve in this role as individual needs change and evolve as performance improves. What role do you serve; learner, coach, or (hopefully) both?

Time & Commitment

Developing expertise takes time and effort. World class performers in most any discipline generally need a minimum of 10,000 hours of intense training and practice before reaching that level. There are no shortcuts! It is difficult to develop and maintain the motivation and commitment to sustain this level of effort.

It is easy to look at our current performance level and think that we do quite well and take pride in our accomplishments. However, is this the best we can do? I would contend that good enough isn’t (good enough).

The greater the time invested in deliberate practice, the greater the improvement in performance. Be a student of your craft, seek out feedback, and work diligently to improve your performance.

Ed Hartin, MS, EFO, MIFireE, CFO

References

Ericsson, A., Prietula, M., & Cokely, E. (2007, July-August). Harvard Business Review,, 85(7/8).

Colvin, G. (2008). Talent is overrated: What really separates world-class performers from everybody else. New York: Penguin Group.